Result of U.P. Higher Judicial Service (Main Written) Examination, 2014 Direct Recruitment to U.P. Higher Judicial Service held on 14th, 15th and 16th November, 2014 has been declared. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur notified Advertisement for recruitment additional district judges through M.P. Higher Judicial Service (Entry Level) Direct Recruitment for BAR, Exam 2015 Haryana Judicial Services Examination 2014-Pre is conducted on 10th of Jan 2015. The result is awaited. THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI will hold examination for direct recruitment against 14 vacancies to Delhi Higher Judicial Service on Sunday, the 06th April,2014-Last Date 06.02.2014 13/11/2013: While renewing the term of the appointment of the existing incumbents the State Government is required to consider their past performance and conduct in the light of the recommendations made by the District Judges and the District Magistrates. Therefore, the High Court could not have issued a Mandamus for renewal of the term of respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and other similarly situated persons and thereby frustrated the provisions of LR Manual and Section 24 Cr.P.C .- SUPREME COURT.
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CJI. K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. D.K. JAIN, J. P. SATHASIVAM, J. J.M. PANCHAL.
 
Judgement Dated:2/17/2010 12:00:00 AM
Civil Appeal - 6249-6250 of 2001
Constitution of India -226 , 32.
 
State of West Bengal & others Vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal & others.
 
Head Note: Whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of Investigation established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 , to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government ? -Yes. : Constitution Bench Supreme Court.
 
Judgement:
                   J U D G M E N T---- D.K. JAIN, J.: 1.The issue which has been referred for the opinion of the Constitution Bench is whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short the CBI), established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short the Special Police Act), to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government. 2.For the determination of the afore-stated important legal issue, it is unnecessary to dilate on the facts obtaining in individual cases in this bunch of civil appeals/special leave petitions/writ petitions and a brief reference to the facts in Civil Appeal Nos.6249- 6250 of 2001, noticed in the referral order dated 8th November, 2006, would suffice. These are: One Abdul Rahaman Mondal (hereinafter referred to as, the complainant) along with a large number of workers of a political party had been staying in several camps of that party at Garbeta, District Midnapore, in the State of West Bengal. On 4th January, 2001, the complainant and few others decided to return to their homes from one such camp. When they reached the complainants house, some miscreants, numbering 50-60, attacked them with firearms and other explosives, which resulted in a number of casualties. The complainant managed to escape from the place of occurrence, hid himself and witnessed the carnage. He lodged a written complaint with the Garbeta Police Station on 4th January, 2001 itself but the First Information Report (the FIR for short) for offences under Sections 148/149/448/436/364/302/201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the IPC) read with Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 9 (B) of the Explosives Act, 1884 was registered only on 5th January, 2001. On 8th January, 2001, Director General of Police, West Bengal directed the C.I.D. to take over the investigations in the case. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was filed in the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta by the Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal, in public interest, inter alia, alleging that although in the said incident 11 persons had died on 4th January, 2001 and more than three months had elapsed since the incident had taken place yet except two persons, no other person named in the FIR, had been arrested; no serious attempt had been made to get the victims identified and so far the police had not been able to come to a definite conclusion whether missing persons were dead or alive. It was alleged that since the police administration in the State was under the influence of the ruling party which was trying to hide the incident to save its image, the investigations in the incident may be handed over to the CBI, an independent agency. 3.Upon consideration of the affidavit filed in opposition by the State Government, the High Court felt that in the background of the case it had strong reservations about the impartiality and fairness in the investigation by the State police because of the political fallout, therefore, no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the investigation by the State Investigating Agency. Moreover, even if the investigation was conducted fairly and truthfully by the State police, it would still be viewed with suspicion because of the allegation that all the assailants were members of the ruling party. Having regard to all these circumstances, the High Court deemed it appropriate to hand over the investigation into the said incident to the CBI. 4.Aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, the State of West Bengal filed a petition for special leave to appeal before this Court. On 3rd September, 2001 leave was granted. When the matter came up for hearing before a two-Judge Bench on 8th November, 2006, taking note of the contentions urged by learned counsel for the parties and the orders passed by this Court in The Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shri Gurudasmal & Ors.1 and Kazi Lhendup Dorji Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors.2, the Bench was of the opinion that the question of law involved in the appeals was of great public importance and was coming before the courts frequently and, therefore, it was necessary that the issue be settled by a larger Bench. Accordingly, the Bench directed that the papers of the case be placed before the Honble Chief Justice of India for passing appropriate orders for placing the matter before a larger Bench. When the matter came up before a three-Judge Bench, 1 1970 (1) SCC 633 2 1994 Supp (2) SCC 116 headed by the Honble Chief Justice of India, on 29th August, 2008, this batch of cases was directed to be listed before a Constitution Bench. This is how these matters have been placed before us. The Rival Contentions: 5.Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State of West Bengal, referring to Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India; Entry 2 of List II of the said Schedule as also Sections 5 and 6 of the Special Police Act strenuously argued that from the said Constitutional and Statutory provisions it is evident that there is a complete restriction on Parliaments legislative power in enacting any law permitting the police of one State to investigate an offence committed in another State, without the consent of that State. It was urged that the Special Police Act enacted in exercise of the powers conferred under the Government of India Act, 1935, Entry 39 of List I (Federal Legislative List) of the Seventh Schedule, the field now occupied by Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, replicates the prohibition of police of one State investigating an offence in another State without the consent of that State. It was submitted that Entry 2 of List II which confers exclusive jurisdiction on the State Legislature in regard to the police, the exclusive jurisdiction of a State Legislature cannot be encroached upon without the consent of the concerned State being obtained. 6.Learned senior counsel submitted that the separation of powers between the three organs of the State, i.e. the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary would require each one of these organs to confine itself within the field entrusted to it by the Constitution and not to act in contravention or contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. 7.Thus, the thrust of argument of the learned counsel was that both, the federal structure as well as the principles of separation of powers, being a part of the basic structure of the Constitution, it is neither permissible for the Central Government to encroach upon the legislative powers of a State in respect of the matters specified in List II of the Seventh Schedule nor can the superior courts of the land adjure such a jurisdiction which is otherwise prohibited under the Constitution. It was urged that if the Parliament were to pass a law which authorises the police of one State to investigate in another State without the consent of that State, such a law would be pro tanto invalid and, therefore, the rule of law would require the courts, which are subservient to the Constitution, to ensure that the federal structure embodied in the Constitution as a basic principle, is not disturbed by permitting/directing the police force of a State to investigate an offence committed in another State without the consent of that State. 8.Relying heavily on the observations of the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India & Anr.3 to the effect that Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved directly, learned counsel contended that when even Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be used by this Court to act contrary to the express provisions of law, the High Court cannot issue any direction ignoring the Statutory and Constitutional provisions. Learned counsel went to the extent of arguing that even when the State police is not in a position to conduct an impartial investigation because of extraneous influences, the Court still cannot exercise executive power of directing the police force of another State to carry out investigations without the consent of that State. In such a situation, the matter is best left to the wisdom of the Parliament to enact an appropriate legislation to take care of the situation. According to the learned counsel, till that 3 (1998) 4 SCC 409 is done, even such an extreme situation would not justify the Court upsetting the federal or quasi-federal system created by the Constitution. 9.As regards the exercise of jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, learned counsel submitted that apart from the fact that there is a significant difference between the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution and the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution because of territorial limitations under Article 226 (1) of the Constitution, a High Court is disentitled from issuing any direction to the authorities situated outside the territories over which it has jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel Clause (2) of Article 226 would have no application in a case, such as the present one, since the cause of action was complete at the time of filing the writ petition and the power under Clause (2) can be exercised only where there is a nexus between the cause of action which arises wholly or partly within the State and the authority which is situated outside the State. It was asserted that the CBI being a rank outsider, unconnected to the incident, which took place within the State of West Bengal, the investigation of which was being conducted by the jurisdictional local police in West Bengal, had no authority to take up the case for investigation. 10.Shri Goolam E. Vahanvati, learned Solicitor General of India, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, submitted that the entire approach of the State being based on an assumption that the alleged restriction on Parliaments legislative power under Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and restriction on the power of the Central Government under Section 6 of the Special Police Act to issue a notification binds the constitutional courts i.e. the Supreme Court and the High Courts is fallacious, inasmuch as the restrictions on the Central Government and Parliament cannot be inferentially extended to be restrictions on the Constitutional Courts in exercise of their powers under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution as it is the obligation of the Superior Courts to protect the citizens and enforce their fundamental rights. Learned counsel vehemently argued that the stand of the appellants that the exercise of power by the Supreme Court or the High Courts to refer investigation to CBI directly without prior approval of the concerned State Government would violate the federal structure of the Constitution is again misconceived as it overlooks the basic fact that in a federal structure it is the duty of the courts to uphold the Constitutional values and to enforce the Constitutional limitations as an ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. In support of the proposition, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.4, S.R. Bommai & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.5 and Kuldip Nayar & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.6. 11.Relying on the recent decision by a Bench of nine Judges of this Court in I.R. Coelho (D) By LRs. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu7, learned counsel submitted that the judicial review being itself the basic feature of the Constitution, no restriction can be placed even by inference and by principle of legislative competence on the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Courts with regard to the enforcement of fundamental rights and protection of the citizens of India. Learned counsel asserted that in exercise of powers either under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the courts are merely discharging their duty of judicial review and are neither usurping any jurisdiction, nor overriding the doctrine of separation of powers. In support of the proposition that the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 32 as also on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution is an important and integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution, learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Special 4 (1977) 3 SCC 592 5 (1994) 3 SCC 1 6 (2006) 7 SCC 1 7 (2007) 2 SCC 1 Reference No.1 of 19648, Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.9, Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 10, Nilabati Behera Vs. State of Orissa & Ors.11 and L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.12. Relying on the decision of this Court in Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided Family Vs. Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur & Anr.13, learned counsel emphasised that the powers of the High Court under Article 226 are also wide and plenary in nature similar to that of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. The Questions for Consideration: 12.It is manifest that in essence the objection of the appellant to the CBIs role in police investigation in a State without its consent, proceeds on the doctrine of distribution of legislative powers as between the Union and the State Legislatures particularly with reference to the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and the distribution of powers between the said three organs of the State. 13.In order to appreciate the controversy, a brief reference to some of the provisions in the Constitution 8 [1965] 1 S.C.R. 413 9 (1980) 3 SCC 625 10 (1981) 1 SCC 568 11 (1993) 2 SCC 746 12 (1997) 3 SCC 261 13 [1965] 3 S.C.R. 536 would be necessary. The Constitution of India is divided into several parts, each part dealing in detail with different aspects of the social, economic, political and administrative set up. For the present case, we are mainly concerned with Part III of the Constitution, which enumerates the fundamental rights guaranteed by the State primarily to citizens and in some cases to every resident of India and Part XI thereof, which pertains to the relations between the Union and the States. 14.Bearing in mind the basis on which the correctness of the impugned direction is being questioned by the State of West Bengal, we shall first notice the scope and purport of Part XI of the Constitution. According to Article 1 of the Constitution, India is a `Union of States, which means a Federation of States. Every federal system requires division of powers between the Union and State Governments, which in our Constitution is effected by Part XI thereof. While Articles 245 to 255 deal with distribution of legislative powers, the distribution of administrative powers is dealt with in Articles 256 to 261. Under the Constitution, there is a three-fold distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States, made by the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. While Article 245 confers the legislative powers upon the Union and the States, Article 246 provides for distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the States. Article 246, relevant for our purpose, reads as follows: 246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the Legislatures of States -- (1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Union List). (2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the Concurrent List). (3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the `State List). (4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. 15.The Article deals with the distribution of legislative powers between the Union and the State Legislatures. List I or the `Union List enumerates the subjects over which the Union shall have exclusive powers of legislation in respect of 99 items or subjects, which include Defence etc.; List II or the `State List comprises of subjects, which include Public Order, Police etc., over which the State Legislature shall have exclusive power of legislation and List III gives concurrent powers to the Union and the State Legislatures to legislate in respect of items mentioned therein. The Article postulates that Parliament shall have exclusive power to legislate with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (2) and (3). The non obstante clause in Article 246(1) contemplates the predominance or supremacy of the Union Legislature. This power is not encumbered by anything contained in clause (2) and (3) for these clauses themselves are expressly limited and made subject to the non obstante clause in Article 246(1). The State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule and it also has the power to make laws with respect to any matters enumerated in List III (Concurrent List). The exclusive power of the State Legislature to legislate with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II has to be exercised subject to clause (1) i.e. the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate with respect to matters enumerated in List I. As a consequence, if there is a conflict between an Entry in List I and an Entry in List II, which is not capable of reconciliation, the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter enumerated in List II must supersede pro tanto the exercise of power of the State Legislature. Both Parliament and the State Legislature have concurrent powers of legislation with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III. The words notwithstanding anything contained in clauses (2) and (3) in Article 246 (1) and the words subject to clauses (1) and (2) in Article 246 (3) lay down the principle of federal supremacy viz. that in case of inevitable conflict between Union and State powers, the Union power as enumerated in List I shall prevail over the State power as enumerated in Lists II and III and in case of an overlapping between Lists II and III, the latter shall prevail. Though, undoubtedly, the Constitution exhibits supremacy of Parliament over State Legislatures, yet the principle of federal supremacy laid down in Article 246 of the Constitution cannot be resorted to unless there is an irreconcilable direct conflict between the entries in the Union and the State Lists. Thus, there is no quarrel with the broad proposition that under the Constitution there is a clear demarcation of legislative powers between the Union and the States and they have to confine themselves within the field entrusted to them. It may also be borne in mind that the function of the Lists is not to confer powers; they merely demarcate the Legislative field. But the issue we are called upon to determine is that when the scheme of Constitution prohibits encroachment by the Union upon a matter which exclusively falls within the domain of the State Legislature, like public order, police etc., can the third organ of the State viz. the Judiciary, direct the CBI, an agency established by the Union to do something in respect of a State subject, without the consent of the concerned State Government? 16.In order to adjudicate upon the issue at hand, it would be necessary to refer to some other relevant Constitutional and Statutory provisions as well. 17.As noted earlier, the Special Police Act was enacted by the Governor General in Council in exercise of the powers conferred by the Government of India Act, 1935 (Entry 39 of List I, Seventh Schedule). The said Entry reads as under:- Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any part of British India to any area in another Governors Province or Chief Commissioners Province, but not so as to enable the police of one part to exercise powers and jurisdiction elsewhere without the consent of the Government of the Province or the Chief Commissioner as the case may be; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any unit to railway areas outside that unit. It is manifest that the Special Police Act was passed in terms of the said Entry imposing prohibition on the Federal Legislature to enact any law permitting the police of one State from investigating an offence committed in another State, without the consent of the State. The said Entry was replaced by Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The said entry reads thus: Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any State to any area outside that State, but not so as to enable the police of one State to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area outside that State without the consent of the Govt. of the State in which such area is situated; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to any State to railway areas outside that State. Entry 2 of List II of the Constitution of India, which corresponds to Entry 2 List II of the Government of India Act, conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the States in matter relating to police reads as under: Entry 2 List II: Police (including railway and village police) subject to the provisions of entry 2A of List I. Entry 2A of List I: Development of any armed force of the Union or any other force subject to the control of the Union or any contingent or unit thereof in any State in aid of the civil power; powers, jurisdiction, privileges and liabilities of the members of such forces while on such deployment. 18.From a bare reading of the afore-noted Constitutional provisions, it is manifest that by virtue of these entries, the legislative power of the Union to provide for the regular police force of one State to exercise power and jurisdiction in any area outside the State can only be exercised with the consent of the Government of that particular State in which such area is situated, except the police force belonging to any State to exercise power and jurisdiction to railway areas outside that State. 19.As the preamble of the Special Police Act states, it was enacted with a view to constitute a special force in Delhi for the investigation of certain offences in the Union Territories and to make provisions for the superintendence and administration of the said force and for the extension to other areas of the powers and jurisdiction of the members of the said force in regard to the investigation of the said offences. Sub-section (1) of Section 1 specifies the title of the Special Police Act and sub-section (2) speaks that the Special Police Act extends to the whole of India. Section 2 contains 3 sub-sections. Sub-section (1) empowers the Central Government to constitute a special police force to be called the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the investigation of offences notified under Section 3 in any Union Territory; sub-section (2) confers upon the members of the said police establishment in relation to the investigation of such offences and arrest of persons concerned in such offences, all the powers, duties, privileges and liabilities which police officers of that Union Territory have in connection with the investigation of offences committed therein and sub-section (3) provides that any member of the said police establishment of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector be deemed to be an officer in charge of a police station. Under Section 3 of the Special Police Act, the Central Government is required to specify and notify the offences or classes of offences which are to be investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment, constituted under the Special Police Act, named the CBI. Section 4 deals with the administrative control of the establishment and according to sub-section (2), the superintendence of the Establishment vests in the Central Government and the administration of the said establishment vests in an officer appointed in this behalf by the Central Government. Explaining the meaning of the word Superintendence in Section 4(1) and the scope of the authority of the Central Government in this context, in Vineet Narain & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. 14, a Bench of three Judges of this Court said: 40....The word superintendence in Section 4(1) cannot be construed in a wider sense to permit supervision of the actual investigation of an offence by the CBI contrary to the manner provided by the statutory provisions. The broad proposition urged on behalf of the Union of India that it can issue any directive to the CBI to curtail or inhibit its jurisdiction to investigate an offence specified in the notification issued under Section 3 by a directive under Section 4(1) of the Act cannot be accepted. The jurisdiction of the CBI to investigate an offence is to be determined with reference to the notification issued under 14 (1998) 1 SCC 226 Section 3 and not by any separate order not having that character. 20.Section 5 of the Special Police Act empowers the Central Government to extend the powers and jurisdiction of the Special Police Establishment to any area, in a State, not being a Union Territory for the investigation of any offences or classes of offences specified in a notification under Section 3 and on such extension of jurisdiction, a member of the Establishment shall discharge the functions of a police officer in that area and shall, while so discharging such functions, be deemed to be a member of the police force of that area and be vested with the powers, functions and privileges and be subject to the liabilities of a police officer belonging to that police force. 21.Section 6, the pivotal provision, reads as follows:- 6. Consent of State Government to exercise of powers and jurisdiction. - Nothing contained in Section 5 shall be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area in a State, not being a Union Territory or railway area, without the consent of the Government of that State. 22.Thus, although Section 5(1) empowers the Central Government to extend the powers and jurisdiction of members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to any area in a State, but Section 6 imposes a restriction on the power of the Central Government to extend the jurisdiction of the said Establishment only with the consent of the State Government concerned. 23.Having noticed the scope and amplitude of Sections 5 and 6 of the Special Police Act, the question for consideration is whether the restriction imposed on the powers of the Central Government would apply mutatis mutandis to the Constitutional Courts as well. As stated above, the main thrust of the argument of Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel, is that the course adopted by the High Court in directing the CBI to undertake investigation in the State of West Bengal without the consent of the State is incompatible with the federal structure as also the doctrine of separation of powers between the three organs of the State, embodied in the Constitution even when the High Court, on the material before it, was convinced that the State Police was dragging its feet in so far as investigation into the 4th January, 2001 carnage was concerned. 24.In so far as the first limb of the argument is concerned, it needs little emphasis that, except in the circumstances indicated above, in a federal structure, the Union is not permitted to encroach upon the legislative powers of a State in respect of the matters specified in List II of the Seventh Schedule. However, the second limb of the argument of the learned counsel in regard to the applicability of the doctrine of separation of powers to the issue at hand, in our view, is clearly untenable. Apart from the fact that the question of Centre - State relationship is not an issue in the present case, a Constitutional Court being itself the custodian of the federal structure, the invocation of the federal structure doctrine is also misplaced. 25.In a democratic country governed by a written Constitution, it is the Constitution which is supreme and sovereign. As observed in Raja Ram Pal Vs. Honble Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors.15, the Constitution is the suprema lex in this country. All organs of the State, including this Court and the High Courts, derive their authority, jurisdiction and powers from the Constitution and owe allegiance to it. Highlighting the fundamental features of a federal Constitution, in Special Reference No.1 (supra), the Constitution Bench (7-Judges) observed as follows: ...the essential characteristic of federalism is `the distribution of limited executive, legislative and judicial authority among bodies which are coordinate with and independent of each other. The supremacy of the Constitution is fundamental to the existence of a federal State in order to prevent either the legislature of the federal unit or those of the member States from destroying or impairing that delicate balance of power which satisfies the particular requirements of States which are desirous of union, but not prepared to merge their individuality in a unity. This supremacy of the Constitution is protected by the 15 (2007) 3 SCC 184 authority of an independent judicial body to act as the interpreter of a scheme of distribution of powers. 26.It is trite that in the Constitutional Scheme adopted in India, besides supremacy of the Constitution, the separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary constitutes the basic features of the Constitution. In fact, the importance of separation of powers in our system of governance was recognised in Special Reference No.1 (supra), even before the basic structure doctrine came to be propounded in the celebrated case of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala & Anr.16, wherein while finding certain basic features of the Constitution, it was opined that separation of powers is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Later, similar view was echoed in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Shri Raj Narain & Anr.17 and in a series of other cases on the point. Nevertheless, apart from the fact that our Constitution does not envisage a rigid and strict separation of powers between the said three organs of the State, the power of judicial review stands entirely on a different pedestal. Being itself part of the basic structure of the Constitution, it cannot be ousted or abridged by even a Constitutional amendment. [See: L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra)]. Besides, judicial review 16 (1973) 4 SCC 225 17 1975 (Supp) SCC 1 is otherwise essential for resolving the disputes regarding the limits of Constitutional power and entering the Constitutional limitations as an ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. In Special Reference No.1 of 1964 (supra), it was observed that whether or not there is distinct and rigid separation of powers under the Indian Constitution, there is no doubt that the Constitution has entrusted to the judicature in this country the task of construing the provisions of the Constitution and of safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens. In Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi (supra), Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as His Lordship then was), drawing distinction between the American and Australian Constitution on the one hand and the Indian Constitution on the other, observed that the principle of separation of powers is not a magic formula for keeping the three organs of the State within the strict confines of their functions. The learned judge also observed that in a federal system, which distributes powers between three coordinate branches of government, though not rigidly, disputes regarding the limits of Constitutional power have to be resolved by courts. Quoting George Whitecross Paton, an Australian Legal Scholar, that the distinction between judicial and other powers may be vital to the maintenance of the Constitution itself, the learned judge said that the principle of separation of powers is a principle of restraint which has in it the percept, innate in the prudence of self-preservation (even if history has not repeatedly brought in home), that discretion is the better part of valour18. 27.Recently in State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Jeet S. Bisht & Anr.19, S.B. Sinha, J. dealt with the topic of separation of powers in the following terms: 77. Separation of powers is a favourite topic for some of us. Each organ of the State in terms of the constitutional scheme performs one or the other functions which have been assigned to the other organ. Although drafting of legislation and its implementation by and large are functions of the legislature and the executive respectively, it is too late in the day to say that the constitutional courts role in that behalf is non-existent. The judge-made law is now well recognised throughout the world. If one is to put the doctrine of separation of power to such a rigidity, it would not have been possible for any superior court of any country, whether developed or developing, to create new rights through interpretative process. 78. Separation of powers in one sense is a limit on active jurisdiction of each organ. But it has another deeper and more relevant purpose: to act as check and balance over the activities of other organs. Thereby the active jurisdiction of the organ is not challenged; nevertheless there are methods of prodding to communicate the institution of its excesses and shortfall in duty. Constitutional mandate sets the dynamics of this communication between the organs of polity. Therefore, it is suggested to not understand separation of powers as operating in vacuum. Separation of powers doctrine has been reinvented in modern times. xxx xxx xxx 18 Julius Stone: Social Dimensions of Law and Justice, (1966) p. 668. 19 (2007) 6 SCC 586 80. The modern view, which is today gathering momentum in constitutional courts the world over, is not only to demarcate the realm of functioning in a negative sense, but also to define the minimum content of the demarcated realm of functioning. Objective definition of function and role entails executing the same, which however may be subject to the plea of financial constraint but only in exceptional cases. In event of any such shortcoming, it is the essential duty of the other organ to advise and recommend the needful to substitute inaction. To this extent we must be prepared to frame answers to these difficult questions. xxx xxx xxx 83. If we notice the evolution of separation of powers doctrine, traditionally the checks and balances dimension was only associated with governmental excesses and violations. But in todays world of positive rights and justifiable social and economic entitlements, hybrid administrative bodies, private functionaries discharging public functions, we have to perform the oversight function with more urgency and enlarge the field of checks and balances to include governmental inaction. Otherwise we envisage the country getting transformed into a state of repose. Social engineering as well as institutional engineering therefore forms part of this obligation. 28.Having discussed the scope and width of the doctrine of separation of powers, the moot question for consideration in the present case is that when the fundamental rights, as enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, which include the right to equality (Article 14); the freedom of speech [Article 19(1)(a)] and the right not to be deprived of life and liberty except by procedure established by law (Article 21), as alleged in the instant case, are violated, can their violation be immunised from judicial scrutiny on the touchstone of doctrine of separation of powers between the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary. To put it differently, can the doctrine of separation of powers curtail the power of judicial review, conferred on the Constitutional Courts even in situations where the fundamental rights are sought to be abrogated or abridged on the ground that exercise of such power would impinge upon the said doctrine?
 
                   29.The Constitution is a living and organic document. It cannot remain static and must grow with the nation. The Constitutional provisions have to be construed broadly and liberally having regard to the changed circumstances and the needs of time and polity. In Kehar Singh & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Anr.20, speaking for the Constitution Bench, R.S. Pathak, C.J. held that in keeping with modern Constitutional practice, the Constitution of India is a constitutive document, fundamental to the governance of the country, whereby the people of India have provided a Constitutional polity consisting of certain primary organs, institutions and functionaries with the intention of working out, maintaining and operating a Constitutional order. On the aspect of interpretation of a Constitution, the following observations of Justice 20 (1989) 1 SCC 204 Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada in Lawson A.W. Hunter & Ors. Vs. Southam Inc.21 are quite apposite: The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in mind. 30.In M. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.22, speaking for the Constitution Bench, S.H. Kapadia, J. observed as under: The Constitution is not an ephemeral legal document embodying a set of legal rules for the passing hour. It sets out principles for an expanding future and is intended to endure for ages to come and consequently to be adapted to the various crisis of human affairs. Therefore, a purposive rather than a strict literal approach to the interpretation should be adopted. A Constitutional provision must be construed not in a narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and liberal manner so as to anticipate and take account of changing conditions and purposes so that a constitutional provision does not get fossilised but remains flexible enough to meet the newly emerging problems and challenges. [Emphasis supplied] 21 (1984) 2 S.C.R.145 (Can SC) 22 (2006) 8 SCC 212 31.Recently, in I.R. Coelho (supra), noticing the principles relevant for the interpretation of Constitutional provisions, Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J., speaking for the Bench of nine Judges of this Court, observed as follows: The principle of constitutionalism is now a legal principle which requires control over the exercise of Governmental power to ensure that it does not destroy the democratic principles upon which it is based. These democratic principles include the protection of fundamental rights. The principle of constitutionalism advocates a check and balance model of the separation of powers; it requires a diffusion of powers, necessitating different independent centres of decision making. The principle of constitutionalism underpins the principle of legality which requires the Courts to interpret legislation on the assumption that Parliament would not wish to legislate contrary to fundamental rights. The Legislature can restrict fundamental rights but it is impossible for laws protecting fundamental rights to be impliedly repealed by future statutes. Observing further that the protection of fundamental constitutional rights through the common law is the main feature of common law constitutionalism, the Court went on to say: Under the controlled Constitution, the principles of checks and balances have an important role to play. Even in England where Parliament is sovereign, Lord Steyn has observed that in certain circumstances, Courts may be forced to modify the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, for example, in cases where judicial review is sought to be abolished. By this the judiciary is protecting a limited form of constitutionalism, ensuring that their institutional role in the Government is maintained. 32.The Constitution of India expressly confers the power of judicial review on this Court and the High Courts under Article 32 and 226 respectively. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar described Article 32 as the very soul of the Constitution - the very heart of it - the most important Article. By now, it is well settled that the power of judicial review, vested in the Supreme Court and the High Courts under the said Articles of the Constitution, is an integral part and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Therefore, ordinarily, the power of the High Court and this Court to test the Constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or even abridged. Moreover, Article 13 of the Constitution not only declares the pre- constitution laws as void to the extent to which they are inconsistent with the fundamental rights, it also prohibits the State from making a law which either takes away totally or abrogates in part a fundamental right. Therefore, judicial review of laws is embedded in the Constitution by virtue of Article 13 read with Articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution. It is manifest from the language of Article 245 of the Constitution that all legislative powers of the Parliament or the State Legislatures are expressly made subject to other provisions of the Constitution, which obviously would include the rights conferred in Part III of the Constitution. Whether there is a contravention of any of the rights so conferred, is to be decided only by the Constitutional Courts, which are empowered not only to declare a law as unconstitutional but also to enforce fundamental rights by issuing directions or orders or writs of or in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, habeas corpus, prohibition and quo warranto for this purpose. It is pertinent to note that Article 32 of the Constitution is also contained in Part III of the Constitution, which enumerates the fundamental rights and not alongside other Articles of the Constitution which define the general jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Thus, being a fundamental right itself, it is the duty of this Court to ensure that no fundamental right is contravened or abridged by any statutory or constitutional provision. Moreover, it is also plain from the expression in the nature of employed in clause (2) of Article 32 that the power conferred by the said clause is in the widest terms and is not confined to issuing the high prerogative writs specified in the said clause but includes within its ambit the power to issue any directions or orders or writs which may be appropriate for enforcement of the fundamental rights. Therefore, even when the conditions for issue of any of these writs are not fulfilled, this Court would not be constrained to fold its hands in despair and plead its inability to help the citizen who has come before it for judicial redress. (per P.N. Bhagwati, J. in Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India & Ors.23). 33.In this context, it would be profitable to make a reference to the decision of this Court in Nilabati Behera (supra). The Court concurred with the view expressed by this Court in Khatri & Ors. (II) Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.24 and Khatri & Ors. (IV) Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.25, wherein it was said that the Court is not helpless to grant relief in a case of violation of the right to life and personal liberty, and it should be prepared to forge new tools and devise new remedies for the purpose of vindicating these precious fundamental rights. It was also indicated that the procedure suitable in the facts of the case must be adopted for conducting the enquiry, needed to ascertain the necessary facts, for granting the relief, as may be available mode of redress, for enforcement of the guaranteed fundamental rights. In his concurring judgment, Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as His Lordship then was), observed as under: 35. This Court and the High Courts, being the protectors of the civil liberties of the citizen, have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir of the victim whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the 23 (1984) 3 SCC 161 24 (1981) 1 SCC 627 25 (1981) 2 SCC 493 Constitution of India are established to have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the State to repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights of the citizen, notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the remedy by way of a civil suit or criminal proceedings. The State, of course has the right to be indemnified by and take such action as may be available to it against the wrongdoer in accordance with law - through appropriate proceedings. 34.It may not be out of place to mention that in so far as this Court is concerned, apart from Articles 32 and 142 which empower this Court to issue such directions, as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter, Article 144 of the Constitution also mandates all authorities, civil or judicial in the territory of India, to act in aid of the orders passed by this Court. 35.As regards the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court, undoubtedly they are, in a way, wider in scope. The High Courts are authorised under Article 226 of the Constitution, to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, including any government to enforce fundamental rights and, for any other purpose. It is manifest from the difference in the phraseology of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution that there is a marked difference in the nature and purpose of the right conferred by these two Articles. Whereas the right guaranteed by Article 32 can be exercised only for the enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, the right conferred by Article 226 can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well, i.e. for enforcement of any legal right conferred by a Statute etc. 36.In Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.26, this Court had observed thus: 8. Under the constitutional scheme as framed for the judiciary, the Supreme Court and the High Courts both are courts of record. The High Court is not a court subordinate to the Supreme Court. In a way the canvas of judicial powers vesting in the High Court is wider inasmuch as it has jurisdiction to issue all prerogative writs conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other purpose while the original jurisdiction of Supreme Court to issue prerogative writs remains confined to the enforcement of fundamental rights and to deal with some such matters, such as Presidential elections or inter-State disputes which the Constitution does not envisage being heard and determined by High Courts. 37.In Dwarkanaths case (supra), this Court had said that Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. This Article enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and extra-ordinary circumstances of the case. Therefore, what we have said above in regard to the exercise of jurisdiction by this 26 (2004) 5 SCC 1 Court under Article 32, must apply equally in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. 38.Article 21, one of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution declares that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. It is trite that the words life and personal liberty are used in the Article as compendious terms to include within themselves all the varieties of life which go to make up the personal liberties of a man and not merely the right to the continuance of persons animal existence. (See: Kharak Singh Vs. State of U.P.27) 39.The paramountcy of the right to life and personal liberty was highlighted by the Constitution Bench in Kehar Singh (supra). It was observed thus: To any civilised society, there can be no attributes more important than the life and personal liberty of its members. That is evident from the paramount position given by the courts to Article 21 of the Constitution. These twin attributes enjoy a fundamental ascendancy over all other attributes of the political and social order, and consequently, the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary are more sensitive to them than to the other attributes of daily existence. The deprivation of personal liberty and the threat of the deprivation of life by the action of the State is in most civilised societies regarded seriously and, recourse, either under express constitutional provision or through legislative enactment is provided to the judicial organ. 27 (1964) 1 SCR 332 40.In Minerva Mills (supra), Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for the majority observed that Articles 14 and 19 do not confer any fanciful rights. They confer rights which are elementary for the proper and effective functioning of democracy. They are universally regarded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If Articles 14 and 19 are put out of operation, Article 32 will be drained of its life blood. Emphasising the significance of Articles 14, 19 and 21, the learned Chief Justice remarked: 74. Three Articles of our Constitution, and only three, stand between the heaven of freedom into which Tagore wanted his country to awake and the abyss of unrestrained power. They are Articles 14, 19 and 21. Article 31-C has removed two sides of that golden triangle which affords to the people of this country an assurance that the promise held forth by the preamble will be performed by ushering an egalitarian era through the discipline of fundamental rights, that is, without emasculation of the rights to liberty and equality which alone can help preserve the dignity of the individual. 41.The approach in the interpretation of fundamental rights has again been highlighted in M. Nagaraj (supra), wherein this Court observed as under: This principle of interpretation is particularly apposite to the interpretation of fundamental rights. It is a fallacy to regard fundamental rights as a gift from the State to its citizens. Individuals possess basic human rights independently of any constitution by reason of basic fact that they are members of the human race. These fundamental rights are important as they possess intrinsic value. Part- III of the Constitution does not confer fundamental rights. It confirms their existence and gives them protection. Its purpose is to withdraw certain subjects from the area of political controversy to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. Every right has a content. Every foundational value is put in Part-III as a fundamental right as it has intrinsic value. The converse does not apply. A right becomes a fundamental right because it has foundational value. Apart from the principles, one has also to see the structure of the Article in which the fundamental value is incorporated. Fundamental right is a limitation on the power of the State. A Constitution, and in particular that of it which protects and which entrenches fundamental rights and freedoms to which all persons in the State are to be entitled is to be given a generous and purposive construction. In Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India28, this Court has held that while considering the nature and content of fundamental rights, the Court must not be too astute to interpret the language in a literal sense so as to whittle them down. The Court must interpret the Constitution in a manner which would enable the citizens to enjoy the rights guaranteed by it in the fullest measure. An instance of literal and narrow interpretation of a vital fundamental right in the Indian Constitution is the early decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras29. Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The Supreme Court by a majority held that procedure established by law means any procedure established by law made by the Parliament or the legislatures of the State. The Supreme Court refused to infuse the procedure with principles of natural justice. It concentrated solely upon the existence of enacted law. After three decades, the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in A.K. Gopalan and held in its landmark judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India30 that the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness. The Court further 28 AIR 1962 SC 305 29 AIR 1950 SC 27 30 (1978) 1 SCC 248 held that the procedure should also be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. This example is given to demonstrate an instance of expansive interpretation of a fundamental right. The expression life in Article 21 does not connote merely physical or animal existence. The right to life includes right to live with human dignity. This Court has in numerous cases deduced fundamental features which are not specifically mentioned in Part-III on the principle that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in the enumerated guarantees. 42.Thus, the opinion of this Court in A.K. Gopalan (supra) to the effect that a person could be deprived of his liberty by `any procedure established by law and it was not for the Court to go into the fairness of that procedure was perceived in Maneka Gandhi (supra) as a serious curtailment of liberty of an individual and it was held that the law which restricted an individuals freedom must also be right, just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. This judgment was a significant step towards the development of law with respect to Article 21 of the Constitution, followed in a series of subsequent decisions. This Court went on to explore the true meaning of the word Life in Article 21 and finally opined that all those aspects of life, which make a person live with human dignity are included within the meaning of the word Life. 43.Commenting on the scope of judicial review vis-`-vis constitutional sovereignty particularly with reference to Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution, in I.R. Coelho (supra), this Court said: There is a difference between Parliamentary and constitutional sovereignty. Our Constitution is framed by a Constituent Assembly which was not Parliament. It is in the exercise of law making power by the Constituent Assembly that we have a controlled Constitution. Articles 14, 19, 21 represent the foundational values which form the basis of the rule of law. These are the principles of constitutionality which form the basis of judicial review apart from the rule of law and separation of powers. If in future, judicial review was to be abolished by a constitutional amendment, as Lord Steyn says, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty even in England would require a relook. This is how law has developed in England over the years. It is in such cases that doctrine of basic structure as propounded in Kesavananda Bharati case (supra) has to apply. While observing that the abrogation or abridgement of the fundamental rights under Chapter III of the Constitution have to be examined on broad interpretation so as to enable the citizens to enjoy the rights guaranteed by Part III in the fullest measure, the Court explained the doctrine of separation of powers as follows: (SCC p.86- 87, paras 64-66) ...[i]t was settled centuries ago that for preservation of liberty and prevention of tyranny it is absolutely essential to vest separate powers in three different organs. In The Federalist Nos. 47, 48, and 51, James Madison details how a separation of powers preserves liberty and prevents tyranny. In The Federalist No. 47, Madison discusses Montesquieus treatment of the separation of powers in Spirit of Laws, (Book XI, Chapter 6). There Montesquieu writes, When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of Magistrates, there can be no liberty ... Again, there is no liberty, if the judicial power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Madison points out that Montesquieu did not feel that different branches could not have overlapping functions, but rather that the power of one department of Government should not be entirely in the hands of another department of Government. Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No.78, remarks on the importance of the independence of the judiciary to preserve the separation of powers and the rights of the people: The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority; such, for instance, that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice in no other way than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing. (434) Montesquieu finds that tyranny pervades when there is no separation of powers: There would be an end of everything, were the same man or same body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals. The Court further observed: (SCC pg.105, paras 129- 130) Equality, rule of law, judicial review and separation of powers form parts of the basic structure of the Constitution. Each of these concepts are intimately connected. There can be no rule of law, if there is no equality before the law. These would be meaningless if the violation was not subject to the judicial review. All these would be redundant if the legislative, executive and judicial powers are vested in one organ. Therefore, the duty to decide whether the limits have been transgressed has been placed on the judiciary. Realising that it is necessary to secure the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights, power for such enforcement has been vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Judicial Review is an essential feature of the Constitution. It gives practical content to the objectives of the Constitution embodied in Part III and other parts of the Constitution. It may be noted that the mere fact that equality which is a part of the basic structure can be excluded for a limited purpose, to protect certain kinds of laws, does not prevent it from being part of the basic structure. Therefore, it follows that in considering whether any particular feature of the Constitution is part of the basic structure - rule of law, separation of power - the fact that limited exceptions are made for limited purposes, to protect certain kind of laws, does not mean that it is not part of the basic structure. Conclusions: 44.Thus, having examined the rival contentions in the context of the Constitutional Scheme, we conclude as follows: (i) The fundamental rights, enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, are inherent and cannot be extinguished by any Constitutional or Statutory provision. Any law that abrogates or abridges such rights would be violative of the basic structure doctrine. The actual effect and impact of the law on the rights guaranteed under Part III has to be taken into account in determining whether or not it destroys the basic structure. (ii) Article 21 of the Constitution in its broad perspective seeks to protect the persons of their lives and personal liberties except according to the procedure established by law. The said Article in its broad application not only takes within its fold enforcement of the rights of an accused but also the rights of the victim. The State has a duty to enforce the human rights of a citizen providing for fair and impartial investigation against any person accused of commission of a cognizable offence, which may include its own officers. In certain situations even a witness to the crime may seek for and shall be granted protection by the State. (iii) In view of the constitutional scheme and the jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 32 and on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution the power of judicial review being an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution, no Act of Parliament can exclude or curtail the powers of the Constitutional Courts with regard to the enforcement of fundamental rights. As a matter of fact, such a power is essential to give practicable content to the objectives of the Constitution embodied in Part III and other parts of the Constitution. Moreover, in a federal constitution, the distribution of legislative powers between the Parliament and the State Legislature involves limitation on legislative powers and, therefore, this requires an authority other than the Parliament to ascertain whether such limitations are transgressed. Judicial review acts as the final arbiter not only to give effect to the distribution of legislative powers between the Parliament and the State Legislatures, it is also necessary to show any transgression by each entity. Therefore, to borrow the words of Lord Steyn, judicial review is justified by combination of the principles of separation of powers, rule of law, the principle of constitutionality and the reach of judicial review. (iv) If the federal structure is violated by any legislative action, the Constitution takes care to protect the federal structure by ensuring that Courts act as guardians and interpreters of the Constitution and provide remedy under Articles 32 and 226, whenever there is an attempted violation. In the circumstances, any direction by the Supreme Court or the High Court in exercise of power under Article 32 or 226 to uphold the Constitution and maintain the rule of law cannot be termed as violating the federal structure. (v) Restriction on the Parliament by the Constitution and restriction on the Executive by the Parliament under an enactment, do not amount to restriction on the power of the Judiciary under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution. (vi) If in terms of Entry 2 of List II of The Seventh Schedule on the one hand and Entry 2A and Entry 80 of List I on the other, an investigation by another agency is permissible subject to grant of consent by the State concerned, there is no reason as to why, in an exceptional situation, court would be precluded from exercising the same power which the Union could exercise in terms of the provisions of the Statute. In our opinion, exercise of such power by the constitutional courts would not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. In fact, if in such a situation the court fails to grant relief, it would be failing in its constitutional duty. (vii) When the Special Police Act itself provides that subject to the consent by the State, the CBI can take up investigation in relation to the crime which was otherwise within the jurisdiction of the State Police, the court can also exercise its constitutional power of judicial review and direct the CBI to take up the investigation within the jurisdiction of the State. The power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be taken away, curtailed or diluted by Section 6 of the Special Police Act. Irrespective of there being any statutory provision acting as a restriction on the powers of the Courts, the restriction imposed by Section 6 of the Special Police Act on the powers of the Union, cannot be read as restriction on the powers of the Constitutional Courts. Therefore, exercise of power of judicial review by the High Court, in our opinion, would not amount to infringement of either the doctrine of separation of power or the federal structure. 45.In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to the CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly. 46.Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these Constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said Articles requires great caution in its exercise. In so far as the question of issuing a direction to the CBI to conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but time and again it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. This extra-ordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. Otherwise the CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and with limited resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the process lose its credibility and purpose with unsatisfactory investigations. 47.In Secretary, Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering Services, U.P. & Ors. Vs. Sahngoo Ram Arya & Anr.31, this Court had said that an order directing an enquiry by the CBI should be passed only when the High Court, after considering the material on record, comes to a conclusion that such material does disclose a prima facie case calling for an investigation by the CBI or any other similar agency. We respectfully concur with these observations.
 
                   48.All the cases shall now be placed before the respective Benches for disposal in terms of this opinion. CJI. (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN) J. (R.V. RAVEENDRAN) J. (D.K. JAIN) . (P. SATHASIVAM) (J.M. PANCHAL)
 
 
 
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  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Death Penalty commuted to Life by Supreme Court- 21/1/2014.         
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COURT
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  APPEAL   , AppealNo:
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE 6/12/2013:"The analysis of the materials placed before us clearly brings the case within the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (supra). We hereby direct the respondents to hand over all the documents to the CBI within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order."-Supreme Court.         
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  HEAD NOTE 21/11/2013: "Magistrate has to exercise judicial discretion and apply his mind to the contents of the petition. The refer report as well as the statement of the complainant would indicate that no offence has been made out so far as the second accused is concerned since, admittedly, no money was entrusted to her and that second accused is the divorced wife of the first accused"- Supreme Court         
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  HEAD NOTE 20/11/2013: Held,"...not a fit case requiring interference in the excercise if inherent jurisdiction under section 482 cr.p.c."- Supreme Court.         
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  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE "While renewing the term of the appointment of the existing incumbents the State Government is required to consider their past performance and conduct in the light of the recommendations made by the District Judges and the District Magistrates...."- Supreme Court - 13/11/2013.         
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  HEAD NOTE Conclusion/Directions: 111) In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold: i) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.         
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  HEAD NOTE 11/11/2013-" What is a little disturbing about this case is that it is illustrative of the slow movement of the wheels of criminal justice delivery. The dowry death took place on 6th September, 1989. The Trial..."-Supreme Court.         
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COURT DR.B.S. CHAUHAN & S.A. BOBDE J.J.
  PARTIES PUTCHALAPALLI NARESH REDDY …. APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF A.P. & ETC. …. RESPONDENTS
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 1521-1522 OF 2011
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 147/148/149/302/324 I.P.C.
  HEAD NOTE 18/10/2013: OverAct- Aplication of 149 IPC defined- Converted to 324 from 302 IPC-" -Supreme Court.         
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COURT Hon,ble A.K.Patnaik & F.M.I.Kalifulla JJ.
  PARTIES Kailash v. State of M.P.
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 2260 OF 2009
  ACT i.p.c. , Section: 306,376(2)(f).
  HEAD NOTE "The medical evidence to the large extent confirmed that deceased was prior to the suicide committed by her.Appeal dissmissed"-Supreme Court. Dated 24.7.2013         
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COURT Hon,ble Dr. B.S.Chauhan & S.A.Bobde.
  PARTIES Kalia v. State of M.P.
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 228 IOF 2008
  ACT i.p.c. , Section: 302.
  HEAD NOTE 'Special knowledge of accused- not explained- Effect"-Supreme Court. Dated 23.7.2013         
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COURT Hon,ble Dr. B.S Chauhan & S.A. Bobde JJ.
  PARTIES Gian Chand v. State of Haryana.
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 2302 of 2010
  ACT N.D.P.S. Act , Section: 15
  HEAD NOTE 23 July 2013-"Once the possession of contraband material is established, the accused has to explain...."-Supreme Court.         
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COURT Hon,ble C.K.Prasad & V. Gopala Gowda JJ..
  PARTIES V.L.S.Finance Ltd. v. Union of India
  APPEAL Writ Petition   , AppealNo:
  ACT Constitution of India. , Section: Article 136.
  HEAD NOTE 10 may 2013-New Plea when may be raised for the first time before the Apex Court-Supreme Court.         
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COURT K.S.P. Radshakrishnan & Madan B. Lokur, JJ.
  PARTIES Shankar Kishanrao Khade v. State of Maharashtra.
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo:
  ACT Indian Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code. , Section: 302 I.P.C,432 Cr.P.C & Article 161.of Constitution.
  HEAD NOTE "Life Imprisionment"-Meaning of- Discussed. "Para 66. Off and on, the issue has been the interpretation of “life sentence” – does it mean imprisonment for only 14 years or 20 years or does it mean for the life of the convict. This doubt has been laid to rest in several cases, more recently in Sangeet where it has been unequivocally laid down that a sentence of imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the rest of the normal life of the convict. The convict is not entitled to any remission in a case of sentence of life imprisonment, as is commonly believed. However, if the convict is sought to be released before the expiry of his life, it can only be by following the procedure laid down in Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or by the Governor exercising power under Article 161 of the Constitution or by the President exercising power under Article 72 of the Constitution. There is no other method or procedure. Whether the statutory procedure under Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can be stultified for a period of 20 years or 30 years needs further discussion as observed in Sangeet..."- Supreme Court - Dated 25.4.2013         
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COURT Hon'ble P. Sathasivam and Hon'ble Dr. B.S Chauhan
  PARTIES Yakub Abdul Razak Memon .... Appellant(s) vs. The State of Maharashtra, through CBI , Bombay …. Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1728 of 2007
  ACT IPC & TADA , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Meaning of Life Imprisionment - Supreme Court: Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. The State of Maharashtra, through CBI , Bombay - See Para524 – "As rightly observed by this Court in Sangeet and Anr. vs. State of Haryana, 2012 (11) Scale 140, there is misconception that a prisoner serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to release on completion of either 14 years or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life, subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under Section 432 of the Code, which in turn is subject to the procedural checks mentioned in the said provision and to further substantive check in Section 433-A of the Code" - Supreme Court of India, Dated 21st. March 2013.         
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COURT Justice Swatanter Kumar and Justice Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya
  PARTIES State of U.P. & Ors. … Appellants Versus Ashok Kumar Nigam … Respondent WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9030 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24562 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9031 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24563 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9032 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24564 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9033 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35561 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9034 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35562 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9035 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35569 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9036 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35568 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9037 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35567 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9038 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35566 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9039 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35565 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9040 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 9156 of 2011] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9041 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 13788 of 2011] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9042 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20917 of 2011] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9043 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20918 of 2011] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9044 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11261 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9045 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12993 of 2010] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9046 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 18407 of 2011]
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 9029
  ACT Constitution of India , Section: 136
  HEAD NOTE UTTAR PRADESH L.R.MANUAL: ""....The order dated 3rd April, 2008, which we have reproduced above, clearly shows non-application of mind and non-recording of reasons, which leads only to one conclusion, that the said order was an arbitrary exercise of power by the State. We cannot find any fault with the reasoning of the High Court in that behalf. But we do find some merit in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant State that the High Court should not have directed appointments while regulating the age, as has been done by the High Court in operative part of its judgment. There is right of consideration, but none can claim right to appointment. Para 7.06 states that renewal beyond 60 years shall depend upon continuous good work, sound integrity and physical fitness of the counsel. These are the considerations which have been weighed by the competent authority in the State Government to examine whether renewal/extension beyond 60 years should be granted or not. That does not ipso facto means that there is a right to appointment upto the age of 60 years irrespective of work, conduct and integrity of the counsel. The rule provides due safeguards as it calls for the report of the District Judge and the District Officer granting renewal""- DISMISSED- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED-13-12-2012         
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COURT HON'BLE JUSTICE J. CHELAMESWAR
  PARTIES VIPUL SHITAL PRASAD AGARWAL … PETITIONER VS STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. … RESPONDENTS
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 3672 of 2012
  ACT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA , Section: 482/167(2), ART- 226, 32
  HEAD NOTE HELD--The mere undertaking of a further investigation either by the Investigating Officer on his own or upon the directions of the superior police officer or pursuant to a direction by the concerned Magistrate to whom the report is forwarded does not mean that the report submitted under Section 173(2) is abandoned or rejected. It is only that either the Investigating Agency or the concerned Court is not completely satisfied with the material collected by the investigating agency and is of the opinion that possibly some more material is required to be collected in order to sustain the allegations of the commission of the offence indicated in the report.--SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED:6-11-2012         
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COURT CORUM OF HON'BLE JUSTICE Swatanter Kumar AND HON'BLE JUSTICE Madan B. Lokur
  PARTIES Ramachandran …..Appellant Versus State of Kerala ....Respondent
  APPEAL ---Select---   , AppealNo: 732 OF 2008
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302
  HEAD NOTE Issue-Whether the said offence is suicide or murder-Medical Evidence-However, what is clinching in the present case is the medicalevidence which clearly indicates that Remani was forcibly administeredFuradan; she had resisted this forcible administration; as a result of herresistance, she received several minor injuries on her body. Eventually,with a view to overcome her resistance, she was smothered and ultimatelyshe died as a result of the forcible administration of Furadan and smothering. No person other than her husband could have possibly causedRemani’s death, especially considering the motive or grudge that heharboured against her.-Held guilty of murder-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED: 30.10.2012         
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COURT CORUM OF HON'BLE JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI AND JUSTICE P. SATHASIVAM
  PARTIES IQBAL ABDUL SAMIYA MALEK ....APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT ....RESPONDENT(S)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1585 OF 2012
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302
  HEAD NOTE It is the duty of an Appellate Court to look into the evidence adduced in the case arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even it can be relied upon then whether the prosecution can be said to have proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by Appellate Court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-DATED: 1ST OCT 2012         
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COURT Justice Hon'ble Dr.B.S. Chauhan
  PARTIES Kunal Majumdar …Appellant VERSUS State of Rajasthan …Respondent
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 407 OF 2008
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section:
  HEAD NOTE It is the bounden duty of the Division Bench to carry out such exercise in the manner set out above and we feel it appropriate, therefore, to set aside the judgment impugned in this appeal for that reason and remit the matter back to the High Court for deciding the Reference under Section 366 Cr.P.C. in the manner it ought to have been decided. Inasmuch as the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant was by the judgment dated 09.03.2007 of the trial Court and the offence alleged was dated 16.01.2006, while remitting the matter back to the High Court, we direct the High Court to dispose of the Reference along with the Appeals expeditiously and in any case within three months from the date of receipt of the records sent back to the High Court. The appeal stands disposed of with the above directions to the High Court         
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COURT P. SATHASIVAM J., DIPAK MISRA J.
  PARTIES Ms. Mayawati .... Petitioner (s) Versus Union of India & Ors. .... Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Writ Petition   , AppealNo: 135 OF 2008
  ACT Prevention of Corruption Act , Section: 13
  HEAD NOTE CBI is not justified in proceeding with the FIR No. R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003. In view of the above discussion, we are satisfied that the CBI exceeded its jurisdiction in lodging FIR No. R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003 in the absence of any direction from this Court in the order dated 18.09.2003 or in any subsequent orders - Supreme Court - Dated 6.7.2012         
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COURT Jagdish Singh Khehar & A. K. Patnaik JJ.
  PARTIES Nupur Talwar …. Petitioner Versus Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. …. Respondents
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 68 OF 2012
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302,201
  HEAD NOTE "As has been held by this Court in Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1997) 1 SCC 361], once a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under Section 190 Cr.P.C., he cannot order of his own further investigation in the case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. but if subsequently the Sessions Court passes an order discharging the accused persons, further investigation by the police on its own would be permissible, which may also result in submission of fresh charge-sheet." - Supreme Court - Dated 7/6/2012.         
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COURT Hon. A.K. Patnaik and Hon. Swatanter Kumar
  PARTIES Ramnaresh & Ors. vs State Of Chhattisgarh
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 166-167 OF 2010
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302
  HEAD NOTE Supreme Court of India- Classification of Aggrevating and Mitigating Offences- Sec 302 IPC- Death Panelty converted into Life Imprisonment (21 Years).         
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COURT Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN & A.K. PATNAIK JJ.
  PARTIES State of Punjab Versus Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Ors.
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 753-755 of 2009
  ACT Criminal Procedure Code , Section: 362,482.
  HEAD NOTE         
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COURT K.P.S. Radhkrishnan & Madan B. Lokur JJ.
  PARTIES Sangeet v. State of Haryana
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo:
  ACT Criminal Procedure Code. , Section: 432(1) to (5),433 & 433 A.
  HEAD NOTE Sentences- Power of remmission under 432(1) Cr.P.C.- Scope and principles considered.- Supreme Court- Dated 20.11.2012.         
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COURT Chelameswar, J.
  PARTIES Union of India & Ors. ........ Appellants Versus Ramesh Gandhi ......... Respondent
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1356 of 2004
  ACT Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act. , Section: 420 IPC AND 13 PC Act
  HEAD NOTE Quashing of FIR - Law discussed - Supreme Court         
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COURT P. SATHASIVAM & Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN J.J.
  PARTIES Prithipal Singh Etc.Vs. State of Punjab and another
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 523-527 of 2009
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 364,302
  HEAD NOTE         
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COURT Hon. J. ALTAMAS KABIR and Hon. J. CYRIAC JOSEPH
  PARTIES RAVINDER RAJ Petitioner(s) VERSUS M/S. COMPETENT MOTORS CO. PVT. LTD.&ANR. Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Writ Petition   , AppealNo: 10364/2006
  ACT Goods Act, 1930 , Section: Section 64A(1)(a)
  HEAD NOTE Civil Laws-Section 64A(1)(a)-Goods Act, 1930-Receipt given to the petitioner for payment of the amount in the proforma invoice, it had been indicated that the prices prevailing on the date of billing would apply. --The billing was done on 5th of April, 1989. In the absence of any evidence of any deliberate intention on the part of the respondents to delay delivery of the vehicle, we are unable to agree with the petitioner that the increase in price has to be borne by the respondents -- It is the liability of the petitioner to pay the extra price when the excise duty had been enhanced prior to the delivery of the vehicle— -The Special Leave Petition fails and is dismissed-Supreme Court of India :Order Dated Feb 10, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
  PARTIES SRI INDRA DAS .. Appellant (s) VERSUS STATE OF ASSAM .. Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1383 OF 2007
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Confession a very weak type of evidence-Confession in TADA Case-The alleged confession was subsequently retracted by the appellant. The alleged confession was not corroborated by any other material. We have held in Arup Bhuyan”“s case (supra) that confession is a very weak type of evidence, particularly when alleged to have been made to the police, and it is not safe to convict on its basis unless there is adequate corroborative material. In the present case there is no corroborative material:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-10-02-2011.         
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COURT Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
  PARTIES HARYANA STATE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD & ANR. ...Appellants VERSUS RAJ PAL ... Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1550 OF 2011
  ACT Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (Sale of Immovable Property) Rules 1997 , Section: Rule 4
  HEAD NOTE Civil Laws-Rule 4-Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (Sale of Immovable Property) Rules 1997-It is clear that the allottees cannot postpone the payment of instalments merely on the ground that some of the amenities were not ready. If they were not entitled for postponement of the instalments, it follows that they will be liable to pay the normal interest on the delayed instalments up to date of payment. However, having regard to the fact that the Rules did not contemplate compound interest and penal interest and the Market Committee was yet to complete certain infrastructural work like water, sewerage disposal, as held in Shantikunj (supra), the Market Committee will not be entitled to claim any compound interest or penal interest.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011         
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COURT J.M. PANCHAL, H.L. GOKHALE J.J.
  PARTIES Supreme Court Bar Association and others ... Appellants Versus B.D. Kaushik ... Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 3401 OF 2003
  ACT SCBA Rules , Section:
  HEAD NOTE One Bar One Vote:Supreme Court Dated 26/09/2011         
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COURT J.M. Panchal, H.L. Gokhale J.J.
  PARTIES The Registrar General High Court of Judicature at Madras Vs. R. Perachi and others
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 7936 OF 2011
  ACT Constitution of India , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Under Constitution administrative powers vests in Chief Justice and not in Judges - "As pointed out above, under the constitutional scheme, Chief Justice is the supreme authority and the other Judges, so far as officers and servants of the High Court are concerned, have no role to play on the administrative side. Some Judges, undoubtedly, will become Chief Justices in their own turn one day, but it is imperative under the constitutional discipline that they work in tranquillity. Judges have been described as "hermits". They have to live and behave like "hermits" who have no desire or aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is to supply light and not heat. This is necessary so that their latent desire to run the High Court administration may not sprout before time, at least, in some cases."-Verdict of Apex Court followed in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7936 OF 2011 The Registrar General High Court of Judicature at Madras Vs. R. Perachi and others - Dated 19/09/2011.         
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COURT D.K. JAIN, P. SATHASIVAM, AFTAB ALAM, JJJ.
  PARTIES JAKIA NASIM AHESAN & ANR. Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1765
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302 read with Section 120B as also under Section 193 read with Sections 114, 186 & 153A, 186, 187 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  HEAD NOTE "The above decisions make it clear that though this Court is competent to entrust the investigation to any independent agency, once the investigating agency complete their function of investigating into the offences, it is the court in which the charge-sheet is filed which is to deal with all matters relating to the trial of the accused including matters falling within the scope of Section 173(8) of the Code. Thus, generally, this Court may not require further monitoring of the case/investigation. However, we make it clear that if any of the parties including CBI require any further direction, they are free to approach this Court by way of an application."- Supreme Court.         
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COURT Dr. B.S. Chauhan & Swantanter Kumar J.J.
  PARTIES Pratap Chandra Mehta ... Appellant Versus State Bar Council of M.P. & Ors. ... Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 6482 of 2011
  ACT Advocates Act , Section: 15 & Rules 121 and 122-A of the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules
  HEAD NOTE Advocates Act and State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules - The provisions of Rules 121 and 122-A (in particular) of the M.P. Rules are not ultra vires of the provisions, including the provisions of Section 15, of the Advocates Act. These rules also do not suffer from the vice of excessive delegation.

In view of the language of Section 15(3) of the Advocates Act and the factual matrix afore-noticed by us, it is clear that the amended rules of the M.P. Rules had received the approval of the Bar Council of India, particularly Rule 122-A. The Rules would not be invalidated for want of issuance of any notification, as it is not the requirement in terms of Section 15(3) of the Advocates Act and in any case would be a curable irregularity at best : Supreme Court.
        
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COURT CJI S.H. Kapadia, & Mukundakam Sharma, K.S. Radhakrishnan, ,Anil R. Dave J.J.J.J.J.
  PARTIES K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs State of Karnataka
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: CIVIL APPEAL NO.6520 OF 2003 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.6521-6537 OF 2003 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO.6538 OF 2003
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Held "(a) Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and the notification dated 8.3.94 are valid, and there is no excessive delegation of legislative power on the State Government.

(b) Non-laying of the notification dt.8.3.94 under Section 140 of the Land Reforms Act before the State Legislature is a curable defect and it will not affect the validity of the notification or action taken thereunder.

(c) The Acquisition Act is protected by Article 31A of the Constitution after having obtained the assent of the President and hence immune from challenge under Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution.
(d) There is no repugnancy between the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, and hence no assent of the President is warranted under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.

(e) Public purpose is a pre-condition for deprivation of a person from his property under Article 300A and the right to claim compensation is also inbuilt in that Article and when a person is deprived of his property the State has to justify both the grounds which may depend on scheme of the statute, legislative policy, object and purpose of the legislature and other related factors.

(f) Statute, depriving a person of his property is, therefore, amenable to judicial review on grounds hereinbefore discussed. 144.-Supreme Court
        
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COURT G.S. SINGHVI & ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY
  PARTIES D.P. Das - Versus - Union of India and Ors.
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 7002 OF 2004
  ACT Service Matters. , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Seniority in Services : For the reasons aforesaid this Court holds that for determination of seniority of the officers who were recommended on the same date, age is the only valid and fair basis as such their seniority should be decided on the basis of age of the candidates who have been recommended.-Supreme Court.         
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COURT P. SATHASIVAM & DR. B.S.CHAUHAN J.J.
  PARTIES Shahnwaj Vs. State of U.P.
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1531 of 2011
  ACT Juvenile Act. , Section: Rule 12.
  HEAD NOTE Determination of Age under Juvenile Act : "We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person.

The School Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person.

Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd- O-Kalan and recorded by the Board.

.... Accordingly, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence that is 04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated 04.06.2007.

We are also satisfied that Rule 12 of the Rules which was brought in pursuance of the Act describes four categories of evidence which have been provided in which preference has been given to school certificate over the medical report"- Supreme Court.
        
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COURT ASOK KUMAR GANGULY & DEEPAK VERMA J.J.
  PARTIES Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen Vs. State of Rajasthan
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1327 OF 2008
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302/34.
  HEAD NOTE Article 136 of the Constitution -
"...this Court will be extremely loath to upset the judgment of conviction which is confirmed in appeal.
However, if it is found that the appreciation of evidence in a case, which is entirely based on circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by serious errors and on that account miscarriage of justice has been occasioned, then the Court will certainly interfere even with the concurrent findings recorded by the Trial court and the High Court.,
[Bharat Vs. State of M.P. 2003 (3) SCC 106] - Followed.-Supreme Court - Dated 13/07/2011.
        
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COURT Dr. B.S. Chauhan & Swantanter Kumar J.J.
  PARTIES State of Delhi Versus Ram Avtar @ Rama
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1101 of 2004
  ACT NDPS Act , Section: 50,21.
  HEAD NOTE " But in no event, the illegal recovery can be the foundation of a successful conviction under the provisions of Section 21 of the (NDPS) Act."- Supreme Court - Dated 07.07.2011. b>         
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COURT ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY I. & DEEPAK VERMA I.
  PARTIES State of Rajasthan Vs. Islam
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1318/2005
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302/304II
  HEAD NOTE Excercising jurisdiction under Article 136 Constitution of India : "However, if this Court is of the opinion that the acquittal is not based on a reasonable view, then it may review the entire material and there will be no limitation on this Cour`s jurisdiction under Article 136 to come to a just decision quashing the acquittal"- 1985(4) SCC 476 para 45; 1996(7) SCC 471 para 4 - Followed.-Supreme Court- Dated 24/05/2011.         
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COURT ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY I. & DEEPAK VERMA I.
  PARTIES BIRENDER PODDAR ... Appellant VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR ... Respondent
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 373 OF 2006
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302,498 A.
  HEAD NOTE Evidence of interested witness - Appreciation thereof - can be relied upon :"in the case of Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 14 SCC 150] and in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed Shaikh Babajan and Others [(2009) 14 SCC 267] which dealt with the question of appreciation of evidence of interested witnesses. Both those decisions follow the well-settled principle that just because evidence is given by the interested persons that is no ground for discarding the same. We have already held that in the instant case, the evidence given by PWs 5, 6, 7 and 8 is quite cogent and clearly established the prosecution case."- Supreme Court - Dated 16/05/2011.         
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COURT Markandey Katju J. & Gyansudhhra J.a Mis Gyan Sudha Misra J.
  PARTIES Prakash Kadam & etc. etc. .. Appellants -versus- Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta & Anr. .. Respondents
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1174-1178 OF 2011
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 320
  HEAD NOTE "We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13th.May,2011.         
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COURT Markandey Katju J. Gyan Sudha Misra J.
  PARTIES Prakash Kadam & etc. etc. .. Appellants -versus-Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta & Anr. .. Respondents
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1174-1178 OF 2011
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302
  HEAD NOTE POLICE ENCOUNTERS: "We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13/05/2011.         
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COURT J.M. Panchal,H.L.Gokhale J.J.
  PARTIES State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Rakesh Kumar Keshari & ANR.
  APPEAL ---Select---   , AppealNo:
  ACT U.P. L.R.MANUAL , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Appointment of DGC/ADGC (Criminal)- Right of their renewal discussed in the light of prevailing judgements of Apex Court: Supreme Court Dated 4/5/2011         
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COURT Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
  PARTIES PRAMOD BUILDINGS & DEVELOPERS (P) LTD. APPELLANT Vs. SHANTA CHOPRA ...RESPONDENT
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1535 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE The plaintiff in a suit for specific performance, cannot obviously succeed unless he proved that he was ready and willing to perform the contract. The exhaustive correspondence between the parties clearly discloses the respective stands of the parties. Even the prayer in the plaint shows that the appellant was not ready to pay the entire balance of Rs.34,00,000/- as agreed under the agreement of sale but that the plaintiff insisted upon the appellant to pay the municipal taxes before the sale, as a condition for sale. If appellant was not willing to pay Rs.34 lakhs at the time of sale, as specifically agreed under the agreement of sale, the appellant could not claim that it was ready and willing to perform its obligations. As noticed above, after appreciating the entire evidence, learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court have recorded a finding that the appellant was not ready and willing and consequently dismissed the suit. Supreme Court of India- Dated: 04:09:2011         
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COURT Deepak Verma J. & B.S.Chauhan J.
  PARTIES Suraz India Trust Vs. Union Of india
  APPEAL ---Select---   , AppealNo: WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 204 OF 2010
  ACT Constitution of India , Section: 32.
  HEAD NOTE Petitioner submits matter be considered by a larger Bench as the petition raises the following issues of Constitutional importance: (1) Whether the aforesaid two verdicts, viz. the 7-Judge Bench and 9-Judge Bench decisions of this Court referred to above really amount to amending Article 124(2) of the Constitution? (2) Whether there is any `Collegium' system for appointing Supreme Court or High Court Judges in the Constitution? 3 (3) Whether the Constitution can be amended by a judicial verdict or it can only be amended by Parliament in accordance with Article 368? (4) Whether the Constitutional scheme was that the Supreme Court and High Court Judges can be appointed by mutual discussions and mutual consensus between the judiciary and the executive; or whether the judiciary can alone appoint Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts? (5) Whether the word `consultation' in Article 224 means `concurrence'? (6) Whether by judicial interpretation words in the Constitution can be made redundant, as appears to have been done in the aforesaid two decisions which have made consultation with High Court Judges redundant while appointing a Supreme Court Judge despite the fact that it is permissible on the clear language of Article 124(2)? (7) Whether the clear language of Article 124(2) can be altered by judicial verdicts and instead of allowing the President of India to consult such Judges of the Supreme Court as he deems necessary (including even junior Judges) only the Chief Justice of India and four seniormost Judges of the Supreme Court can alone be consulted while appointing a Supreme Court Judge? (8) Whether there was any convention that the President is bound by the advice of the Chief Justice of India, and whether any such convention (assuming there was one) can prevail over the clear language of Article 124(2)? (9) Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has any primacy in the aforesaid appointments? (10) Whether the aforesaid two decisions should be overruled by a larger Bench?-Supreme Court-Dated 4/4/2011 4         
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COURT Markandey Katju J. Gyan Sudha Misra J.
  PARTIES Mehboob Batcha & Ors. .. Appellant(s) -versus- State Rep. by Supdt. of Police .. Respondent
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: . 1511 of 2003
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302,376
  HEAD NOTE POLICE CUSTODY DEATHS & RAPES-"In spite of the constitutional and statutory provisions aimed at safeguarding the personal liberty and life of a citizen, growing incidence of torture and deaths in police custody has been a disturbing factor. Experience shows that worst violations of human rights take place during the course of investigation, when the police with a view to secure evidence or confession often resorts to third-degree methods including torture and adopts techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the arrest or describing the deprivation of liberty merely as a prolonged interrogation. A reading of the morning newspapers almost everyday carrying reports of dehumanising torture, assault, rape and death in custody of police or other governmental agencies is indeed depressing. The increasing incidence of torture and death in custody has assumed such alarming proportions that it is affecting the credibility of the rule of law and the administration of criminal justice system. The community rightly feels perturbed. Societys cry for justice becomes louder. Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-Dated 29/03/2011.         
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COURT V.S. SIRPURKAR & T.S. THAKUR J.
  PARTIES Rajesh Singh & Ors. Versus State of U.P.
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1160 OF 2005
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302
  HEAD NOTE   Applicability of section 34 I.P.C. read with 302 - which accused actually caused the murder not certain But It is clear that all the three accused persons had taken part in the beating of deceased Deepak and all the accused persons dragged him   in the room and closed the door.
Therefore, it was up to the accused persons to explain as to how Deepak died. It is very clear that all the three accused persons had acted with common intention of causing the death and, therefore, all the three accused persons would be guilty with the aid of Section 34, IPC. The High Court has rightly held them guilty: Supreme Court.
        
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COURT Hon. J. HARJIT SINGH BEDI and Hon. J. CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
  PARTIES UNION OF INDIA & ORS.APPELLANTS Versus MANAB KUMAR GUHA RESPONDENT
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 2175 OF 2011
  ACT Civil Procedure Code , Section:
  HEAD NOTE On the basis of the materials on record, the enquiry officer held the writ petitioner guilty with which the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority agreed. It is well settled that High Court while exercising the power of judicial review from the order of the disciplinary authority do not act as a Court of appeal and appraise evidence. It interferes with the finding of enquiry officer only when the finding is found to be perverse. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the order of learned Single Judge and quashing the order of compulsory retirement. The finding recorded by the enquiry officer is based on the materials on record and on proper appreciation of evidence which cannot be said to be perverse calling for interference by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED 28 FEB 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
  PARTIES AJAY KUMAR PRASAD APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR TH: VIGILANCE RESPONDENT(S)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 613 OF 2011
  ACT Criminal Procedure Code , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Order to conduct Trial Expediously- Supreme Court of India-Order Dated 28 Feb 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
  PARTIES GHANSHYAM Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 631 OF 2011
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Criminal Procedure , Section: Sections 420 and 471 IPC
  HEAD NOTE The appellant filed a revision before the High Court which was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 420 and 471 of the I.P.C. Admittedly, the entire amount of Rs.60,000/- involved in the case, has been deposited by the appellant. The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the complainant. In our considered view, ends of justice would meet if, while upholding the conviction of the appellant, the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone by him. We direct accordingly. This order is subject to the appellant”“s paying additionally a fine of Rupees One Lakh within six weeks from today. This appeal is disposed of with these observations and directions. In case the amount of fine, as directed above is not deposited by the appellant, then this order would be of no avail to the appellant and he would have to serve out the remaining period of sentence.         
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COURT Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
  PARTIES GHANSHYAM Appellant(s) :VERSUS: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 631 OF 2011
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 420
  HEAD NOTE The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence.-Supreme Court Allowed the request.         
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COURT Hon. J. D.K. JAIN and Hon J. H.L. DATTU
  PARTIES RANU HAZARIKA & ORS. APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF ASSAM & ORS. RESPONDENTS
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 2153 OF 2011 with 2154-2167 of 2011 and 2168-2170 of 2011
  ACT The National Council for Teacher Education , Section: Section 12
  HEAD NOTE the decision of the High Court, permitting the State Govern- ment to continue with the recruitment process, initiated on the basis of the Amendment Rules, 2005 which have been declared by it to be illegal is clearly indefensible. Having clearly held that ““the requirement of ad- herence to the Statutory Regulations framed by the NCTE cannot be left to be determined at the discretion of the authorities of the State Govern- ment and that there was no compelling reason with the State to justify a departure from the Statutory Regulations, any action under illegal rules would be null and void”“, the High Court could not have permitted the State Government to perpetuate an illegality. To say the least, we are equally amazed by the stand of the State Government. Having failed to sustain the Amendment Rules, 2005 before the High Court, it would be improper for the State to go ahead with the recruitments under the said amended Rules which have been declared null and void, particularly when the decision of the High Court on that issue has not been ques- tioned by it. We are of the view that the impugned observation by the High Court would be clearly inimical to the rule of law. While it is trite that Courts can exercise judicial discretion in moulding the relief, however, such discretion cannot be exercised to perpetuate and encour- age an illegality.         
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COURT Hon. J. AFTAB ALAM and Hon. J. R.M. LODHA
  PARTIES The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Appellants Versus M/s. Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd. Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 2152 OF 2011
  ACT the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 , Section: Section 31(5), Section 34
  HEAD NOTE The High Court overlooked that what section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal. ---In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the claimant-respondent but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case. ---In the light of the discussion made above this appeal must succeed.         
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COURT Hon. J. D.K. JAIN and Hon. J. ASOK KUMAR GANGULY and Hon. J. H.L. DATTU
  PARTIES M/S. MUSTAN TAHERBHAI APPELLANT VERSUS COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS RESPONDENT
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 3788 OF 2003
  ACT the Customs Act, 1962 , Section: Section 130E
  HEAD NOTE Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are constrained to hold that the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside on the short ground that while deciding the case, the Tribunal has ignored the specific directions issued by this Court, vide order dated 30th August, 2001. It is evident from the impugned order, in particular from paras 15 and 16 that the Tribunal has not appreciated the facts obtaining in the present case in their correct perspective, which has resulted in vitiating its decision on the question of leviability of import duty. Although, from para 14 of the impugned order it is evident that the Tribunal was conscious of the direction of this Court that it was required to first record the correct facts and then in the factual perspective locate and apply the relevant law, yet in the very next paragraph it proceeds to hold that when it is accepted that Notification No. 118/59-Cus. did not exist at the time of clearance of the vessel from the ship yard, the persistent plea that the ship was manufactured in a warehouse located in India and therefore, it attracted 8 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606 9 (2009) 14 SCC 342 excise duty alone need not be considered at all. In our opinion, in light of the decision and directions of this Court in C.A. 1998 of 2000, judicial discipline obliged the Tribunal to examine the entire legal issue after ascertaining the foundational facts, regardless of its earlier view in the matter. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be sustained         
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COURT Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
  PARTIES HARISH KUMAR AND ANR.Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. Respondent(s) WITH ABHA SINHA Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ORS. Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 627 OF 2011 with 628 OF 2011
  ACT Criminal Procedure Code , Section:
  HEAD NOTE The Trial Court to conduct the trial of the case on day-to-day basis and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible. Supreme Court of India- Dated:February 25, 2011.         
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COURT Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
  PARTIES PERSN MEDICINAL PLANTS PVT. LTD. & ANR. Appellant(s) VERSUS INDIAN BANK AND ORS. Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 2074-2078 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Learned Solicitor General submits that if the Bank is allowed to appropriate this amount, then he has no objection to the appeal of the appellant being heard on merit by the DRAT. We direct that the Indian Bank would be at liberty to appropriate the amount which is already with the Bank, however, this would be subject to the final decision of the appeal by the DRAT.-- In the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the DRAT to hear and dispose of the appeal on all questions of law, as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within two months from the date of the communication of this order.--Supreme Court of India- Dated:February 25, 2011.         
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COURT Hon. J. B. SUDERSHAN REDDY and Hon. J. SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR
  PARTIES JUGAL KISHORE KHETAWAT APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL RESPONDENT
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 168 OF 2007 with 1399 of 2007
  ACT Indian Penal Code, Constitution of India, Criminal Procedure Code , Section: Section 120B/302 IPC, Art 136 of Constitution of India
  HEAD NOTE where the appeal is against a conviction and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any of his near relatives may, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, apply to the Appellate Court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave is granted, the appeal shall not abate; (b) the power to grant leave to continue the appeal is conferred on the court and not on the Registrar under Order VI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.--Supreme Court Of India- Order Dated:February 25, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. P. SATHASIVAM and Hon. J. Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN
  PARTIES Ashok Tshering Bhutia Appellant Versus State of Sikkim Respondent
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 945 of 2003
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE On a consideration of the matter it cannot be said that there is no disproportion or even a sizeable disproportion.....There are also other possible errors in the calculations in regard to point (c). The finding becomes inescapable that the assets were in excess of the known sources of income. But on the question whether the extent of the disproportion is such as to justify a conviction for criminal misconduct...., a somewhat liberal view requires to be taken of what proportion of assets in excess of the known sources of income constitutes ““disproportion”“ for purposes of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act         
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COURT Hon. J. HARJIT SINGH BEDI and J. CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
  PARTIES TUKARAM & ORS. APPELLANT(S) vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA RESPONDENT(S)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 902 OF 2007 with 1195 OF 2007 with 615 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE         
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COURT Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
  PARTIES MD.SUKUR ALI Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF ASSAM Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 546 OF 2011
  ACT Constitution of India , Section: Art. 21
  HEAD NOTE The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all. Order Dated-24-2-2011         
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COURT Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. Anil R. Dave
  PARTIES M/S.UTTAM INDUSTRIES APPELLANT (s) VERSUS COMMNR.OF CENTRAL EXCISE HARYANA Respondent (s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 3727-3728 OF 2005
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE It is by now a settled law that the exemption notification has to be construed strictly and there has to be strict interpretation of the same by reading the same literally. In this connection reference can be made to the decision of this Court in Collector of Customs (Preventive), Amritsar vs. Malwa Industries Limited reported at (2009) 12 SCC 735 as also to the decision in Kartar Rolling Mills vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi reported at (2006) 4 SCC 772 wherein also it was held by this Court that finding recorded by the Tribunal and the two authorities below are findings of fact and such findings in absence of evidence on record to the contrary is not subject to interference. In order to get benefit of such notification granting exemption the claimant has to show that he satisfies the eligibility criteria. Since the Tribunal and the authorities below have categorically held that the appellant does not satisfy the eligibility criteria on the basis of the evidence on record, therefore, we hold that the said exemption Notification is not applicable to the case of the appellants.         
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COURT Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. Anil R. Dave
  PARTIES Union of India & Ors. Appellants Versus M/s. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1976 OF 2011
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE An order passed by the Settlement Commission could be interfered with only if the said order is found to be contrary to any provisions of the Act. So far findings of the fact recorded by Commission or question of facts are concerned, the same is not open for examination either by the High Court or by the Supreme Court. In the present case the order of the Settlement Commission clearly indicates that the said order, particularly, with regard to the imposition of simple interest @ 10 per cent per annum was passed in accordance with the provisions of Rule 14 but the High Court wrongly interpreted the said Rule and thereby arrived at an erroneous finding.

So far as the second issue with respect to interest on Rs. 50 lacs is concerned, the same being a factual issue should not have been gone into by the High Court exercising the writ jurisdiction and the High Court should not have substituted its own opinion against the opinion of the Settlement Commission when the same was not challenged on merits.

In that view of the matter, we set aside the order passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court by the impugned judgment and order and restore the order of the Settlement Commission leaving the parties to bear their own costs. ORDER DATED-February 21, 2011.
        
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COURT Hon. J. R. V. Raveendran and Hon. J. A. K. Patnaik
  PARTIES M/s Hussnain International Appellant Versus Union of India & Ors. Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1980-1981 OF 2011
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD--We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court should not have passed the impugned order for deposit of Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the appeals when the Appellate Authority had directed the appellant to make pre- deposit for Rs.5,00,000/- for both the appeals. The second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act states that in the case of an appeal against a decision or order imposing a penalty or redemption charges, no such appeal shall be entertained unless the amount of the penalty or redemption charges has been deposited by the appellant. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act, however, states ““where the Appellate Authority is of opinion that the deposit to be made will cause undue hardship to the appellant, it may, at its discretion, dispense with such deposit either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may impose.”“ Hence, under the Act discretion is vested in the Appellate Authority to dispense with a pre-deposit of penalty either unconditionally or subject to such condition as the Appellate Authority may impose. If in exercise of such discretion, the Appellate Authority in the present case dispensed with the pre-deposit penalty of Rs.1,30,00,000/- in each of the two appeals subject to the appellant depositing a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court ought not to have enhanced the amount of pre-deposit to Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the two appeals.

As the two appeals of the appellant have not been heard on merits, we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and the order of the learned Single Judge and direct that in case the appellant deposits the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as directed by the Appellate Authority within two months from today, the two appellate orders of the Appellate Authority will stand quashed and the appeal will be heard on merits afresh by the Appellate Authority.

With the aforesaid directions, the appeals are allowed. No costs- ORDER DATED- February 21, 2011.
        
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COURT Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. Anil R. Dave
  PARTIES State of Haryana & Others Appellants Versus M/s. Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. Ltd. Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1977 OF 2011
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD--The High Court has gone on the premise that once the Appellant have themselves extended the benefit to the Respondent they cannot further classify the benefit of investment up to the date of amendment, putting the unit in the negative list. It appears that the High Court while arriving at the said finding has failed to appreciate the fact that the case of the Respondent was considered for exemption in the light of the judgment passed by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620 wherein it was held that the Respondent is entitled to exemption. However, the issue of quantum was kept open. The High Court while giving the said finding has altogether closed itself in considering the said issue and on the contrary has held that only because the Respondent has been considered for grant of exemption, there is no issue of quantum and the Respondent is entitled to entire exemption. In our opinion the said finding is not in line with the observations made by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620. The quantification made by the LLSC is in accord with the ratio laid by this Court.
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court leaving the parties to bear their own costs.- ORDER DATED February 21, 2011.
        
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COURT Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. Anil R. Dave
  PARTIES Ram Narayan Tiwari Appellant Versus Union of India & Ors. Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1978 OF 2011
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD- Counsel appearing for the appellant also submitted that the punishment awarded to the appellant was too severe and harsh considering the nature and the degree of the offences established. The appellant belongs to Air Force, which is a disciplined service. The allegations made against the appellant were serious. The charge number (2) against him stood proved. The said charge is also serious and we are of the considered opinion that for an offence of the aforesaid nature the authority was justified in awarding him the punishment of dismissal from service. -- The scale of punishment provided in Section 73 of the Act clearly confirms the position that dismissal from service is a lesser punishment than that of detention in prison. By commuting the punishment of three months detention and imposing the punishment of dismissal, the Confirming Authority has strictly followed the scale of punishment provided for in Section 73 of the Act and, therefore, there is no justification for any interference with the nature of punishment awarded to the appellant-APPEAL DISMISSED- ORDER DATED- FEB 21, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. D.K. JAIN and Hon. J. H.L. DATTU
  PARTIES Sudhir Kumar Consul Appellant versus Allahabad Bank Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1982-1983 OF 2011
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Held- The only ground on which Article 14 has been put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the fixation of the cut-off date for payment of the revised benefits under the two notifications concerned was arbitrary and it resulted in denying arrears of payments to certain Sections of the employees. This argument is no longer res integra. It has been held in a catena of judgments that fixing of a cut-off date for granting of benefits is well within the powers of the Government as long as the reasons therefor are not arbitrary and are based on some rational consideration.”“ -- We have sympathies for the appellant but, in a society governed by Rule of law, sympathies cannot override the Rules and Regulations. We may recall the observations made by this Court while considering the issue of compassionate appointment in public service. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramachhandra Ambekar and Anr. (1994) 2 SCC 718, wherein the Court observed: ““The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration.... Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered that ““law is the embodiment of all wisdom”“. Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be.- Order Dated Feb 21 ,2011         
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COURT Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
  PARTIES Visveswaraya Technological University & Anr. Appellants Vs. Krishnendu Halder & Ors. Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1947 OF 2011
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD--The proliferating unaided private colleges, may need a full complement of students for their comfortable sustenance (meeting the cost of running the college and paying the staff etc.). But that cannot be at the risk of quality of education. To give an example, if 35% is the minimum passing marks in a qualifying examination, can it be argued by colleges that the minimum passing marks in the qualifying examination should be reduced to only 25 or 20 instead of 35 on the ground that the number of students/candidates who pass the examination are not sufficient to fill their seats? Reducing the standards to `fill the seats”“ will be a dangerous trend which will destroy the quality of education. If there are large number of vacancies, the remedy lies in (a) not permitting new colleges; (b) reducing the intake in existing colleges; (c) improving the infrastructure and quality of the institution to attract more students. Be that as it may. The need to fill the seats cannot be permitted to override the need to maintain quality of education. Creeping commercialization of education in the last few years should be a matter of concern for the central bodies, states and universities. 13. No student or college, in the teeth of the existing and prevalent rules of the State and the University can say that such rules should be ignored, whenever there are unfilled vacancies in colleges. In fact the State/University, may, in spite of vacancies, continue with the higher eligibility criteria to maintain better standards of higher education in the State or in the colleges affiliated to the University. Determination of such standards, being part of the academic policy of the University, are beyond the purview of judicial review, unless it is established that such standards are arbitrary or `adversely affect”“ the standards if any fixed by the Central Body under a Central enactment. The order of the Division Bench is therefore unsustainable. ORDER DATED:FEB 18, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. Dalveer Bhandari and Hon. J. Deepak Verma
  PARTIES Ravi Appellant Versus Badrinarayan & Ors. Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1926 of 2011
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD-- a permanent disability certificate by the said Medical Board. Therefore, the said certificate clearly establishes that Appellant had sustained permanent disability to his own body to the extent of 50% and even after several surgeries; he was not able to control his urination. We can well appreciate and imagine the problems and difficulties of a young boy aged 16 years, who is not able to control his urination and spoils his clothes even while attending school. We have been given to understand that he is required to go with additional sets of clothings so that he could change the same, in case they are spoiled. This is the state of affairs even as on date. We do not doubt the genuineness and correctness of the aforesaid certificate. Even otherwise, Respondents have also not contended that this certificate is forged or fabricated and has been obtained with an intention to get compensation-APPEAL ALLOWED- ORDER DATED- FEB 18, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. G.S. SINGHVI and Hon. J. ASOK KUMAR GANGULY
  PARTIES Sri. K.R. Madhusudhan & Ors....Appellant(s) Versus The Administrative Officer & Anr. ...Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1923-1924 OF 2011
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD--the Tribunal should have considered the prospect of future income while computing compensation but the Tribunal has not done that. In the appeal, which was filed by the appellants before the High Court, the High Court instead of maintaining the amount of compensation, granted by the Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had not given any reason. The High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from the multiplier used by the Tribunal without disclosing any reason therefore. The High Court has also not considered the clear and corroborative evidence about the prospect of future increment of the deceased. When the age of the deceased is between 51 and 55 years the multiplier is 11, which is specified in the II Column in the II Schedule in the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Tribunal has not committed any error by accepting the said multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate why the High Court chose to apply the multiplier of 6.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -ORDER DATED : FEB 18 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. R.V. Raveendran and Hon. J. A. K. Patnaik
  PARTIES Chowdhury Navin Hemabhai & Ors. ...... Appellants Versus The State of Gujarat & Ors....... Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1925 OF 2011
  ACT Civil Laws , Section:
  HEAD NOTE This is, however, a clear case where the admissions of the seven appellants took place due to the fault of the rule-making authority in not making the State Rules, 2008 in conformity of the MCI Regulations. For this fault of the rule-making authority if the appellants are discharged from the MBBS course, they will suffer grave injustice. On the peculiar facts of the case, we are thus of the view that this is a fit case where this Court should exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice between parties. In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Others. [(1991) 4 SCC 406] after examining the width of this power under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court held: ““No enactment made by Central or State legislature can limit or restrict the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, though while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the court must take into consideration the statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute. What would be the need of ““complete justice”“ in a cause or matter would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and while exercising that power the Court would take into consideration the express provisions of a substantive statute. Once this Court has taken seisin of a case, cause or matter, it has power to pass any order or issue direction as may be necessary to do complete justice in the matter. --In the facts of the present case, we have found that the appellants were not to be blamed for having secured admission in the MBBS course and the fault was entirely of the rule-making authority in making the 2008 Rules and the appellants have gone through the pains of appearing in the common entrance test and have been selected on the basis of their merit and admitted into the MBBS course in the college in accordance with the State Rules, 2008 and have pursued their studies for a year. Hence, even though under the MCI Regulations the appellants were not eligible for admission to the MBBS course in the academic year 2008-2009, for the purpose of doing complete justice in the matter before us, we direct that the admissions of the appellants to the MBBS course in the college during the academic year 2008-2009 will not be disturbed. This direction shall not, however, be treated as a precedent- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA - ORDER DATED- FEB 18,2011         
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COURT Hon. J. ALTAMAS KABIR and Hon. J. CYRIAC JOSEPH
  PARTIES United India Insurance Co. Ltd. ... Appellants Vs. K.M. Poonam & Ors. ... Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1928 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE The liability of the Insurance Company to pay compensation was limited to six persons travelling inside the vehicle only and that the liability to pay the others was that of the owner, we, in this case, are faced with the same problem as had surfaced in Anjana Shyam's case (supra). The number of persons to be compensated being in excess of the number of persons who could validly be carried in the vehicle, the question which arises is one of apportionment of the amounts to be paid. Since there can be no pick and choose method to identify the five passengers, excluding the driver, in respect of whom compensation would be payable by the Insurance Company, to meet the ends of justice we may apply the procedure adopted in Baljit Kaur”“s case (supra) and direct that the Insurance Company should deposit the total amount of compensation awarded to all the claimants and the amounts so deposited be disbursed to the claimants in respect to their claims, with liberty to the Insurance Company to recover the amounts paid by it over and above the compensation amounts payable in respect of the persons covered by the Insurance Policy from the owner of the vehicle, as was directed in Baljit Kaur”“s case- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011         
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COURT Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
  PARTIES ARUNA RAMCHANDRA SHANBAUG Petitioner(s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Writ Petition   , AppealNo: 115 OF 2009
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE The Dean of King Edward Memorial Hospital as well as Ms. Pinky Virani (who claims to be the next friend of the petitioner) are directed to intimate the brother(s)/sister(s) or other close relatives of the petitioner that the case will be listed on 2nd March, 2011 in the Supreme Court and they can put forward their views before the Court, if they so desire. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the Registry of this Court shall communicate a copy of this Order forthwith to the Dean, KEM Hospital. The Dean, KEM Hospital is requested to file an affidavit stating his views regarding the prayer in this writ petition, and also the condition of the petitioner- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011         
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COURT Hon. J. D.K. JAIN and Hon. J. H.L. DATTU
  PARTIES COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS -- APPELLANT VERSUS SAYED ALI & ANR.-- RESPONDENTS
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 4294-4295 OF 2002
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE The import manifest and the bill of entry having been filed before the Collectorate of Customs (Imports) Mumbai, the same having been assessed and clearance for home consumption having been allowed by the proper officer on importers executing bond, undertaking the obligation of export, in our opinion, the Collector of Customs (Preventive), not being a ““proper officer”“ within the meaning of Section 2(34) of the Act, was not competent to issue show cause notice for re- assessment under Section 28 of the Act. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the Collector of Customs (Preventive), who had issued the show cause notices was assigned the functions under Section 28 of the Act as ““proper officer”“ either by the Board or the Collector/Commissioner of Customs. We are convinced that Notifications No. 250-Cus and 251-Cus., both dated 27th August, 1983, issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of the Section 4 of the Act, appointing Collector of Customs (Preventive) etc. to be the Collector of Customs for Bombay, Thane and Kolaba Districts in the State of Maharashtra did not ipso facto confer jurisdiction on him to exercise power entrusted to the ““proper officers”“ for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act. In that view of the matter, we do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. V. Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the revenue in the second set of appeals, that the source of power to act as a ““proper officer”“ is Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and not sub-section 34 of Section 2 of the Act. The said sections merely authorize the Board to appoint officers of Customs and confer on them the powers and duties to be exercised/discharged by them, but for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act, an officer of customs has to be designated as ““proper officer”“ by assigning the function of levy and collection of duty, by the Board or the Commissioner of Customs. The argument is rejected accordingly. Similarly, revenue’‘‘‘s reliance on the decision of this court in Ram Narain Bishwanath & Ors. (supra) is clearly misplaced. In that case the issue for determination was that when goods imported and cleared at Paradip Port (Orissa State) were seized by the Customs authorities in West Bengal on the allegation that these had been imported on the strength of fictitious licences, whether the customs authorities at Paradip or West Bengal will have the jurisdiction to initiate adjudication proceedings. By a short order it was held that it was for the customs authorities at Paradip to initiate proceedings against the importer. Apart from the fact that none of the statutory provisions were considered in that case, the issue arising for consideration in the present appeals was not the subject matter therein. Thus, the said decision is of no avail to the revenue.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA and Hon. J. ANIL R. DAVE
  PARTIES GURJINDER SINGH .....APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF PUNJAB .....RESPONDENT
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1237 OF 2008
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD--With regard to recovery of the pistol, the learned counsel is right that the pistol was recovered from a public place but it was recovered from the place which could not have been easily located by anyone and, therefore, the accused cannot get benefit which the learned counsel wanted him to get. From the memo of recovery, it is clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under a plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar. Thus, it is very clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under the plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away on the eastern katcha path from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar and, therefore, in our opinion, the recovery cannot be said to be from a place which could have been easily accessible to anyone.
--With regard to recovery memo, the mistake committed in writing the word "witness" or "witnesses" can not be said to be so material so as to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. – SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED:FEB 18,2011
        
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COURT Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA
  PARTIES KHAJA SHARIFF & ORS. Appellant(s) VERSUS B.H.E.L., HYDERABAD Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 44 OF 2007
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE If the order has re-determined the valuable rights of the parties to the proceeding, whether without issuing any notice or after issuing notice, it is a judgment as per the tests laid down in Khimji's case.         
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COURT Hon. J. HARJIT SINGH BEDI and Hon. J. CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
  PARTIES SHARADBHAI JIVANLAL VANIYA .... APPELLANT Versus STATE OF GUJARAT.... RESPONDENT
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 810 OF 2004
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE CRIMINAL LAWS-The letter which forms the basis of conviction by the Appellate Court was never produced during the investigation and for the first time produced by the witness during the course of trial, when she appeared as a witness. It is submitted that authenticity of the letter in question has not been proved and hence the appellate Court ought not to have reversed the judgment of acquittal and convicted the appellant. --Moreover, this letter had not been produced before the police during the course of the initial investigation and had been handed over to the police after several months. This fact, as also a reading of the letter, indicates that this was a concocted piece of evidence and the work of a legal mind, as no person would write such a letter meeting all legal requirements for implicating himself and his near relatives, in a claim for dowry. It has also been pointed out that view taken by the Trial Court was one of the possible views which the High Court in appeal ought not to have reversed.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17,2011         
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COURT Hon. J. G.S. SINGHVI and Hon. J. ASOK KUMAR GANGULY
  PARTIES STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND OTHERS...Appellant(s) VERSUS HARPAL SINGH RAWAT...Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1894 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE CIVIL LAWS--An agreement signed by the parties in the matter of collection of toll. While rejecting the argument of the writ petitioner that he was not liable to pay stamp duty under Article 35(b) read with Section 2(16) of the Act, the Division Bench observed: ““On bare reading of the section it becomes clear that all leases with respect to immovable property would be leases in terms of Section 2(16) but in addition to leases of immovable property in other three categories there would also be lease under category (c) in which any instrument by which tolls of any description are let would be a lease for the purpose of Section 2(16). The instrument by which right to collect toll is conveyed has to be treated as lease for the purposes of Stamp Act. Right to collect toll will never in any circumstances involve immovable property. Basically toll is collected for using a road or bridge and as such neither the road nor the bridge is leased out, only the right to collection is leased out and this right of leasing out the collection is ““lease”“ for the purposes of Stamp Act- APPEAL ALLOWED- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. R V Raveendran and Hon. J. P Sathasivam
  PARTIES Meghwal Samaj Shiksha Samiti ... Appellant Vs. Lakh Singh & Ors. ... Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 821 OF 2004
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Civil Laws-There is concurrent finding that a pond exists and the area covered by it varies in the rainy season. In such a case no part of it could have been allotted to anybody for construction of house building or any allied purposes. It is important to notice that the material resources of the community like forests, tanks, ponds, hillock, mountain etc. are nature”“s bounty. They maintain delicate ecological balance. They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment which enables people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the guaranteed right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government, including the Revenue Authorities i.e. Respondents 11 to 13, having noticed that a pond is falling in disuse, should have bestowed their attention to develop the same which would, on one hand, have prevented ecological disaster and on the other provided better environment for the benefit of the public at large. Such vigil is the best protection against knavish attempts to seek allotment in non-abadi sites- Appeal Dismissed- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. S. H. Kapadia and Hon. J. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan and Hon. J. Swatanter Kumar
  PARTIES Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. ...Appellant(s) versus Union of India & Ors. ...Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1883 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. ...Appellant(s) versus Union of India & Ors. ...Respondent(s) - Case         
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COURT Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and J. Anil R. Dave
  PARTIES Union of India .... Appellant Versus Giani .... Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1884 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD--In the present case the acquisition proceeding commenced with the notification under Section 4 issued on 06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by the Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982, the date from which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was made applicable to the pending and subsequent proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan (supra) the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1A).

All the appeals, therefore, are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent and disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs. -SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED FEB 17,2011
        
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COURT Hon. J. G.S. SINGHVI and Hon. J. ASOK KUMAR GANGULY
  PARTIES P.S. Somanathan and Ors. ...Appellant(s) Versus District Insurance Officer and Anr. ...Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1891 OF 2011
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD--The High Court unfortunately took a very technical view in the matter of applying the multiplier. The High Court cannot keep out of its consideration the claim of the daughter of the first claimant, since the daughter was impleaded, and was 49 years of age. Admittedly, the deceased was looking after the entire family. In determining the age of the mother, the High Court should have accepted the age of the mother at 65, as given in the claim petition, since there is no controversy on that. By accepting the age of mother at 67, the High Court further reduced the multiplier from 6 to 5, even if we accept the reasoning of the High Court to be correct. The reasoning of the High Court is not correct in view of the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra). Following the same the High Court should have proceeded to compute the compensation on the age of the deceased.

Thus, the finding of the High Court is contrary to the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra), which is the leading decision on this question and which we follow.

This Court, therefore, cannot sustain the High Court judgment and is constrained to set aside the same. The award of MACT is restored.

The appeal is allowed. No costs
        
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COURT Hon. J. R. V. Raveendran and Hon. J. P. Sathasivam
  PARTIES Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited ... Appellant Versus Ghanshyam Dass & Ors. ... Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 4369 OF 2006
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD--The language of the circular dated 13.12.1995 makes it crystal clear that the Government took a fresh decision in supersession of earlier instructions that promotion to Grade-IV may be given from amongst officials in Grade-III on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade. Hence, the decision of the Government to make promotions to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade could take effect only from 13.12.1995 and not from a prior date and the respondents, who had filed O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 in the Central Administrative Tribunal could not claim any promotion to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic cadre with effect from any date prior to 13.12.1995. The Central Administrative Tribunal was, therefore, not right in allowing O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 by order dated 11.08.2000, directing the Government to consider promoting the applicants to Grade-IV with effect from the dates their immediate juniors in the basic grade seniority were so promoted subject to their being found fit with consequential benefits of seniority as well as arrears of pay and allowance and of retiral benefits in the case of those of the applicants in the O.As. who had retired on superannuation. In our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have interfered with the decision of the Tribunal. 18. We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the impugned orders dated 22.05.2003 of the High Court and the common order dated 11.08.2000 of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997. The two O.As. stand rejected. There will be no order as to costs.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA
  PARTIES UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ... APPELLANT(S) VERSUS NRIPEN SARMA ... RESPONDENT(S)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1922 OF 2011
  ACT Civil Laws , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Held- The appellant has preferred this appeal against the final judgment dated 10.09.2007 before this Court. This appeal is also barred by limitation of 114 days. There is no satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay before this Court also. -Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 17,2011 The Union of India ought to have been careful particularly in filing this Civil Appeal because the Division Bench, by the impugned order, has dismissed the appeal before it on the ground of delay. It is a matter of deep anguish and distress that majority of the matters filed by the Union of India are hopelessly barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanations exist for condoning inordinate delay in filing those cases. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to dismiss this appeal on the ground of delay. However, in the larger interest, we are keeping the question of law open         
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COURT Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
  PARTIES State of Haryana & Others ..Appellants versus Praduman Singh (D) By Lrs. ..Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 356 OF 2007
  ACT Civil Laws , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Held- It is, therefore, difficult for us to uphold the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court and hence we quash and set aside the same. If, however, the writ petitioner, respondents herein, has/have any other alternative remedy or forum to claim allotment of the land, they obviously will have to first of all get the letter of the State Government quashed and set aside which has ordered stopping the allotment of rehabilitation land forthwith. Unless the respondents succeed in doing so, no allotment of the land could have been made specially without any enquiry as to whether the predecessor-in-interest had left any land at all in Pakistan when he migrated to India. Besides this, learned counsel for the appellants-State further informed that the writ petitioner, predecessor-in- interest of the respondents herein had already been allotted land under the rehabilitation scheme way back in the year 1952 and, therefore, claim for allotment for the second time should not have been allowed by the High Court contrary to the government instructions. We find force in this submission also, and, therefore, this aspect was required to be examined and enquired before any order was passed in favour of the respondents-claimants- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 15, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
  PARTIES SURENDRA KOLI Appellant (s) VERSUS STATE OF U.P. ORS.Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 2227 OF 2010
  ACT Criminal Laws , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Held- Supreme Court of India-Order Dated Feb 15, 2011- The DNA test of Rimpa by CDFD, a pioneer institute in Hyderabad matched with that of blood of her parents and brother. The Doctors at AIIMS have put the parts of the deceased girls which have been recovered by the Doctors of AIIMS together. These bodies have been recovered in the presence of the Doctors of AIIMS at the pointing out by the accused Surendra Koli. Thus, recovery is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
On the facts of the case we see no reason to interfere with the findings of the trial court and the High Court that the appellant Surendra Koli is guilty of murdering Rimpa Haldar. Both Courts have gone into the evidence in great detail and we have perused the same. The appellant appears to be a serial killer, and these cases in our opinion fall within the category of rarest of the rare cases as laid down in Bachan singh Vs State of Punjab, 1982 SCC 689 which has been subsequently followed in Atbir Vs Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 SCC (9) 1.
The killings by the appellant Surendra Koli are horrifying and barbaric. He used a definite methodology in committing these murders. He would see small girls passing by the house, and taking advantage of their weakness lure them inside the house no. D-5, Sector 31, Nithari Village, Noida and there he would strangulate them and after killing them he tried to have sex with the body and would then cut off their body parts and eat them. Some parts of the body were disposed off by throwing them in the passage gallery and drain (nala) beside the house. House no. D-5, Sector 31 had become a virtual slaughter house, where innocent children were regularly butchered.
In our opinion, this case clearly falls within the category of rarest of rare case and no mercy can be shown to the appellant Surendra Koli.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
        
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COURT Hon. J. V.S. SIRPURKAR and Hon. J. T.S. THAKUR
  PARTIES Sheo Shankar Singh ...Appellant Versus State of Jharkhand & Anr. ...Respondents
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 791-792 OF 2005
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: Section 302/34/120B and 201 IPC
  HEAD NOTE Held-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 15, 2011-Coming to the case at hand we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in imposing the extreme penalty of death upon the appellants. We say so for reasons more than one. Firstly, because the appellants are not professional killers. Even according to the prosecution they were only a part of the coal mafia active in the region indulging in theft of coal from the collieries. The deceased being opposed to such activities appears to have incurred their wrath and got killed. Secondly, because even when the deceased was a politician there was no political angle to his killing. Thirdly, because while all culpable homicides amounting to murder are inhuman, hence legally and ethically unacceptable yet there was nothing particularly brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly in the manner of its execution so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community or exhaust depravity and meanness on the part of the assailants to call for the extreme penalty. Fourthly, because there was difference of opinion on the question of sentence to be awarded to the convicts. The Trial Court did not find it to be a rarest of rare case and remained content with the award of life sentence only which sentence the High Court enhanced to death. Considering all these circumstances, the death sentence awarded to the appellants in our opinion deserves to be commuted to life imprisonment.-Appeal Allowed         
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COURT Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
  PARTIES PRIYA DARSHNI DENTAL COLLEGE & HOSPITAL ... Petitioner VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS ... Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 319 OF 2010
  ACT CIVIL LAWS , Section:
  HEAD NOTE HELD- In view of the fact that the inspection and verification in regard to renewal of permission for the second, third, fourth and fifth years will be restricted only to the consideration of the additional faculty and additional infrastructure, it may not be necessary to apply the lengthy time schedule prescribed for initial permission, to renewal of permissions during the next four years. The DCI Regulations presently contemplate almost similar time schedules in regard to applications for establishment of new dental colleges, for opening of higher courses of study, for increase of admission capacity, and for renewal of permissions, with 15th July being the last date both for grant of permission or renewal of permission. DCI and Central Government may consider amendment to the DCI Regulations suitably to provide for a shorter and distinct time schedule for renewal of permissions, so that the dental colleges could file applications till end of February and the process of grant or refusal of renewal is completed by 15th of June. Conclusion 22. In view of the above, these writ petitions are allowed as follows : (a) The condition imposed by the Central Government (requiring the dental colleges to secure appropriate orders from this court approving the renewals of permission) in the letters of renewal of permission issued to the petitioners in July/August/September, 2010, is quashed; (b) It is however declared that the renewal of permissions issued by Central Government to the petitioners for the academic year 2010-2011, are valid.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 15,2011         
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COURT Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. H.L. GOKHALE
  PARTIES RAJESH NAUPATLAL SANKLA AND ANR. Appellant(s) VERSUS RAJA MAHENDRAGIR DHANRAJGIR AND ORS. Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1999 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Held- Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the suit is pending before the Small Causes Court, Pune. We direct the proceedings in the suit to continue, however, no final order in the suit be passed until the disposal of the writ petition to be filed by the appellants before the Bombay High Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we request the Bombay High Court to dispose of the writ petition, if filed (by the appellants within four weeks from today) as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within a period of one year from the date of filing of the writ petition. In case, the writ petition is not filed within a period of four weeks, this order would be of no avail to the appellants- Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 15 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and J. A.K. PATNAIK
  PARTIES UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .......APPELLANTS Versus J. JASON JOSEPH .....RESPONDENT
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1863 OF 2011
  ACT Civil Laws , Section:
  HEAD NOTE The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no justification for the High Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, to interfere with the findings of the revisional authority and the punishment imposed, which had been accepted by the Administrative Tribunal It is impermissible in law.
--The revisional authority did not interfere with the findings recorded by the appellate authority that respondent was not guilty of charges 2,3,4 and 5. The appellate authority found that as only charges 1,6 and 7 were proved and the other charges relating mis- appropriation of additional fare were not proved, the punishment of dismissal was excessive and consequently set aside the same and imposed a lesser punishment of reduction in rank.
-On the facts and circumstances, the said order of the appellate authority did not call for interference and that too in exercise of power of revision.
Therefore we are of the view that the High Court was justified in restoring the decision of the appellate authority imposing a lesser punishment.
However while the High Court was justified in restoring the order of reinstatement with imposition of lesser punishment of reduction in service with continuity of service, the High Court was not justified in granting the reliefs of seniority and 25% back wages. When the High Court has upheld the finding that the respondent was guilty of charges 1,6 and 7, any direction for back wages would amount to rewarding the guilty, which is not permissible. Nor will he be entitled to restoration of his seniority as ordered by the High Court.
we allow this appeal in part and set aside the order of the High Court awarding backwages of 25% and restoring the seniority.- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated :Feb 14, 2011
        
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COURT Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
  PARTIES ZAFRUDDIN KHAN ...APPELLANT vs. ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1862 OF 2011
  ACT Civil Laws , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Appeal-Civil Laws-The appellant has pointed out that apart from being a Member of the Bar, he is a former President of the Student Union of the AMU, former elected Member of AMU Court, Life Member of AMU Old Boys Association and Donor Life Member of the AMU-- He had produced documents in support of the said averments. The said averments are not shown to be false. The appellant claims that his only interest in filing the writ petition was to ensure that AMU continues to be an Institution of academic excellence and that no action of the University should dilute its academic excellence. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the writ petition was filed with the oblique motive of maligning the Vice Chancellor of the University. It is not necessary to examine that aspect now-Held- he has sufficient interest to file the writ petition in public interest. The High Court ought not to have dismissed the public interest litigation only on the ground of locus standi of appellant to file the writ petition. Appeal Allowed-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated: Feb 14 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
  PARTIES Budhadev Karmaskar ..Appellant versus State of West Bengal ..Respondents
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 135 OF 2010
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: Sec 302 IPC
  HEAD NOTE Appeal- Sec 302-Indian Penal Code-Medical Officer of Mauza Burdwan Medical College, opined that the death was due to the effect of the injuries as noted anti-mortem in nature; that all the injuries as noted in the post mortem examination report might be caused if a person pushed against the wall and it may be homicidal in nature- Appeal Dismised- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. Aftab Alam and Hon. J. R.M. Lodha
  PARTIES S.K.M. Haider .... Appellant Versus Union of India & Ors. ....Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1630 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Appeal- Civil Laws- Post of Ticket Collector is categorised in Annexure IV in Class B-2 but while doing so the underlying object of division of staff into three broad groups A, B and C for vision tests of candidates and of serving Railway employees in non-Gazetted Railway services seems to have been overlooked. Broadly, Class B-2 covers a certain staff in workshops and engine rooms engaged on duties. It has been so done because failing eyesight may endanger themselves or other employees from moving parts of the machinery and crane drivers on open line. This is in consonance with the objective of group B viz; `in the interest of the employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“. Insofar as Ticket Collectors are concerned, vision tests for them are not required `in the interest of employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“ as contemplated in group B but it is required in the interest of administration only - the objective contemplated in group C. In this view of the matter, there seems to be no rational basis, in relation to the object set out in Para 510 of IRMM, of categorizing the post of Ticket Collectors under Class B-2 in Annexure IV. However, it is for the respondents to have a fresh look insofar as categorisation of posts pertaining to non-Gazetted Railway services in Annexure IV is concerned. Suffice it to say that categorization of posts for the purpose of vision tests must have nexus with the object set out in Para 510. Having regard to the objective of division of groups/ classes for the purpose of vision tests under Para 510 of IRMM, the post of Ticket Collectors can not be held to be covered by Class B-2 but rather will be covered by Class C-2. Any inconsistency in categorization of Railway posts in Annexure IV, in our view, must not operate against the appellant in getting promotion to the post of Ticket Collector. --the appellant could not have been denied promotion to the post of Ticket Collector as he had passed written test and viva voce and was provisionally selected for the post of Ticket Collector and had been declared medically fit in Class C-2. --Appeal is allowed- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 14, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
  PARTIES NEHA ARUN JUGADAR & ANR. Petitioner(s) VERSUS KUMARI PALAK DIWAN JI Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 182 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Writ- Transfer Petition- Transfer Petition pending at the District Judge (MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P.) to the competent Court at Pune, Maharashtra. The petitioners allege in the petition that the MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. has no jurisdiction in the matter. - An order of transfer of a case can be passed where both the courts, namely, the transferor court as well as the transferee court, have jurisdiction to hear the case and the party seeking transfer of the case alleges that the transferee court would be more convenient because the witnesses are available there or for some other reason it will be convenient for the parties to have the case heard by the transferee court. There is no question of transfer of a case which has been filed in a court which has no jurisdiction at all to hear it.-With these observations, the transfer petition is dismissed-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and J. DEEPAK VERMA
  PARTIES JASVINDER SINGH SOHAL Appellant(s) VERSUS INDIAN BANK AND ANR. Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1642 OF 2011
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE In the facts of this case, we deem it appropriate to direct that the appeal, which was dismissed in default for not depositing the amount in time, shall be restored to its original number and be heard expeditiously by the Tribunal.-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated February 11, 2011.         
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COURT Hon. J. B.Sudershan Reddy and Hon. J. Surinder Singh Nijjar
  PARTIES Jarnail Singh ... Appellant VERSUS State of Punjab ...Respondent
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1960 OF 2009
  ACT , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Criminal Laws--Handed over the sample parcel, duly sealed and sample impression of seal to Constable for depositing the same in the office of Chemical Examiner. --None had tampered with the aforesaid case property and the seal which remained in his custody. --Deposited the case property in the office of Chemical Examiner on the same day and tendered receipt. --Report of the Chemical Examiner (Ex. PJ) which indicates that the seals were intact when the sample was received and tallied with the sample impression of the seal.
--It is note worthy that such a report of the Chemical Examiner would be admissible under Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. Considering the aforesaid clear evidence, it cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the link evidence merely because there was a delay of few days in sending the sample to the office of the Chemical Examiner.-Appeal Dismissed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated-February 11, 2011.
        
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COURT Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
  PARTIES Senior Law Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. And Anr. .Appellants Versus Guru Shakti Singh and Anr. .....Respondents
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1649 OF 2011
  ACT Civil Laws , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Civil Laws-Assigning of lesser marks to Sardar Mahinder Singh not only denied him the first place in the panel, but also unjustly and undeservedly gave the first respondent, the first place in the panel. The manner of assigning marks showed a clear intention to favour the first respondent at the cost of the other applicants. It is this finding that persuaded the General Manager of IOC to scrap the selection. The High Court having recorded a finding that the appellant was satisfied about the illegality committed by the selection committee, ought to have rejected the writ petition, as the decision of the appellants to scrap the selection was reasonable and not arbitrary.-Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India-Order dated:Feb 14, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. P. SATHASIVAM and Hon. J. DR. B.S. CHAUHAN
  PARTIES V.S. Achuthanandan .... Appellant(s) Versus R. Balakrishna Pillai & Ors. .... Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 350 OF 2006
  ACT Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 of 1947) , Section: Sections 120-B and 409- IPC, Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) -PC Act
  HEAD NOTE Criminal Laws-Appeal-Sections 120-B and 409- IPC, Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) -PC Act-- The prosecution has established - a) By awarding both the works of Idamalayar at a very high and exorbitant rate with special conditions having heavy financial implications. b) By reducing the retention and security amount. c) By allowing the contractor to return only fifty per cent of the empty cement bags. Having arrived at such conclusion, - High Court failed to appreciate in its proper sense the materials placed by the prosecution and brushed aside several important items of evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Unable to accept the conclusion of the High Court, namely, ““the proved circumstances are not sufficient to hold that there was conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution”“. - Satisfied that the Special Court after framing various points for consideration and after thorough discussion has accepted the case of the prosecution insofar as the work of driving the surge shaft, lining the surge shaft, balance driving the power tunnel and other allied works of Idamalayar Hydro Electric Power Project at a higher or exorbitant rates to the contractor K.P. Poulose and the accused persons have abused their official positions. -The Special Court has also accepted the prosecution case founding that A1 along with K.P. Poulose, Paul Mundakkal and other accused persons entered into criminal conspiracy and rightly convicted them. -The High Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused without adverting to the reliable and acceptable evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011         
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COURT Hon. J. DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA and Hon. J. ANIL R. DAVE
  PARTIES The Commissioner of Central Excise Visakhapatnam .Appellant Versus M/s. Mehta & Co. ...Respondent
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: 1090 OF 2009
  ACT Civil Procedure Code , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Civil Laws- Appeal- A bare perusal of the said order would also indicate that he has given deductions for the items held as immovable. -The Commissioner having considered the aforesaid issue carefully and after proper scrutiny, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the said findings by mere conclusion and without trying to meet the findings recorded by the Commissioner–Appeal Allowed , Set aside order passed by Tribunal and restore the order of Commissioner- Supreme Court of India. –Order Dated:FEBRUARY 10, 2011.         
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COURT Hon. J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI) and Hon. J (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
  PARTIES KILAKKATHA PARAMBATH SASI & ORS. ...APPELLANTS

Versus

STATE OF KERALA .....RESPONDENT

  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1383 OF 2003
  ACT Indian Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code , Section: Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC
  HEAD NOTE Even assuming, however, that the bus crew ought to have been examined as that would have greatly enhanced the value of the prosecution evidence, but their non-examination case would not mean that the entire prosecution story would fall through as there were several other credible witnesses including an injured one-- The appeal is accordingly dismissed.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated- 4 Feb 2011.         
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COURT Hon''ble Justice Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN and Hon''ble Justice P. SATHASIVAM
  PARTIES Bansi Lal ...Appellant

Versus State of Haryana ...Respondent


  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1322 OF 2004
  ACT Criminal Procdure Code,1973, Evidence Act , Section: Section 313 Cr.PC, Section 113B Evidence Act
  HEAD NOTE SUICIDE NOTE- DEFENCE TOOK BY ACCUSED THAT SUICIDE NOTE WRITTEN BY DECEASED-FAILURE TO REBUT THE PRESUMTION THAT HE HAD CAUSED DOWRY DEATH-APPEAL DISMISSED- In the instant case, evidently, the suicide note, Ext.P-2 purported to have been written by Sarla (deceased) had been taken by appellant as his defence while making his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the onus was on him to establish his defence by leading sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he has caused the dowry death. The appellant miserably failed to discharge that onus.--SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, DATED- 14/01/2011         
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COURT Hon'ble Justice J.M. Panchal and Hon'ble Justice H.L. Gokhale
  PARTIES Vikas Kumar Roorkewal ... Petitioner

Versus

State of Uttarakhand and others ...Respondents

  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 29 OF 2008
  ACT Criminal Procdure Code,1973 , Section: Section 406 Cr.P.C
  HEAD NOTE TRANSFER PETITION ALLOWED-CR.P.C-The petitioner has been able to show the circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred that it has become difficult for the witnesses to safely depose truth because of fear of being haunted by those against whom they have to depose. The reluctance of the witnesses to go to the court at Haridwar in spite of receipt of repeated summons is bound to hamper the course of justice.

If such a situation is permitted to continue, it will pave way for anarchy, oppression, etc., resulting in breakdown of criminal justice system. In order to see that the incapacitation of the eye-witnesses is removed and justice triumphs, it has become necessary to grant the relief claimed in the instant petition. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice would be served if transfer of the case from Haridwar to Delhi is ordered.
        
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COURT Hon'ble Justice HARJIT SINGH BEDI, Hon'ble Justice P. SATHASIVAM, Hon'ble Justice CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
  PARTIES Laxmichand @ Balbutya…………… ....Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Maharashtra………………....... Respondent(s)
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1643 OF 2005
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: 302 IPC
  HEAD NOTE Accused caused single blow in quarrel--Converted from Culpable homicide amounting to Culpable homicide not amounting to murder- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED-06/01/2011         
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COURT Hon'ble Justice MARKANDEY KATJU, Hon'ble Justice GYAN SUDHA MISRA
  PARTIES State of Kerala.............Appellant
-versus-
Raneef.............................Respondent
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: _ 3____OF 2011
  ACT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 1973, Constitution Of India , Section: Article 21
  HEAD NOTE BAIL- GRANTED-DELAY IN CONCLUDING THE TRAIL-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -dated--03/01/2011-
In deciding bail applications an important factor which should certainly be taken into consideration by the Court is the delay in concluding the trial. Often this takes several years, and if the accused is denied bail is ultimately acquitted, who will restore so many years of his life spent in custody? Is Article 21 of the constitution, which is the most basic of all the fundamental rights in our Constitution, not violated in such a case? Of course this is not the only factor, but it is certainly one of the important factors in deciding whether to grant bail.
        
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COURT Hon'ble Justice HARJIT SINGH BEDI, Hon'ble Justice P. SATHASIVAM, Hon'ble Justice CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
  PARTIES Jagat Singh .... Appellant(s)

Versus

State of H.P. .... Respondent(s)

  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1145 OF 2010
  ACT Indian Penal Code ,1860 , Section: Sec 302/307/34/323 IPC
  HEAD NOTE No Intention - as mentioned U/s 300 IPC- considering the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased as opined by Medical Expert- the conviction from Section 302 to Section 323 is altered.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- dated--03/01/2011         
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COURT Hon'ble Justice P. SATHASIVAM and Hon'ble Justice Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN
  PARTIES Ganesan ...Appellant

Versus

Rama Raghuraman & Ors. ...Respondents

  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 989 of 2003
  ACT Indian Penal Code ,1860 , Section: Sec 302/307/34/ 304-Part-II. IPC
  HEAD NOTE No intention to murder- Section 302 converted into 304 Part-II- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- dated--03/01/2011         
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COURT HARJIT SINGH BEDI J. & P.SATHASHIVAM j.
  PARTIES Abrar Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 1668 OF 2005
  ACT Indian Penal Code ,1860 , Section: 302 I.P.C.
  HEAD NOTE Dyeing Declaration - All witnesses hostiled - Conviction maintained on the basis of dyeing declaration alone : Supreme Court.         
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COURT Justice Dalveer Bhandari. and Justice. H.L. Gokhale
  PARTIES Sanjay Kumar Jain .....Appellant Versus State of Delhi .....Respondent
  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: 2400 OF 2010
  ACT Indian Penal Code , Section: Sec 302/304-B
  HEAD NOTE Evidence on record - The deceased was subjected to crueltyand harassment by her husband, the appellant herein and the harassment was in connection with the demand of dowry- victim (deceased) died within oneyear and two months of the marriage- to set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but in the facts and circumstances of this case we proceed to convict the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentence him to 9 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-         
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COURT J.M. PANCHAL,DEEPAK VERMA,Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN JJJ.
  PARTIES State of U.P. & Ors. Versus Hirendra Pal Singh etc.
  APPEAL Civil Appeal   , AppealNo: Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14992-93 of 2010
  ACT L.R.Manual , Section:
  HEAD NOTE Question of revival of the repealed clauses of L.R. Manual in case the substituted clauses are struck down by the court, would not arise. In view of this, the interim order would amount to substituting the legal policy by the judicial order, and thus not sustainable:Supreme Court         
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COURT J.M. PANCHAL, DEEPAK VERMA, Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN J.J.J.
  PARTIES State of U.P. & Ors. …… Appellants Versus Hirendra Pal Singh etc. …….Respondents
  APPEAL Writ Petition   , AppealNo: (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14992-93 of 2010)
  ACT U.P. L.R.MANUAL , Section:
  HEAD NOTE APPOINTMENTS OF District Government Counsels/Asst.District Government Counsels in Uttar Pradesh under amended provisions of L.R.Manual : Supreme COURT Dated 3/12/2010.         
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COURT Hon'ble Aftab Alam & Hon'ble R.M. Lodha
  PARTIES Laxmi Ram Pawar ...... Appellant

Vs.

Sitabai Balu Dhotre & Anr. ...... Respondents

  APPEAL Criminal Appeal   , AppealNo: