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Latest Judgements of Supreme Court of India
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CJI. K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. D.K. JAIN, J. P. SATHASIVAM, J. J.M. PANCHAL.
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Judgement Dated:2/17/2010 12:00:00 AM
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Civil Appeal
- 6249-6250 of 2001
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Constitution of India
-226 , 32.
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State of West Bengal & others
Vs.
Committee for Protection of Democratic
Rights, West Bengal & others.
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Head Note: Whether the High Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of
Investigation established under
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 , to investigate a
cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without
the consent of the State Government ? -Yes. : Constitution Bench Supreme Court.
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Judgement:
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J U D G M E N T----
D.K. JAIN, J.:
1.The issue which has been referred for the opinion of
the Constitution Bench is whether the High Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of
Investigation (for short the CBI), established under
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for
short the Special Police Act), to investigate a
cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without
the consent of the State Government.
2.For the determination of the afore-stated important
legal issue, it is unnecessary to dilate on the facts
obtaining in individual cases in this bunch of civil
appeals/special leave petitions/writ petitions and a
brief reference to the facts in Civil Appeal Nos.6249-
6250 of 2001, noticed in the referral order dated 8th
November, 2006, would suffice. These are:
One Abdul Rahaman Mondal (hereinafter referred to
as, the complainant) along with a large number of
workers of a political party had been staying in several
camps of that party at Garbeta, District Midnapore, in
the State of West Bengal. On 4th January, 2001, the
complainant and few others decided to return to their
homes from one such camp. When they reached the
complainants house, some miscreants, numbering 50-60,
attacked them with firearms and other explosives, which
resulted in a number of casualties. The complainant
managed to escape from the place of occurrence, hid
himself and witnessed the carnage. He lodged a written
complaint with the Garbeta Police Station on 4th January,
2001 itself but the First Information Report (the FIR
for short) for offences under Sections
148/149/448/436/364/302/201 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short the IPC) read with Sections 25/27 of
the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 9 (B) of the Explosives
Act, 1884 was registered only on 5th January, 2001. On 8th
January, 2001, Director General of Police, West Bengal
directed the C.I.D. to take over the investigations in
the case. A writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution was filed in the High Court of Judicature at
Calcutta by the Committee for Protection of Democratic
Rights, West Bengal, in public interest, inter alia,
alleging that although in the said incident 11 persons
had died on 4th January, 2001 and more than three months
had elapsed since the incident had taken place yet except
two persons, no other person named in the FIR, had been
arrested; no serious attempt had been made to get the
victims identified and so far the police had not been
able to come to a definite conclusion whether missing
persons were dead or alive. It was alleged that since
the police administration in the State was under the
influence of the ruling party which was trying to hide
the incident to save its image, the investigations in the
incident may be handed over to the CBI, an independent
agency.
3.Upon consideration of the affidavit filed in opposition
by the State Government, the High Court felt that in the
background of the case it had strong reservations about
the impartiality and fairness in the investigation by the
State police because of the political fallout, therefore,
no useful purpose would be served in continuing with the
investigation by the State Investigating Agency.
Moreover, even if the investigation was conducted fairly
and truthfully by the State police, it would still be
viewed with suspicion because of the allegation that all
the assailants were members of the ruling party. Having
regard to all these circumstances, the High Court deemed
it appropriate to hand over the investigation into the
said incident to the CBI.
4.Aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, the
State of West Bengal filed a petition for special leave
to appeal before this Court. On 3rd September, 2001 leave
was granted. When the matter came up for hearing before a
two-Judge Bench on 8th November, 2006, taking note of the
contentions urged by learned counsel for the parties and
the orders passed by this Court in The Management of
Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Shri Gurudasmal & Ors.1 and
Kazi Lhendup Dorji Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation &
Ors.2, the Bench was of the opinion that the question of
law involved in the appeals was of great public
importance and was coming before the courts frequently
and, therefore, it was necessary that the issue be
settled by a larger Bench. Accordingly, the Bench
directed that the papers of the case be placed before the
Honble Chief Justice of India for passing appropriate
orders for placing the matter before a larger Bench.
When the matter came up before a three-Judge Bench,
1
1970 (1) SCC 633
2
1994 Supp (2) SCC 116
headed by the Honble Chief Justice of India, on 29th
August, 2008, this batch of cases was directed to be
listed before a Constitution Bench. This is how these
matters have been placed before us.
The Rival Contentions:
5.Shri K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the State of West Bengal, referring to Entry
80 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution
of India; Entry 2 of List II of the said Schedule as also
Sections 5 and 6 of the Special Police Act strenuously
argued that from the said Constitutional and Statutory
provisions it is evident that there is a complete
restriction on Parliaments legislative power in enacting
any law permitting the police of one State to investigate
an offence committed in another State, without the
consent of that State. It was urged that the Special
Police Act enacted in exercise of the powers conferred
under the Government of India Act, 1935, Entry 39 of List
I (Federal Legislative List) of the Seventh Schedule, the
field now occupied by Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution, replicates the prohibition
of police of one State investigating an offence in
another State without the consent of that State. It was
submitted that Entry 2 of List II which confers exclusive
jurisdiction on the State Legislature in regard to the
police, the exclusive jurisdiction of a State Legislature
cannot be encroached upon without the consent of the
concerned State being obtained.
6.Learned senior counsel submitted that the separation of
powers between the three organs of the State, i.e. the
Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary would
require each one of these organs to confine itself within
the field entrusted to it by the Constitution and not to
act in contravention or contrary to the letter and spirit
of the Constitution.
7.Thus, the thrust of argument of the learned counsel was
that both, the federal structure as well as the
principles of separation of powers, being a part of the
basic structure of the Constitution, it is neither
permissible for the Central Government to encroach upon
the legislative powers of a State in respect of the
matters specified in List II of the Seventh Schedule nor
can the superior courts of the land adjure such a
jurisdiction which is otherwise prohibited under the
Constitution. It was urged that if the Parliament were
to pass a law which authorises the police of one State to
investigate in another State without the consent of that
State, such a law would be pro tanto invalid and,
therefore, the rule of law would require the courts,
which are subservient to the Constitution, to ensure that
the federal structure embodied in the Constitution as a
basic principle, is not disturbed by permitting/directing
the police force of a State to investigate an offence
committed in another State without the consent of that
State.
8.Relying heavily on the observations of the Constitution
Bench in Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India
& Anr.3 to the effect that Article 142, even with the
width of its amplitude, cannot be used to build a new
edifice where none existed earlier, by ignoring express
statutory provisions dealing with a subject and thereby
to achieve something indirectly which cannot be achieved
directly, learned counsel contended that when even
Article 142 of the Constitution cannot be used by this
Court to act contrary to the express provisions of law,
the High Court cannot issue any direction ignoring the
Statutory and Constitutional provisions. Learned counsel
went to the extent of arguing that even when the State
police is not in a position to conduct an impartial
investigation because of extraneous influences, the Court
still cannot exercise executive power of directing the
police force of another State to carry out investigations
without the consent of that State. In such a situation,
the matter is best left to the wisdom of the Parliament
to enact an appropriate legislation to take care of the
situation. According to the learned counsel, till that
3
(1998) 4 SCC 409
is done, even such an extreme situation would not justify
the Court upsetting the federal or quasi-federal system
created by the Constitution.
9.As regards the exercise of jurisdiction by a High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution, learned counsel
submitted that apart from the fact that there is a
significant difference between the power of this Court
under Article 142 of the Constitution and the
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution because of territorial limitations under
Article 226 (1) of the Constitution, a High Court is
disentitled from issuing any direction to the authorities
situated outside the territories over which it has
jurisdiction. According to the learned counsel Clause
(2) of Article 226 would have no application in a case,
such as the present one, since the cause of action was
complete at the time of filing the writ petition and the
power under Clause (2) can be exercised only where there
is a nexus between the cause of action which arises
wholly or partly within the State and the authority which
is situated outside the State. It was asserted that the
CBI being a rank outsider, unconnected to the incident,
which took place within the State of West Bengal, the
investigation of which was being conducted by the
jurisdictional local police in West Bengal, had no
authority to take up the case for investigation.
10.Shri Goolam E. Vahanvati, learned Solicitor General of
India, appearing on behalf of the Union of India,
submitted that the entire approach of the State being
based on an assumption that the alleged restriction on
Parliaments legislative power under Entry 80 of List I
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and
restriction on the power of the Central Government under
Section 6 of the Special Police Act to issue a
notification binds the constitutional courts i.e. the
Supreme Court and the High Courts is fallacious, inasmuch
as the restrictions on the Central Government and
Parliament cannot be inferentially extended to be
restrictions on the Constitutional Courts in exercise of
their powers under Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution as it is the obligation of the Superior
Courts to protect the citizens and enforce their
fundamental rights. Learned counsel vehemently argued
that the stand of the appellants that the exercise of
power by the Supreme Court or the High Courts to refer
investigation to CBI directly without prior approval of
the concerned State Government would violate the federal
structure of the Constitution is again misconceived as it
overlooks the basic fact that in a federal structure it
is the duty of the courts to uphold the Constitutional
values and to enforce the Constitutional limitations as
an ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. In support
of the proposition, learned counsel placed reliance on
the decisions of this Court in State of Rajasthan & Ors.
Vs. Union of India & Ors.4, S.R. Bommai & Ors. Vs. Union
of India & Ors.5 and Kuldip Nayar & Ors. Vs. Union of
India & Ors.6.
11.Relying on the recent decision by a Bench of nine
Judges of this Court in I.R. Coelho (D) By LRs. Vs. State
of Tamil Nadu7, learned counsel submitted that the
judicial review being itself the basic feature of the
Constitution, no restriction can be placed even by
inference and by principle of legislative competence on
the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Courts with
regard to the enforcement of fundamental rights and
protection of the citizens of India. Learned counsel
asserted that in exercise of powers either under Article
32 or 226 of the Constitution, the courts are merely
discharging their duty of judicial review and are neither
usurping any jurisdiction, nor overriding the doctrine of
separation of powers. In support of the proposition that
the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by
Article 32 as also on the High Courts under Article 226
of the Constitution is an important and integral part of
the basic structure of the Constitution, learned counsel
placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Special
4
(1977) 3 SCC 592
5
(1994) 3 SCC 1
6
(2006) 7 SCC 1
7
(2007) 2 SCC 1
Reference No.1 of 19648, Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. Vs.
Union of India & Ors.9, Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar
Union (Regd.), Sindri & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 10,
Nilabati Behera Vs. State of Orissa & Ors.11 and L.
Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.12. Relying on the
decision of this Court in Dwarkanath, Hindu Undivided
Family Vs. Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Kanpur &
Anr.13, learned counsel emphasised that the powers of the
High Court under Article 226 are also wide and plenary in
nature similar to that of the Supreme Court under Article
32 of the Constitution.
The Questions for Consideration:
12.It is manifest that in essence the objection of the
appellant to the CBIs role in police investigation in a
State without its consent, proceeds on the doctrine of
distribution of legislative powers as between the Union
and the State Legislatures particularly with reference to
the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution and the distribution of powers between the
said three organs of the State.
13.In order to appreciate the controversy, a brief
reference to some of the provisions in the Constitution
8
[1965] 1 S.C.R. 413
9
(1980) 3 SCC 625
10
(1981) 1 SCC 568
11
(1993) 2 SCC 746
12
(1997) 3 SCC 261
13
[1965] 3 S.C.R. 536
would be necessary. The Constitution of India is divided
into several parts, each part dealing in detail with
different aspects of the social, economic, political and
administrative set up. For the present case, we are
mainly concerned with Part III of the Constitution, which
enumerates the fundamental rights guaranteed by the State
primarily to citizens and in some cases to every resident
of India and Part XI thereof, which pertains to the
relations between the Union and the States.
14.Bearing in mind the basis on which the correctness of
the impugned direction is being questioned by the State
of West Bengal, we shall first notice the scope and
purport of Part XI of the Constitution. According to
Article 1 of the Constitution, India is a `Union of
States, which means a Federation of States. Every federal
system requires division of powers between the Union and
State Governments, which in our Constitution is effected
by Part XI thereof. While Articles 245 to 255 deal with
distribution of legislative powers, the distribution of
administrative powers is dealt with in Articles 256 to
261. Under the Constitution, there is a three-fold
distribution of legislative powers between the Union and
the States, made by the three Lists in the Seventh
Schedule of the Constitution. While Article 245 confers
the legislative powers upon the Union and the States,
Article 246 provides for distribution of legislative
powers between the Union and the States. Article 246,
relevant for our purpose, reads as follows:
246. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament
and by the Legislatures of States -- (1)
Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3),
Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List
I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution
referred to as the Union List).
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3),
Parliament and, subject to clause (1), the
Legislature of any State also, have power to
make laws with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule
(in this Constitution referred to as the
Concurrent List).
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the
Legislature of any State has exclusive power to
make laws for such State or any part thereof
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in
List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this
Constitution referred to as the `State List).
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with
respect to any matter for any part of the
territory of India not included in a State
notwithstanding that such matter is a matter
enumerated in the State List.
15.The Article deals with the distribution of legislative
powers between the Union and the State Legislatures.
List I or the `Union List enumerates the subjects over
which the Union shall have exclusive powers of
legislation in respect of 99 items or subjects, which
include Defence etc.; List II or the `State List
comprises of subjects, which include Public Order, Police
etc., over which the State Legislature shall have
exclusive power of legislation and List III gives
concurrent powers to the Union and the State Legislatures
to legislate in respect of items mentioned therein. The
Article postulates that Parliament shall have exclusive
power to legislate with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List I notwithstanding anything contained
in clauses (2) and (3). The non obstante clause in
Article 246(1) contemplates the predominance or supremacy
of the Union Legislature. This power is not encumbered
by anything contained in clause (2) and (3) for these
clauses themselves are expressly limited and made subject
to the non obstante clause in Article 246(1). The State
Legislature has exclusive power to make laws for such
State or any part thereof with respect to any of the
matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule and
it also has the power to make laws with respect to any
matters enumerated in List III (Concurrent List). The
exclusive power of the State Legislature to legislate
with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II
has to be exercised subject to clause (1) i.e. the
exclusive power of Parliament to legislate with respect
to matters enumerated in List I. As a consequence, if
there is a conflict between an Entry in List I and an
Entry in List II, which is not capable of reconciliation,
the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a
matter enumerated in List II must supersede pro tanto the
exercise of power of the State Legislature. Both
Parliament and the State Legislature have concurrent
powers of legislation with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in List III. The words notwithstanding
anything contained in clauses (2) and (3) in Article 246
(1) and the words subject to clauses (1) and (2) in
Article 246 (3) lay down the principle of federal
supremacy viz. that in case of inevitable conflict
between Union and State powers, the Union power as
enumerated in List I shall prevail over the State power
as enumerated in Lists II and III and in case of an
overlapping between Lists II and III, the latter shall
prevail. Though, undoubtedly, the Constitution exhibits
supremacy of Parliament over State Legislatures, yet the
principle of federal supremacy laid down in Article 246
of the Constitution cannot be resorted to unless there is
an irreconcilable direct conflict between the entries in
the Union and the State Lists. Thus, there is no quarrel
with the broad proposition that under the Constitution
there is a clear demarcation of legislative powers
between the Union and the States and they have to confine
themselves within the field entrusted to them. It may
also be borne in mind that the function of the Lists is
not to confer powers; they merely demarcate the
Legislative field. But the issue we are called upon to
determine is that when the scheme of Constitution
prohibits encroachment by the Union upon a matter which
exclusively falls within the domain of the State
Legislature, like public order, police etc., can the
third organ of the State viz. the Judiciary, direct the
CBI, an agency established by the Union to do something
in respect of a State subject, without the consent of the
concerned State Government?
16.In order to adjudicate upon the issue at hand, it
would be necessary to refer to some other relevant
Constitutional and Statutory provisions as well.
17.As noted earlier, the Special Police Act was enacted
by the Governor General in Council in exercise of the
powers conferred by the Government of India Act, 1935
(Entry 39 of List I, Seventh Schedule). The said Entry
reads as under:-
Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of
members of a police force belonging to any part
of British India to any area in another
Governors Province or Chief Commissioners
Province, but not so as to enable the police of
one part to exercise powers and jurisdiction
elsewhere without the consent of the Government
of the Province or the Chief Commissioner as the
case may be; extension of the powers and
jurisdiction of members of a police force
belonging to any unit to railway areas outside
that unit.
It is manifest that the Special Police Act was passed in
terms of the said Entry imposing prohibition on the
Federal Legislature to enact any law permitting the
police of one State from investigating an offence
committed in another State, without the consent of the
State. The said Entry was replaced by Entry 80 of List I
of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.
The said entry reads thus:
Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of
members of a police force belonging to any State
to any area outside that State, but not so as to
enable the police of one State to exercise
powers and jurisdiction in any area outside that
State without the consent of the Govt. of the
State in which such area is situated; extension
of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a
police force belonging to any State to railway
areas outside that State.
Entry 2 of List II of the Constitution of India, which
corresponds to Entry 2 List II of the Government of India
Act, conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the States in
matter relating to police reads as under:
Entry 2 List II:
Police (including railway and village police)
subject to the provisions of entry 2A of List
I.
Entry 2A of List I:
Development of any armed force of the Union or
any other force subject to the control of the
Union or any contingent or unit thereof in any
State in aid of the civil power; powers,
jurisdiction, privileges and liabilities of the
members of such forces while on such
deployment.
18.From a bare reading of the afore-noted Constitutional
provisions, it is manifest that by virtue of these
entries, the legislative power of the Union to provide
for the regular police force of one State to exercise
power and jurisdiction in any area outside the State can
only be exercised with the consent of the Government of
that particular State in which such area is situated,
except the police force belonging to any State to
exercise power and jurisdiction to railway areas outside
that State.
19.As the preamble of the Special Police Act states, it
was enacted with a view to constitute a special force in
Delhi for the investigation of certain offences in the
Union Territories and to make provisions for the
superintendence and administration of the said force and
for the extension to other areas of the powers and
jurisdiction of the members of the said force in regard
to the investigation of the said offences. Sub-section
(1) of Section 1 specifies the title of the Special
Police Act and sub-section (2) speaks that the Special
Police Act extends to the whole of India. Section 2
contains 3 sub-sections. Sub-section (1) empowers the
Central Government to constitute a special police force
to be called the Delhi Special Police Establishment for
the investigation of offences notified under Section 3 in
any Union Territory; sub-section (2) confers upon the
members of the said police establishment in relation to
the investigation of such offences and arrest of persons
concerned in such offences, all the powers, duties,
privileges and liabilities which police officers of that
Union Territory have in connection with the investigation
of offences committed therein and sub-section (3)
provides that any member of the said police establishment
of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector be deemed to be an
officer in charge of a police station. Under Section 3 of
the Special Police Act, the Central Government is
required to specify and notify the offences or classes of
offences which are to be investigated by the Delhi
Special Police Establishment, constituted under the
Special Police Act, named the CBI. Section 4 deals
with the administrative control of the establishment and
according to sub-section (2), the superintendence of
the Establishment vests in the Central Government and the
administration of the said establishment vests in an
officer appointed in this behalf by the Central
Government. Explaining the meaning of the word
Superintendence in Section 4(1) and the scope of the
authority of the Central Government in this context, in
Vineet Narain & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Anr. 14, a Bench
of three Judges of this Court said:
40....The word superintendence in Section 4(1)
cannot be construed in a wider sense to permit
supervision of the actual investigation of an
offence by the CBI contrary to the manner
provided by the statutory provisions. The broad
proposition urged on behalf of the Union of
India that it can issue any directive to the CBI
to curtail or inhibit its jurisdiction to
investigate an offence specified in the
notification issued under Section 3 by a
directive under Section 4(1) of the Act cannot
be accepted. The jurisdiction of the CBI to
investigate an offence is to be determined with
reference to the notification issued under
14
(1998) 1 SCC 226
Section 3 and not by any separate order not
having that character.
20.Section 5 of the Special Police Act empowers the
Central Government to extend the powers and jurisdiction
of the Special Police Establishment to any area, in a
State, not being a Union Territory for the investigation
of any offences or classes of offences specified in a
notification under Section 3 and on such extension of
jurisdiction, a member of the Establishment shall
discharge the functions of a police officer in that area
and shall, while so discharging such functions, be deemed
to be a member of the police force of that area and be
vested with the powers, functions and privileges and be
subject to the liabilities of a police officer belonging
to that police force.
21.Section 6, the pivotal provision, reads as follows:-
6. Consent of State Government to exercise of
powers and jurisdiction. - Nothing contained in
Section 5 shall be deemed to enable any member of
the Delhi Special Police Establishment to
exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area in a
State, not being a Union Territory or railway
area, without the consent of the Government of
that State.
22.Thus, although Section 5(1) empowers the Central
Government to extend the powers and jurisdiction of
members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to any
area in a State, but Section 6 imposes a restriction on
the power of the Central Government to extend the
jurisdiction of the said Establishment only with the
consent of the State Government concerned.
23.Having noticed the scope and amplitude of Sections 5
and 6 of the Special Police Act, the question for
consideration is whether the restriction imposed on the
powers of the Central Government would apply mutatis
mutandis to the Constitutional Courts as well. As stated
above, the main thrust of the argument of Shri K.K.
Venugopal, learned senior counsel, is that the course
adopted by the High Court in directing the CBI to
undertake investigation in the State of West Bengal
without the consent of the State is incompatible with the
federal structure as also the doctrine of separation of
powers between the three organs of the State, embodied in
the Constitution even when the High Court, on the
material before it, was convinced that the State Police
was dragging its feet in so far as investigation into the
4th January, 2001 carnage was concerned.
24.In so far as the first limb of the argument is
concerned, it needs little emphasis that, except in the
circumstances indicated above, in a federal structure,
the Union is not permitted to encroach upon the
legislative powers of a State in respect of the matters
specified in List II of the Seventh Schedule. However,
the second limb of the argument of the learned counsel in
regard to the applicability of the doctrine of separation
of powers to the issue at hand, in our view, is clearly
untenable. Apart from the fact that the question of
Centre - State relationship is not an issue in the
present case, a Constitutional Court being itself the
custodian of the federal structure, the invocation of the
federal structure doctrine is also misplaced.
25.In a democratic country governed by a written
Constitution, it is the Constitution which is supreme and
sovereign. As observed in Raja Ram Pal Vs. Honble
Speaker, Lok Sabha & Ors.15, the Constitution is the
suprema lex in this country. All organs of the State,
including this Court and the High Courts, derive their
authority, jurisdiction and powers from the Constitution
and owe allegiance to it. Highlighting the fundamental
features of a federal Constitution, in Special Reference
No.1 (supra), the Constitution Bench (7-Judges) observed
as follows:
...the essential characteristic of federalism is
`the distribution of limited executive,
legislative and judicial authority among bodies
which are coordinate with and independent of
each other. The supremacy of the Constitution
is fundamental to the existence of a federal
State in order to prevent either the legislature
of the federal unit or those of the member
States from destroying or impairing that
delicate balance of power which satisfies the
particular requirements of States which are
desirous of union, but not prepared to merge
their individuality in a unity. This supremacy
of the Constitution is protected by the
15
(2007) 3 SCC 184
authority of an independent judicial body to act
as the interpreter of a scheme of distribution
of powers.
26.It is trite that in the Constitutional Scheme adopted
in India, besides supremacy of the Constitution, the
separation of powers between the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary constitutes the basic
features of the Constitution. In fact, the importance of
separation of powers in our system of governance was
recognised in Special Reference No.1 (supra), even before
the basic structure doctrine came to be propounded in the
celebrated case of His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati
Sripadagalvaru Vs. State of Kerala & Anr.16, wherein while
finding certain basic features of the Constitution, it
was opined that separation of powers is part of the basic
structure of the Constitution. Later, similar view was
echoed in Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi Vs. Shri Raj Narain &
Anr.17 and in a series of other cases on the point.
Nevertheless, apart from the fact that our Constitution
does not envisage a rigid and strict separation of powers
between the said three organs of the State, the power of
judicial review stands entirely on a different pedestal.
Being itself part of the basic structure of the
Constitution, it cannot be ousted or abridged by even a
Constitutional amendment. [See: L. Chandra Kumar Vs.
Union of India & Ors. (supra)]. Besides, judicial review
16
(1973) 4 SCC 225
17
1975 (Supp) SCC 1
is otherwise essential for resolving the disputes
regarding the limits of Constitutional power and entering
the Constitutional limitations as an ultimate interpreter
of the Constitution. In Special Reference No.1 of 1964
(supra), it was observed that whether or not there is
distinct and rigid separation of powers under the Indian
Constitution, there is no doubt that the Constitution has
entrusted to the judicature in this country the task of
construing the provisions of the Constitution and of
safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens. In
Smt. Indira Nehru Gandhi (supra), Y.V. Chandrachud, J.
(as His Lordship then was), drawing distinction between
the American and Australian Constitution on the one hand
and the Indian Constitution on the other, observed that
the principle of separation of powers is not a magic
formula for keeping the three organs of the State within
the strict confines of their functions. The learned
judge also observed that in a federal system, which
distributes powers between three coordinate branches of
government, though not rigidly, disputes regarding the
limits of Constitutional power have to be resolved by
courts. Quoting George Whitecross Paton, an Australian
Legal Scholar, that the distinction between judicial and
other powers may be vital to the maintenance of the
Constitution itself, the learned judge said that the
principle of separation of powers is a principle of
restraint which has in it the percept, innate in the
prudence of self-preservation (even if history has not
repeatedly brought in home), that discretion is the
better part of valour18.
27.Recently in State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Jeet S. Bisht &
Anr.19, S.B. Sinha, J. dealt with the topic of separation
of powers in the following terms:
77. Separation of powers is a favourite topic
for some of us. Each organ of the State in
terms of the constitutional scheme performs one
or the other functions which have been assigned
to the other organ. Although drafting of
legislation and its implementation by and large
are functions of the legislature and the
executive respectively, it is too late in the
day to say that the constitutional courts role
in that behalf is non-existent. The judge-made
law is now well recognised throughout the
world. If one is to put the doctrine of
separation of power to such a rigidity, it
would not have been possible for any superior
court of any country, whether developed or
developing, to create new rights through
interpretative process.
78. Separation of powers in one sense is a
limit on active jurisdiction of each organ. But
it has another deeper and more relevant
purpose: to act as check and balance over the
activities of other organs. Thereby the active
jurisdiction of the organ is not challenged;
nevertheless there are methods of prodding to
communicate the institution of its excesses and
shortfall in duty. Constitutional mandate sets
the dynamics of this communication between the
organs of polity. Therefore, it is suggested to
not understand separation of powers as
operating in vacuum. Separation of powers
doctrine has been reinvented in modern times.
xxx xxx xxx
18
Julius Stone: Social Dimensions of Law and Justice, (1966) p. 668.
19
(2007) 6 SCC 586
80. The modern view, which is today gathering
momentum in constitutional courts the world
over, is not only to demarcate the realm of
functioning in a negative sense, but also to
define the minimum content of the demarcated
realm of functioning. Objective definition of
function and role entails executing the same,
which however may be subject to the plea of
financial constraint but only in exceptional
cases. In event of any such shortcoming, it is
the essential duty of the other organ to advise
and recommend the needful to substitute
inaction. To this extent we must be prepared to
frame answers to these difficult questions.
xxx xxx xxx
83. If we notice the evolution of separation of
powers doctrine, traditionally the checks and
balances dimension was only associated with
governmental excesses and violations. But in
todays world of positive rights and
justifiable social and economic entitlements,
hybrid administrative bodies, private
functionaries discharging public functions, we
have to perform the oversight function with
more urgency and enlarge the field of checks
and balances to include governmental inaction.
Otherwise we envisage the country getting
transformed into a state of repose. Social
engineering as well as institutional
engineering therefore forms part of this
obligation.
28.Having discussed the scope and width of the doctrine
of separation of powers, the moot question for
consideration in the present case is that when the
fundamental rights, as enshrined in Part III of the
Constitution, which include the right to equality
(Article 14); the freedom of speech [Article 19(1)(a)]
and the right not to be deprived of life and liberty
except by procedure established by law (Article 21), as
alleged in the instant case, are violated, can their
violation be immunised from judicial scrutiny on the
touchstone of doctrine of separation of powers between
the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary. To put it
differently, can the doctrine of separation of powers
curtail the power of judicial review, conferred on the
Constitutional Courts even in situations where the
fundamental rights are sought to be abrogated or abridged
on the ground that exercise of such power would impinge
upon the said doctrine?
|
|
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29.The Constitution is a living and organic document. It
cannot remain static and must grow with the nation. The
Constitutional provisions have to be construed broadly
and liberally having regard to the changed circumstances
and the needs of time and polity. In Kehar Singh & Anr.
Vs. Union of India & Anr.20, speaking for the Constitution
Bench, R.S. Pathak, C.J. held that in keeping with modern
Constitutional practice, the Constitution of India is a
constitutive document, fundamental to the governance of
the country, whereby the people of India have provided a
Constitutional polity consisting of certain primary
organs, institutions and functionaries with the intention
of working out, maintaining and operating a
Constitutional order. On the aspect of interpretation of
a Constitution, the following observations of Justice
20
(1989) 1 SCC 204
Dickson of the Supreme Court of Canada in Lawson A.W.
Hunter & Ors. Vs. Southam Inc.21 are quite apposite:
The task of expounding a constitution is
crucially different from that of construing a
statute. A statute defines present rights and
obligations. It is easily enacted and as easily
repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is
drafted with an eye to the future. Its function
is to provide a continuing framework for the
legitimate exercise of governmental power and,
when joined by a Bill or a Charter of rights,
for the unremitting protection of individual
rights and liberties. Once enacted, its
provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended.
It must, therefore, be capable of growth and
development over time to meet new social,
political and historical realities often
unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the
guardian of the constitution and must, in
interpreting its provisions, bear these
considerations in mind.
30.In M. Nagaraj & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.22,
speaking for the Constitution Bench, S.H. Kapadia, J.
observed as under:
The Constitution is not an ephemeral legal
document embodying a set of legal rules for the
passing hour. It sets out principles for an
expanding future and is intended to endure for
ages to come and consequently to be adapted to
the various crisis of human affairs. Therefore, a
purposive rather than a strict literal approach
to the interpretation should be adopted. A
Constitutional provision must be construed not in
a narrow and constricted sense but in a wide and
liberal manner so as to anticipate and take
account of changing conditions and purposes so
that a constitutional provision does not get
fossilised but remains flexible enough to meet
the newly emerging problems and challenges.
[Emphasis supplied]
21
(1984) 2 S.C.R.145 (Can SC)
22
(2006) 8 SCC 212
31.Recently, in I.R. Coelho (supra), noticing the
principles relevant for the interpretation of
Constitutional provisions, Y.K. Sabharwal, C.J., speaking
for the Bench of nine Judges of this Court, observed as
follows:
The principle of constitutionalism is now a
legal principle which requires control over the
exercise of Governmental power to ensure that it
does not destroy the democratic principles upon
which it is based. These democratic principles
include the protection of fundamental rights.
The principle of constitutionalism advocates a
check and balance model of the separation of
powers; it requires a diffusion of powers,
necessitating different independent centres of
decision making. The principle of
constitutionalism underpins the principle of
legality which requires the Courts to interpret
legislation on the assumption that Parliament
would not wish to legislate contrary to
fundamental rights. The Legislature can restrict
fundamental rights but it is impossible for laws
protecting fundamental rights to be impliedly
repealed by future statutes.
Observing further that the protection of fundamental
constitutional rights through the common law is the main
feature of common law constitutionalism, the Court went
on to say:
Under the controlled Constitution, the
principles of checks and balances have an
important role to play. Even in England where
Parliament is sovereign, Lord Steyn has observed
that in certain circumstances, Courts may be
forced to modify the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty, for example, in cases where
judicial review is sought to be abolished. By
this the judiciary is protecting a limited form
of constitutionalism, ensuring that their
institutional role in the Government is
maintained.
32.The Constitution of India expressly confers the power
of judicial review on this Court and the High Courts
under Article 32 and 226 respectively. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
described Article 32 as the very soul of the Constitution
- the very heart of it - the most important Article. By
now, it is well settled that the power of judicial
review, vested in the Supreme Court and the High Courts
under the said Articles of the Constitution, is an
integral part and essential feature of the Constitution,
constituting part of its basic structure. Therefore,
ordinarily, the power of the High Court and this Court to
test the Constitutional validity of legislations can
never be ousted or even abridged. Moreover, Article 13
of the Constitution not only declares the pre-
constitution laws as void to the extent to which they are
inconsistent with the fundamental rights, it also
prohibits the State from making a law which either takes
away totally or abrogates in part a fundamental right.
Therefore, judicial review of laws is embedded in the
Constitution by virtue of Article 13 read with Articles
32 and 226 of our Constitution. It is manifest from the
language of Article 245 of the Constitution that all
legislative powers of the Parliament or the State
Legislatures are expressly made subject to other
provisions of the Constitution, which obviously would
include the rights conferred in Part III of the
Constitution. Whether there is a contravention of any of
the rights so conferred, is to be decided only by the
Constitutional Courts, which are empowered not only to
declare a law as unconstitutional but also to enforce
fundamental rights by issuing directions or orders or
writs of or in the nature of mandamus, certiorari,
habeas corpus, prohibition and quo warranto for this
purpose. It is pertinent to note that Article 32 of the
Constitution is also contained in Part III of the
Constitution, which enumerates the fundamental rights and
not alongside other Articles of the Constitution which
define the general jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Thus, being a fundamental right itself, it is the duty of
this Court to ensure that no fundamental right is
contravened or abridged by any statutory or
constitutional provision. Moreover, it is also plain
from the expression in the nature of employed in clause
(2) of Article 32 that the power conferred by the said
clause is in the widest terms and is not confined to
issuing the high prerogative writs specified in the said
clause but includes within its ambit the power to issue
any directions or orders or writs which may be
appropriate for enforcement of the fundamental rights.
Therefore, even when the conditions for issue of any of
these writs are not fulfilled, this Court would not be
constrained to fold its hands in despair and plead its
inability to help the citizen who has come before it for
judicial redress. (per P.N. Bhagwati, J. in Bandhua Mukti
Morcha Vs. Union of India & Ors.23).
33.In this context, it would be profitable to make a
reference to the decision of this Court in Nilabati
Behera (supra). The Court concurred with the view
expressed by this Court in Khatri & Ors. (II) Vs. State
of Bihar & Ors.24 and Khatri & Ors. (IV) Vs. State of
Bihar & Ors.25, wherein it was said that the Court is not
helpless to grant relief in a case of violation of the
right to life and personal liberty, and it should be
prepared to forge new tools and devise new remedies for
the purpose of vindicating these precious fundamental
rights. It was also indicated that the procedure
suitable in the facts of the case must be adopted for
conducting the enquiry, needed to ascertain the necessary
facts, for granting the relief, as may be available mode
of redress, for enforcement of the guaranteed fundamental
rights. In his concurring judgment, Dr. A.S. Anand, J.
(as His Lordship then was), observed as under:
35. This Court and the High Courts, being the
protectors of the civil liberties of the
citizen, have not only the power and
jurisdiction but also an obligation to grant
relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to the
victim or the heir of the victim whose
fundamental rights under Article 21 of the
23
(1984) 3 SCC 161
24
(1981) 1 SCC 627
25
(1981) 2 SCC 493
Constitution of India are established to have
been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the
State to repair the damage done by its officers
to the fundamental rights of the citizen,
notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the
remedy by way of a civil suit or criminal
proceedings. The State, of course has the right
to be indemnified by and take such action as may
be available to it against the wrongdoer in
accordance with law - through appropriate
proceedings.
34.It may not be out of place to mention that in so far
as this Court is concerned, apart from Articles 32 and
142 which empower this Court to issue such directions, as
may be necessary for doing complete justice in any cause
or matter, Article 144 of the Constitution also mandates
all authorities, civil or judicial in the territory of
India, to act in aid of the orders passed by this Court.
35.As regards the power of judicial review conferred on
the High Court, undoubtedly they are, in a way, wider in
scope. The High Courts are authorised under Article 226
of the Constitution, to issue directions, orders or writs
to any person or authority, including any government to
enforce fundamental rights and, for any other purpose.
It is manifest from the difference in the phraseology of
Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution that there is a
marked difference in the nature and purpose of the right
conferred by these two Articles. Whereas the right
guaranteed by Article 32 can be exercised only for the
enforcement of fundamental rights conferred by Part III
of the Constitution, the right conferred by Article 226
can be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well,
i.e. for enforcement of any legal right conferred by a
Statute etc.
36.In Tirupati Balaji Developers (P) Ltd. & Ors. Vs.
State of Bihar & Ors.26, this Court had observed thus:
8. Under the constitutional scheme as framed
for the judiciary, the Supreme Court and the
High Courts both are courts of record. The High
Court is not a court subordinate to the
Supreme Court. In a way the canvas of judicial
powers vesting in the High Court is wider
inasmuch as it has jurisdiction to issue all
prerogative writs conferred by Article 226 of
the Constitution for the enforcement of any of
the rights conferred by Part III of the
Constitution and for any other purpose while the
original jurisdiction of Supreme Court to issue
prerogative writs remains confined to the
enforcement of fundamental rights and to deal
with some such matters, such as Presidential
elections or inter-State disputes which the
Constitution does not envisage being heard and
determined by High Courts.
37.In Dwarkanaths case (supra), this Court had said that
Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in
comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide
power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is
found. This Article enables the High Courts to mould the
reliefs to meet the peculiar and extra-ordinary
circumstances of the case. Therefore, what we have said
above in regard to the exercise of jurisdiction by this
26
(2004) 5 SCC 1
Court under Article 32, must apply equally in relation to
the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
38.Article 21, one of the fundamental rights enshrined in
Part III of the Constitution declares that no person
shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to the procedure established by law. It
is trite that the words life and personal liberty are
used in the Article as compendious terms to include
within themselves all the varieties of life which go to
make up the personal liberties of a man and not merely
the right to the continuance of persons animal
existence. (See: Kharak Singh Vs. State of U.P.27)
39.The paramountcy of the right to life and personal
liberty was highlighted by the Constitution Bench in
Kehar Singh (supra). It was observed thus:
To any civilised society, there can be no
attributes more important than the life and
personal liberty of its members. That is
evident from the paramount position given by the
courts to Article 21 of the Constitution. These
twin attributes enjoy a fundamental ascendancy
over all other attributes of the political and
social order, and consequently, the Legislature,
the Executive and the Judiciary are more
sensitive to them than to the other attributes
of daily existence. The deprivation of personal
liberty and the threat of the deprivation of
life by the action of the State is in most
civilised societies regarded seriously and,
recourse, either under express constitutional
provision or through legislative enactment is
provided to the judicial organ.
27
(1964) 1 SCR 332
40.In Minerva Mills (supra), Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J.,
speaking for the majority observed that Articles 14 and
19 do not confer any fanciful rights. They confer rights
which are elementary for the proper and effective
functioning of democracy. They are universally regarded
by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If
Articles 14 and 19 are put out of operation, Article 32
will be drained of its life blood. Emphasising the
significance of Articles 14, 19 and 21, the learned Chief
Justice remarked:
74. Three Articles of our Constitution, and only
three, stand between the heaven of freedom into
which Tagore wanted his country to awake and the
abyss of unrestrained power. They are Articles
14, 19 and 21. Article 31-C has removed two sides
of that golden triangle which affords to the
people of this country an assurance that the
promise held forth by the preamble will be
performed by ushering an egalitarian era through
the discipline of fundamental rights, that is,
without emasculation of the rights to liberty and
equality which alone can help preserve the
dignity of the individual.
41.The approach in the interpretation of fundamental
rights has again been highlighted in M. Nagaraj (supra),
wherein this Court observed as under:
This principle of interpretation is
particularly apposite to the interpretation of
fundamental rights. It is a fallacy to regard
fundamental rights as a gift from the State to
its citizens. Individuals possess basic human
rights independently of any constitution by
reason of basic fact that they are members of
the human race. These fundamental rights are
important as they possess intrinsic value. Part-
III of the Constitution does not confer
fundamental rights. It confirms their existence
and gives them protection. Its purpose is to
withdraw certain subjects from the area of
political controversy to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts. Every right has a content. Every
foundational value is put in Part-III as a
fundamental right as it has intrinsic value. The
converse does not apply. A right becomes a
fundamental right because it has foundational
value. Apart from the principles, one has also
to see the structure of the Article in which the
fundamental value is incorporated. Fundamental
right is a limitation on the power of the State.
A Constitution, and in particular that of it
which protects and which entrenches fundamental
rights and freedoms to which all persons in the
State are to be entitled is to be given a
generous and purposive construction. In Sakal
Papers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India28, this Court
has held that while considering the nature and
content of fundamental rights, the Court must
not be too astute to interpret the language in a
literal sense so as to whittle them down. The
Court must interpret the Constitution in a
manner which would enable the citizens to enjoy
the rights guaranteed by it in the fullest
measure. An instance of literal and narrow
interpretation of a vital fundamental right in
the Indian Constitution is the early decision of
the Supreme Court in A.K. Gopalan v. State of
Madras29. Article 21 of the Constitution provides
that no person shall be deprived of his life and
personal liberty except according to procedure
established by law. The Supreme Court by a
majority held that procedure established by
law means any procedure established by law made
by the Parliament or the legislatures of the
State. The Supreme Court refused to infuse the
procedure with principles of natural justice. It
concentrated solely upon the existence of
enacted law. After three decades, the Supreme
Court overruled its previous decision in A.K.
Gopalan and held in its landmark judgment in
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India30 that the
procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer
the test of reasonableness. The Court further
28
AIR 1962 SC 305
29
AIR 1950 SC 27
30
(1978) 1 SCC 248
held that the procedure should also be in
conformity with the principles of natural
justice. This example is given to demonstrate an
instance of expansive interpretation of a
fundamental right. The expression life in
Article 21 does not connote merely physical or
animal existence. The right to life includes
right to live with human dignity. This Court has
in numerous cases deduced fundamental features
which are not specifically mentioned in Part-III
on the principle that certain unarticulated
rights are implicit in the enumerated
guarantees.
42.Thus, the opinion of this Court in A.K. Gopalan
(supra) to the effect that a person could be deprived of
his liberty by `any procedure established by law and it
was not for the Court to go into the fairness of that
procedure was perceived in Maneka Gandhi (supra) as a
serious curtailment of liberty of an individual and it
was held that the law which restricted an individuals
freedom must also be right, just and fair and not
arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. This judgment was a
significant step towards the development of law with
respect to Article 21 of the Constitution, followed in a
series of subsequent decisions. This Court went on to
explore the true meaning of the word Life in Article 21
and finally opined that all those aspects of life, which
make a person live with human dignity are included within
the meaning of the word Life.
43.Commenting on the scope of judicial review vis-`-vis
constitutional sovereignty particularly with reference to
Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution, in I.R.
Coelho (supra), this Court said:
There is a difference between Parliamentary and
constitutional sovereignty. Our Constitution is
framed by a Constituent Assembly which was not
Parliament. It is in the exercise of law making
power by the Constituent Assembly that we have a
controlled Constitution. Articles 14, 19, 21
represent the foundational values which form the
basis of the rule of law. These are the
principles of constitutionality which form the
basis of judicial review apart from the rule of
law and separation of powers. If in future,
judicial review was to be abolished by a
constitutional amendment, as Lord Steyn says,
the principle of parliamentary sovereignty even
in England would require a relook. This is how
law has developed in England over the years. It
is in such cases that doctrine of basic
structure as propounded in Kesavananda Bharati
case (supra) has to apply.
While observing that the abrogation or abridgement of the
fundamental rights under Chapter III of the Constitution
have to be examined on broad interpretation so as to
enable the citizens to enjoy the rights guaranteed by
Part III in the fullest measure, the Court explained the
doctrine of separation of powers as follows: (SCC p.86-
87, paras 64-66)
...[i]t was settled centuries ago that for
preservation of liberty and prevention of
tyranny it is absolutely essential to vest
separate powers in three different organs. In
The Federalist Nos. 47, 48, and 51, James
Madison details how a separation of powers
preserves liberty and prevents tyranny. In The
Federalist No. 47, Madison discusses
Montesquieus treatment of the separation of
powers in Spirit of Laws, (Book XI, Chapter 6).
There Montesquieu writes,
When the legislative and
executive powers are united in the
same person, or in the same body of
Magistrates, there can be no liberty
... Again, there is no liberty, if the
judicial power be not separated from
the legislative and executive.
Madison points out that Montesquieu did not feel
that different branches could not have
overlapping functions, but rather that the power
of one department of Government should not be
entirely in the hands of another department of
Government.
Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No.78,
remarks on the importance of the independence of
the judiciary to preserve the separation of
powers and the rights of the people:
The complete independence of the
courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution.
By a limited Constitution, I
understand one which contains certain
specified exceptions to the
legislative authority; such, for
instance, that it shall pass no bills
of attainder, no ex post facto laws,
and the like. Limitations of this kind
can be preserved in practice in no
other way than through the medium of
courts of justice, whose duty it must
be to declare all acts contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution
void. Without this, all the
reservations of particular rights or
privileges would amount to nothing.
(434)
Montesquieu finds that tyranny pervades when
there is no separation of powers:
There would be an end of
everything, were the same man or same
body, whether of the nobles or of the
people, to exercise those three
powers, that of enacting laws, that of
executing the public resolutions, and
of trying the causes of individuals.
The Court further observed: (SCC pg.105, paras 129-
130)
Equality, rule of law, judicial review and
separation of powers form parts of the basic
structure of the Constitution. Each of these
concepts are intimately connected. There can be
no rule of law, if there is no equality before
the law. These would be meaningless if the
violation was not subject to the judicial
review. All these would be redundant if the
legislative, executive and judicial powers are
vested in one organ. Therefore, the duty to
decide whether the limits have been transgressed
has been placed on the judiciary.
Realising that it is necessary to secure the
enforcement of the Fundamental Rights, power for
such enforcement has been vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court and the High
Courts. Judicial Review is an essential feature
of the Constitution. It gives practical content
to the objectives of the Constitution embodied
in Part III and other parts of the Constitution.
It may be noted that the mere fact that equality
which is a part of the basic structure can be
excluded for a limited purpose, to protect
certain kinds of laws, does not prevent it from
being part of the basic structure. Therefore, it
follows that in considering whether any
particular feature of the Constitution is part
of the basic structure - rule of law, separation
of power - the fact that limited exceptions are
made for limited purposes, to protect certain
kind of laws, does not mean that it is not part
of the basic structure.
Conclusions:
44.Thus, having examined the rival contentions in the
context of the Constitutional Scheme, we conclude as
follows:
(i) The fundamental rights, enshrined in
Part III of the Constitution, are
inherent and cannot be extinguished by
any Constitutional or Statutory
provision. Any law that abrogates or
abridges such rights would be violative
of the basic structure doctrine. The
actual effect and impact of the law on
the rights guaranteed under Part III has
to be taken into account in determining
whether or not it destroys the basic
structure.
(ii) Article 21 of the Constitution in its
broad perspective seeks to protect the
persons of their lives and personal
liberties except according to the
procedure established by law. The said
Article in its broad application not
only takes within its fold enforcement
of the rights of an accused but also the
rights of the victim. The State has a
duty to enforce the human rights of a
citizen providing for fair and impartial
investigation against any person accused
of commission of a cognizable offence,
which may include its own officers. In
certain situations even a witness to the
crime may seek for and shall be granted
protection by the State.
(iii) In view of the constitutional scheme and
the jurisdiction conferred on this Court
under Article 32 and on the High Courts
under Article 226 of the Constitution
the power of judicial review being an
integral part of the basic structure of
the Constitution, no Act of Parliament
can exclude or curtail the powers of the
Constitutional Courts with regard to the
enforcement of fundamental rights. As a
matter of fact, such a power is
essential to give practicable content to
the objectives of the Constitution
embodied in Part III and other parts of
the Constitution. Moreover, in a federal
constitution, the distribution of
legislative powers between the
Parliament and the State Legislature
involves limitation on legislative
powers and, therefore, this requires an
authority other than the Parliament to
ascertain whether such limitations are
transgressed. Judicial review acts as
the final arbiter not only to give
effect to the distribution of
legislative powers between the
Parliament and the State Legislatures,
it is also necessary to show any
transgression by each entity.
Therefore, to borrow the words of Lord
Steyn, judicial review is justified by
combination of the principles of
separation of powers, rule of law, the
principle of constitutionality and the
reach of judicial review.
(iv) If the federal structure is violated by
any legislative action, the Constitution
takes care to protect the federal
structure by ensuring that Courts act as
guardians and interpreters of the
Constitution and provide remedy under
Articles 32 and 226, whenever there is
an attempted violation. In the
circumstances, any direction by the
Supreme Court or the High Court in
exercise of power under Article 32 or
226 to uphold the Constitution and
maintain the rule of law cannot be
termed as violating the federal
structure.
(v) Restriction on the Parliament by the
Constitution and restriction on the
Executive by the Parliament under an
enactment, do not amount to restriction
on the power of the Judiciary under
Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution.
(vi) If in terms of Entry 2 of List II of The
Seventh Schedule on the one hand and
Entry 2A and Entry 80 of List I on the
other, an investigation by another
agency is permissible subject to grant
of consent by the State concerned, there
is no reason as to why, in an
exceptional situation, court would be
precluded from exercising the same power
which the Union could exercise in terms
of the provisions of the Statute. In
our opinion, exercise of such power by
the constitutional courts would not
violate the doctrine of separation of
powers. In fact, if in such a situation
the court fails to grant relief, it
would be failing in its constitutional
duty.
(vii) When the Special Police Act itself
provides that subject to the consent by
the State, the CBI can take up
investigation in relation to the crime
which was otherwise within the
jurisdiction of the State Police, the
court can also exercise its
constitutional power of judicial review
and direct the CBI to take up the
investigation within the jurisdiction of
the State. The power of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution
cannot be taken away, curtailed or
diluted by Section 6 of the Special
Police Act. Irrespective of there being
any statutory provision acting as a
restriction on the powers of the Courts,
the restriction imposed by Section 6 of
the Special Police Act on the powers of
the Union, cannot be read as restriction
on the powers of the Constitutional
Courts. Therefore, exercise of power of
judicial review by the High Court, in
our opinion, would not amount to
infringement of either the doctrine of
separation of power or the federal
structure.
45.In the final analysis, our answer to the question
referred is that a direction by the High Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, to the CBI to investigate a cognizable
offence alleged to have been committed within the
territory of a State without the consent of that State
will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the
Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of
power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of
civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High
Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also
an obligation to protect the fundamental rights,
guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of
the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly.
46.Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to
emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Articles
32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order,
the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed
limitations on the exercise of these Constitutional
powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said
Articles requires great caution in its exercise. In so
far as the question of issuing a direction to the CBI to
conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no
inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether
or not such power should be exercised but time and again
it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be
passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party
has levelled some allegations against the local police.
This extra-ordinary power must be exercised sparingly,
cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes
necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in
investigations or where the incident may have national
and international ramifications or where such an order
may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing
the fundamental rights. Otherwise the CBI would be
flooded with a large number of cases and with limited
resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate
even serious cases and in the process lose its
credibility and purpose with unsatisfactory
investigations.
47.In Secretary, Minor Irrigation & Rural Engineering
Services, U.P. & Ors. Vs. Sahngoo Ram Arya & Anr.31, this
Court had said that an order directing an enquiry by the
CBI should be passed only when the High Court, after
considering the material on record, comes to a conclusion
that such material does disclose a prima facie case
calling for an investigation by the CBI or any other
similar agency. We respectfully concur with these
observations.
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48.All the cases shall now be placed before the
respective Benches for disposal in terms of this opinion.
CJI.
(K.G. BALAKRISHNAN)
J.
(R.V. RAVEENDRAN)
J.
(D.K. JAIN)
.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
(J.M. PANCHAL)
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COURT |
Hon'ble P. Sathasivam and Hon'ble Dr. B.S Chauhan
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PARTIES |
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon .... Appellant(s)
vs.
The State of Maharashtra,
through CBI , Bombay …. Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1728 of 2007
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ACT |
IPC & TADA
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Meaning of Life Imprisionment - Supreme Court:
Yakub Abdul Razak Memon vs. The State of Maharashtra,
through CBI , Bombay - See Para524 –
"As rightly observed by this Court in Sangeet and Anr. vs. State of
Haryana, 2012 (11) Scale 140, there is misconception that a prisoner
serving life sentence has an indefeasible right to release on completion of
either 14 years or 20 years imprisonment. A convict undergoing life
imprisonment is expected to remain in custody till the end of his life,
subject to any remission granted by the appropriate Government under
Section 432 of the Code, which in turn is subject to the procedural checks
mentioned in the said provision and to further substantive check in Section
433-A of the Code" - Supreme Court of India, Dated 21st. March 2013.
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COURT |
Justice Swatanter Kumar and Justice Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya
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PARTIES |
State of U.P. & Ors. … Appellants
Versus
Ashok Kumar Nigam … Respondent
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9030 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24562 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9031 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24563 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9032 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 24564 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9033 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35561 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9034 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35562 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9035 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35569 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9036 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35568 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9037 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35567 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9038 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35566 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9039 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 35565 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9040 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 9156 of 2011]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9041 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 13788 of 2011]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9042 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20917 of 2011]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9043 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 20918 of 2011]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9044 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 11261 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9045 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12993 of 2010]
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9046 OF 2012
[Arising out of SLP(C) No. 18407 of 2011]
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
9029
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ACT |
Constitution of India
, Section:
136
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HEAD NOTE |
UTTAR PRADESH L.R.MANUAL: ""....The order dated 3rd April, 2008, which we have reproduced above, clearly shows non-application of mind and non-recording of reasons, which leads only to one conclusion, that the said order was an arbitrary exercise of power by the State. We cannot find any fault with the reasoning of the High Court in that behalf. But we do find some merit in the contention
raised on behalf of the appellant State that the High Court should not have
directed appointments while regulating the age, as has been done by the
High Court in operative part of its judgment. There is right of
consideration, but none can claim right to appointment. Para 7.06 states
that renewal beyond 60 years shall depend upon continuous good work, sound
integrity and physical fitness of the counsel. These are the
considerations which have been weighed by the competent authority in the
State Government to examine whether renewal/extension beyond 60 years
should be granted or not. That does not ipso facto means that there is a
right to appointment upto the age of 60 years irrespective of work, conduct
and integrity of the counsel. The rule provides due safeguards as it
calls for the report of the District Judge and the District Officer
granting renewal""- DISMISSED- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED-13-12-2012
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COURT |
HON'BLE JUSTICE J. CHELAMESWAR
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PARTIES |
VIPUL SHITAL PRASAD AGARWAL … PETITIONER
VS STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. … RESPONDENTS
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
3672 of 2012
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ACT |
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
, Section:
482/167(2), ART- 226, 32
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD--The mere undertaking of a further investigation
either by the Investigating Officer on his own or upon the directions of
the superior police officer or pursuant to a direction by the concerned
Magistrate to whom the report is forwarded does not mean that the report
submitted under Section 173(2) is abandoned or rejected. It is only
that either the Investigating Agency or the concerned Court is not
completely satisfied with the material collected by the investigating
agency and is of the opinion that possibly some more material is
required to be collected in order to sustain the allegations of the
commission of the offence indicated in the report.--SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED:6-11-2012
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COURT |
CORUM OF HON'BLE JUSTICE Swatanter Kumar AND HON'BLE JUSTICE Madan B. Lokur
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PARTIES |
Ramachandran …..Appellant
Versus
State of Kerala ....Respondent
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APPEAL |
---Select---
, AppealNo:
732 OF 2008
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302
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HEAD NOTE |
Issue-Whether the said offence is suicide or murder-Medical Evidence-However, what is clinching in the present case is the medicalevidence which clearly indicates that Remani was forcibly administeredFuradan; she had resisted this forcible administration; as a result of herresistance, she received several minor injuries on her body. Eventually,with a view to overcome her resistance, she was smothered and ultimatelyshe died as a result of the forcible administration of Furadan and smothering. No person other than her husband could have possibly causedRemani’s death, especially considering the motive or grudge that heharboured against her.-Held guilty of murder-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED: 30.10.2012
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COURT |
CORUM OF HON'BLE JUSTICE RANJAN GOGOI AND JUSTICE P. SATHASIVAM
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PARTIES |
IQBAL ABDUL SAMIYA MALEK ....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF GUJARAT ....RESPONDENT(S)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1585 OF 2012
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302
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HEAD NOTE |
It is the duty of an Appellate Court to look into the
evidence adduced in the case arrive at an independent conclusion as to
whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even it can be
relied upon then whether the prosecution can be said to have proved
beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a
witness has to be adjudged by Appellate Court in drawing inference from
proved and admitted facts-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-DATED: 1ST OCT 2012
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COURT |
Justice Hon'ble Dr.B.S. Chauhan
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PARTIES |
Kunal Majumdar …Appellant
VERSUS
State of Rajasthan …Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
407 OF 2008
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
It is the bounden duty of the Division Bench to
carry out such exercise in the manner set out above and we feel it
appropriate, therefore, to set aside the judgment impugned in this
appeal for that reason and remit the matter back to the High Court for
deciding the Reference under Section 366 Cr.P.C. in the manner it ought
to have been decided. Inasmuch as the conviction and sentence imposed
on the appellant was by the judgment dated 09.03.2007 of the trial
Court and the offence alleged was dated 16.01.2006, while remitting the
matter back to the High Court, we direct the High Court to dispose of
the Reference along with the Appeals expeditiously and in any case
within three months from the date of receipt of the records sent back
to the High Court. The appeal stands disposed of with the above
directions to the High Court
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COURT |
P. SATHASIVAM J., DIPAK MISRA J.
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PARTIES |
Ms. Mayawati .... Petitioner (s)
Versus
Union of India & Ors. .... Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Writ Petition
, AppealNo:
135 OF 2008
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ACT |
Prevention of Corruption Act
, Section:
13
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HEAD NOTE |
CBI is not justified in proceeding with the FIR No.
R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003. In view of the above discussion, we
are satisfied that the CBI exceeded its jurisdiction in lodging FIR No.
R.C. 0062003A0019 dated 05.10.2003 in the absence of any direction from
this Court in the order dated 18.09.2003 or in any subsequent orders - Supreme Court - Dated 6.7.2012
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COURT |
Jagdish Singh Khehar & A. K. Patnaik JJ.
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PARTIES |
Nupur Talwar …. Petitioner
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. …. Respondents
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
68 OF 2012
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302,201
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HEAD NOTE |
"As has been held
by this Court in Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration)
[(1997) 1 SCC 361], once a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence
under Section 190 Cr.P.C., he cannot order of his own further
investigation in the case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. but if
subsequently the Sessions Court passes an order discharging the accused
persons, further investigation by the police on its own would be
permissible, which may also result in submission of fresh charge-sheet." - Supreme Court - Dated 7/6/2012.
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COURT |
Hon. A.K. Patnaik and Hon. Swatanter Kumar
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PARTIES |
Ramnaresh & Ors. vs State Of Chhattisgarh
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
166-167 OF 2010
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302
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HEAD NOTE |
Supreme Court of India- Classification of Aggrevating and Mitigating Offences- Sec 302 IPC- Death Panelty converted into Life Imprisonment (21 Years).
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COURT |
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN & A.K. PATNAIK JJ.
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PARTIES |
State of Punjab Versus Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Ors.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
753-755 of 2009
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ACT |
Criminal Procedure Code
, Section:
362,482.
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HEAD NOTE |
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COURT |
Chelameswar, J.
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PARTIES |
Union of India & Ors. ........ Appellants
Versus
Ramesh Gandhi ......... Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1356 of 2004
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Corruption Act.
, Section:
420 IPC AND 13 PC Act
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HEAD NOTE |
Quashing of FIR - Law discussed - Supreme Court
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COURT |
P. SATHASIVAM & Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN J.J.
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PARTIES |
Prithipal Singh Etc.Vs. State of Punjab and another
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
523-527 of 2009
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
364,302
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HEAD NOTE |
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COURT |
Hon. J. ALTAMAS KABIR and Hon. J. CYRIAC JOSEPH
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PARTIES |
RAVINDER RAJ Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
M/S. COMPETENT MOTORS CO. PVT. LTD.&ANR. Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Writ Petition
, AppealNo:
10364/2006
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ACT |
Goods Act, 1930
, Section:
Section 64A(1)(a)
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HEAD NOTE |
Civil Laws-Section 64A(1)(a)-Goods Act, 1930-Receipt given to the petitioner for payment of the amount in the proforma invoice, it had been indicated that the prices prevailing on the date of billing would apply.
--The billing was done on 5th of April, 1989. In the absence of any evidence of any deliberate intention on the part of the respondents to delay delivery of the vehicle, we are unable to agree with the petitioner that the increase in price has to be borne by the respondents
-- It is the liability of the petitioner to pay the extra price when the excise duty had been enhanced prior to the delivery of the vehicle—
-The Special Leave Petition fails and is dismissed-Supreme Court of India :Order Dated Feb 10, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
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PARTIES |
SRI INDRA DAS .. Appellant (s)
VERSUS
STATE OF ASSAM .. Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1383 OF 2007
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Confession a very weak type of evidence-Confession in TADA Case-The alleged confession was subsequently retracted by the appellant. The alleged confession was not corroborated by any other material. We have held in Arup Bhuyan”“s case (supra) that confession is a very weak type of evidence, particularly when alleged to have been made to the police, and it is not safe to convict on its basis unless there is adequate corroborative material. In the present case there is no corroborative material:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-10-02-2011.
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COURT |
Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
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PARTIES |
HARYANA STATE AGRICULTURAL MARKETING BOARD & ANR. ...Appellants
VERSUS
RAJ PAL ... Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1550 OF 2011
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ACT |
Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (Sale of
Immovable Property) Rules 1997
, Section:
Rule 4
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HEAD NOTE |
Civil Laws-Rule 4-Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (Sale of
Immovable Property) Rules 1997-It is clear that the allottees cannot postpone the payment of instalments merely on the ground that some of the amenities were not ready. If they were not entitled for postponement of the instalments, it follows that they will be liable to pay the normal interest on the delayed instalments up to date of payment. However, having regard to the fact that the Rules did not contemplate compound interest and penal interest and the Market Committee was yet to complete certain infrastructural work like water, sewerage disposal, as held in Shantikunj (supra), the Market Committee will not be entitled to claim any compound interest or penal interest.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011
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COURT |
J.M. PANCHAL, H.L. GOKHALE J.J.
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PARTIES |
Supreme Court Bar Association
and others ... Appellants
Versus
B.D. Kaushik ... Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
3401 OF 2003
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ACT |
SCBA Rules
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
One Bar One Vote:Supreme Court Dated 26/09/2011
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COURT |
J.M. Panchal, H.L. Gokhale J.J.
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PARTIES |
The Registrar General
High Court of Judicature at Madras
Vs.
R. Perachi and others
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
7936 OF 2011
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ACT |
Constitution of India
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Under Constitution administrative powers vests in Chief Justice and not in Judges - "As pointed out above, under the constitutional
scheme, Chief Justice is the supreme authority and the other
Judges, so far as officers and servants of the High Court are
concerned, have no role to play on the administrative side. Some
Judges, undoubtedly, will become Chief Justices in their own turn
one day, but it is imperative under the constitutional discipline that
they work in tranquillity. Judges have been described as "hermits".
They have to live and behave like "hermits" who have no desire or
aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is to
supply light and not heat. This is necessary so that their latent
desire to run the High Court administration may not sprout before
time, at least, in some cases."-Verdict of Apex Court followed in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7936 OF 2011
The Registrar General
High Court of Judicature at Madras
Vs.
R. Perachi and others - Dated 19/09/2011.
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COURT |
D.K. JAIN, P. SATHASIVAM, AFTAB ALAM, JJJ.
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PARTIES |
JAKIA NASIM AHESAN & ANR.
Vs.
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1765
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302 read with Section 120B as also under Section 193 read with Sections 114, 186 & 153A, 186, 187 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
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HEAD NOTE |
"The above decisions make it clear that though
this Court is competent to entrust the investigation
to any independent agency, once the investigating
agency complete their function of investigating
into the offences, it is the court in which the
charge-sheet is filed which is to deal with all
matters relating to the trial of the accused
including matters falling within the scope of
Section 173(8) of the Code. Thus, generally, this
Court may not require further monitoring of the
case/investigation. However, we make it clear that
if any of the parties including CBI require any
further direction, they are free to approach this
Court by way of an application."- Supreme Court.
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COURT |
Dr. B.S. Chauhan & Swantanter Kumar J.J.
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PARTIES |
Pratap Chandra Mehta ... Appellant
Versus
State Bar Council of M.P. & Ors. ... Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
6482 of 2011
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ACT |
Advocates Act
, Section:
15 & Rules 121 and 122-A of the State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules
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HEAD NOTE |
Advocates Act and State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules - The provisions of Rules 121 and 122-A (in
particular) of the M.P. Rules are not ultra vires of the provisions,
including the provisions of Section 15, of the Advocates Act.
These rules also do not suffer from the vice of excessive
delegation.
In view of the language of Section 15(3) of the Advocates
Act and the factual matrix afore-noticed by us, it is clear that the
amended rules of the M.P. Rules had received the approval of the
Bar Council of India, particularly Rule 122-A. The Rules would
not be invalidated for want of issuance of any notification, as it
is not the requirement in terms of Section 15(3) of the Advocates
Act and in any case would be a curable irregularity at best : Supreme Court.
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COURT |
CJI S.H. Kapadia, & Mukundakam Sharma, K.S. Radhakrishnan, ,Anil R. Dave J.J.J.J.J.
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PARTIES |
K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.
Vs
State of Karnataka
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
CIVIL APPEAL NO.6520 OF 2003 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.6521-6537 OF 2003 AND CIVIL APPEAL NO.6538 OF 2003
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Held "(a) Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and the notification dated 8.3.94 are valid, and there is no excessive delegation of legislative power on the State Government.
(b) Non-laying of the notification dt.8.3.94 under Section 140 of the Land Reforms Act before the State Legislature is a curable defect and it will not affect the validity of the notification or action taken thereunder.
(c) The Acquisition Act is protected by Article 31A of the Constitution after having obtained the assent of the President and hence immune from challenge under Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution.
(d) There is no repugnancy between the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, and hence no assent of the President is warranted under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.
(e) Public purpose is a pre-condition for deprivation of a person from his property under Article 300A and the right to claim compensation is also inbuilt in that Article and when a person is deprived of his property the State has to justify both the grounds which may depend on scheme of the statute, legislative policy, object and purpose of the legislature and other related factors.
(f) Statute, depriving a person of his property is, therefore, amenable to judicial review on grounds hereinbefore discussed. 144.-Supreme Court
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COURT |
G.S. SINGHVI & ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY
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PARTIES |
D.P. Das
- Versus -
Union of India and Ors.
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
7002 OF 2004
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ACT |
Service Matters.
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Seniority in Services : For the reasons aforesaid this Court holds that
for determination of seniority of the officers
who were recommended on the same date, age is the
only valid and fair basis as such their seniority
should be decided on the basis of age of the
candidates who have been recommended.-Supreme Court.
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COURT |
P. SATHASIVAM & DR. B.S.CHAUHAN J.J.
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PARTIES |
Shahnwaj Vs. State of U.P.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1531 of 2011
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ACT |
Juvenile Act.
, Section:
Rule 12.
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HEAD NOTE |
Determination of Age under Juvenile Act : "We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person.
The School Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person.
Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd- O-Kalan and recorded by the Board.
.... Accordingly, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence that is 04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated 04.06.2007.
We are also satisfied that Rule 12 of the Rules which was brought in pursuance of the Act describes four categories of evidence which have been provided in which preference has been given to school certificate over the medical report"- Supreme Court.
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COURT |
ASOK KUMAR GANGULY & DEEPAK VERMA J.J.
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PARTIES |
Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen Vs. State of Rajasthan
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1327 OF 2008
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302/34.
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HEAD NOTE |
Article 136 of the
Constitution -
"...this Court will be
extremely loath to upset the judgment of
conviction which is confirmed in appeal.
However, if it is found that the
appreciation of evidence in a case,
which is entirely based on
circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by
serious errors and on that account
miscarriage of justice has been
occasioned, then the Court will
certainly interfere even with the
concurrent findings recorded by the
Trial court and the High Court.,
[Bharat
Vs. State of M.P. 2003 (3) SCC 106] - Followed.-Supreme Court - Dated 13/07/2011.
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COURT |
Dr. B.S. Chauhan & Swantanter Kumar J.J.
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PARTIES |
State of Delhi
Versus
Ram Avtar @ Rama
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1101 of 2004
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ACT |
NDPS Act
, Section:
50,21.
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HEAD NOTE |
" But in no event, the illegal recovery can be the foundation of a successful conviction under the provisions of Section 21 of the (NDPS) Act."- Supreme Court - Dated 07.07.2011.
b>
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COURT |
ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY I. & DEEPAK VERMA I.
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PARTIES |
State of Rajasthan Vs. Islam
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1318/2005
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302/304II
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HEAD NOTE |
Excercising jurisdiction under Article 136 Constitution of India : "However, if this Court is of the opinion that the
acquittal is not based on a reasonable view, then it may review
the entire material and there will be no limitation on this
Cour`s jurisdiction under Article 136 to come to a just
decision quashing the acquittal"- 1985(4) SCC 476 para 45;
1996(7) SCC 471 para 4 - Followed.-Supreme Court- Dated 24/05/2011.
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COURT |
ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY I. & DEEPAK VERMA I.
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PARTIES |
BIRENDER PODDAR ... Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF BIHAR ... Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 373 OF 2006
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302,498 A.
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HEAD NOTE |
Evidence of interested witness - Appreciation thereof - can be relied upon :"in the case of
Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 14 SCC 150] and in
the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed Shaikh Babajan
and Others [(2009) 14 SCC 267] which dealt with the
question of appreciation of evidence of interested
witnesses. Both those decisions follow the well-settled
principle that just because evidence is given by the
interested persons that is no ground for discarding the
same. We have already held that in the instant case, the
evidence given by PWs 5, 6, 7 and 8 is quite cogent and
clearly established the prosecution case."- Supreme Court - Dated 16/05/2011.
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COURT |
Markandey Katju J. & Gyansudhhra J.a Mis Gyan Sudha Misra J.
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PARTIES |
Prakash Kadam & etc. etc. .. Appellants
-versus-
Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta & Anr. .. Respondents
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1174-1178 OF 2011
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
320
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HEAD NOTE |
"We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing
murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out
the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the
Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are
orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal
order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry
out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found
guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal
philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen
who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with
it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13th.May,2011.
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COURT |
Markandey Katju J. Gyan Sudha Misra J.
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PARTIES |
Prakash Kadam & etc. etc. .. Appellants -versus-Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta & Anr. .. Respondents
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1174-1178 OF 2011
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302
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HEAD NOTE |
POLICE ENCOUNTERS: "We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13/05/2011.
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COURT |
J.M. Panchal,H.L.Gokhale J.J.
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PARTIES |
State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Rakesh Kumar Keshari & ANR.
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APPEAL |
---Select---
, AppealNo:
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ACT |
U.P. L.R.MANUAL
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Appointment of DGC/ADGC (Criminal)- Right of their renewal discussed in the light of prevailing judgements of Apex Court: Supreme Court Dated 4/5/2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
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PARTIES |
PRAMOD BUILDINGS & DEVELOPERS (P) LTD. APPELLANT
Vs.
SHANTA CHOPRA ...RESPONDENT
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1535 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The plaintiff in a suit for specific performance, cannot obviously succeed unless he proved that he was ready and willing to perform the contract. The exhaustive correspondence between the parties clearly discloses the respective stands of the parties. Even the
prayer in the plaint shows that the appellant was not ready to pay the entire balance of Rs.34,00,000/- as agreed under
the agreement of sale but that the plaintiff insisted upon
the appellant to pay the municipal taxes before the sale, as a condition for sale. If appellant was not willing to pay Rs.34 lakhs at the time of sale, as specifically agreed under
the agreement of sale, the appellant could not claim that it was ready and willing to perform its obligations. As noticed above, after appreciating the entire evidence, learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court have recorded a finding that the appellant was not ready and willing and consequently dismissed the suit. Supreme Court of India- Dated: 04:09:2011
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COURT |
Deepak Verma J. & B.S.Chauhan J.
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PARTIES |
Suraz India Trust Vs. Union Of india
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APPEAL |
---Select---
, AppealNo:
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 204 OF 2010
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ACT |
Constitution of India
, Section:
32.
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HEAD NOTE |
Petitioner submits matter be
considered by a larger Bench as the petition raises the following
issues of Constitutional importance:
(1) Whether the aforesaid two verdicts, viz. the 7-Judge Bench
and 9-Judge Bench decisions of this Court referred to above
really amount to amending Article 124(2) of the
Constitution?
(2) Whether there is any `Collegium' system for appointing
Supreme Court or High Court Judges in the Constitution?
3
(3) Whether the Constitution can be amended by a judicial
verdict or it can only be amended by Parliament in
accordance with Article 368?
(4) Whether the Constitutional scheme was that the Supreme
Court and High Court Judges can be appointed by mutual
discussions and mutual consensus between the judiciary and
the executive; or whether the judiciary can alone appoint
Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts?
(5) Whether the word `consultation' in Article 224 means
`concurrence'?
(6) Whether by judicial interpretation words in the Constitution
can be made redundant, as appears to have been done in the
aforesaid two decisions which have made consultation with
High Court Judges redundant while appointing a Supreme
Court Judge despite the fact that it is permissible on the clear
language of Article 124(2)?
(7) Whether the clear language of Article 124(2) can be altered
by judicial verdicts and instead of allowing the President of
India to consult such Judges of the Supreme Court as he
deems necessary (including even junior Judges) only the
Chief Justice of India and four seniormost Judges of the
Supreme Court can alone be consulted while appointing a
Supreme Court Judge?
(8) Whether there was any convention that the President is
bound by the advice of the Chief Justice of India, and
whether any such convention (assuming there was one) can
prevail over the clear language of Article 124(2)?
(9) Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has any
primacy in the aforesaid appointments?
(10) Whether the aforesaid two decisions should be overruled by
a larger Bench?-Supreme Court-Dated 4/4/2011
4
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COURT |
Markandey Katju J. Gyan Sudha Misra J.
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PARTIES |
Mehboob Batcha & Ors. .. Appellant(s)
-versus-
State Rep. by Supdt. of Police .. Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
. 1511 of 2003
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302,376
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HEAD NOTE |
POLICE CUSTODY DEATHS & RAPES-"In spite of the constitutional and statutory
provisions aimed at safeguarding the personal liberty and
life of a citizen, growing incidence of torture and deaths
in police custody has been a disturbing factor. Experience
shows that worst violations of human rights take place
during the course of investigation, when the police with a
view to secure evidence or confession often resorts to
third-degree methods including torture and adopts
techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the
arrest or describing the deprivation of liberty merely as a
prolonged interrogation. A reading of the morning
newspapers almost everyday carrying reports of
dehumanising torture, assault, rape and death in custody
of police or other governmental agencies is indeed
depressing. The increasing incidence of torture and death
in custody has assumed such alarming proportions that it
is affecting the credibility of the rule of law and the
administration of criminal justice system. The
community rightly feels perturbed. Societys cry for
justice becomes louder.
Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-Dated 29/03/2011.
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COURT |
V.S. SIRPURKAR & T.S. THAKUR J.
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PARTIES |
Rajesh Singh & Ors.
Versus
State of U.P.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1160 OF 2005
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302
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HEAD NOTE |
Applicability of section 34 I.P.C. read with 302 - which accused actually caused the murder not certain
But It is clear that all the three accused persons had taken part in
the beating of deceased Deepak and all the accused persons dragged him
in the room and closed the door.
Therefore, it was up to the accused
persons to explain as to how Deepak died. It is very clear that all the three
accused persons had acted with common intention of causing the death
and, therefore, all the three accused persons would be guilty with the aid of
Section 34, IPC. The High Court has rightly held them guilty: Supreme Court.
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COURT |
Hon. J. HARJIT SINGH BEDI and Hon. J. CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
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PARTIES |
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.APPELLANTS
Versus
MANAB KUMAR GUHA RESPONDENT
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
2175 OF 2011
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ACT |
Civil Procedure Code
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
On the basis of the materials on record, the enquiry officer held the writ petitioner guilty with which the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority agreed. It is well settled that High Court while exercising the power of judicial review from the order of the disciplinary authority do not act as a Court of appeal and appraise evidence. It interferes with the finding of enquiry officer only when the finding is found to be perverse. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the order of learned Single Judge and quashing the order of compulsory retirement. The finding recorded by the enquiry officer is based on the materials on record and on proper appreciation of evidence which cannot be said to be perverse calling for interference by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED 28 FEB 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
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PARTIES |
AJAY KUMAR PRASAD APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF BIHAR TH: VIGILANCE RESPONDENT(S)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
613 OF 2011
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ACT |
Criminal Procedure Code
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Order to conduct Trial Expediously- Supreme Court of India-Order Dated 28 Feb 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
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PARTIES |
GHANSHYAM Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
631 OF 2011
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code , Criminal Procedure
, Section:
Sections 420 and 471 IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
The appellant filed a revision before the High Court which was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 420 and 471 of the I.P.C.
Admittedly, the entire amount of Rs.60,000/- involved in the case, has been deposited by the appellant.
The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence.
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the complainant. In our considered view, ends of justice would meet if, while upholding the conviction of the appellant, the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone by him. We direct accordingly.
This order is subject to the appellant”“s paying additionally a fine of Rupees One Lakh within six weeks from today. This appeal is disposed of with these observations and directions.
In case the amount of fine, as directed above is not deposited by the appellant, then this order would be of no avail to the appellant and he would have to serve out the remaining period of sentence.
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COURT |
Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
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PARTIES |
GHANSHYAM Appellant(s)
:VERSUS:
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
631 OF 2011
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
420
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HEAD NOTE |
The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence.-Supreme Court Allowed the request.
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COURT |
Hon. J. D.K. JAIN and Hon J. H.L. DATTU
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PARTIES |
RANU HAZARIKA & ORS. APPELLANTS
VERSUS
STATE OF ASSAM & ORS. RESPONDENTS
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
2153 OF 2011 with 2154-2167 of 2011 and 2168-2170 of 2011
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ACT |
The National Council for Teacher Education
, Section:
Section 12
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HEAD NOTE |
the decision of the High Court, permitting the State Govern- ment to continue with the recruitment process, initiated on the basis of the Amendment Rules, 2005 which have been declared by it to be illegal is clearly indefensible. Having clearly held that ““the requirement of ad- herence to the Statutory Regulations framed by the NCTE cannot be left to be determined at the discretion of the authorities of the State Govern- ment and that there was no compelling reason with the State to justify a departure from the Statutory Regulations, any action under illegal rules would be null and void”“, the High Court could not have permitted the State Government to perpetuate an illegality. To say the least, we are equally amazed by the stand of the State Government. Having failed to sustain the Amendment Rules, 2005 before the High Court, it would be improper for the State to go ahead with the recruitments under the said amended Rules which have been declared null and void, particularly when the decision of the High Court on that issue has not been ques- tioned by it. We are of the view that the impugned observation by the High Court would be clearly inimical to the rule of law. While it is trite that Courts can exercise judicial discretion in moulding the relief, however, such discretion cannot be exercised to perpetuate and encour- age an illegality.
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COURT |
Hon. J. AFTAB ALAM and Hon. J. R.M. LODHA
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PARTIES |
The State of Maharashtra & Ors. Appellants
Versus
M/s. Ark Builders Pvt. Ltd. Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
2152 OF 2011
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ACT |
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
, Section:
Section 31(5), Section 34
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HEAD NOTE |
The High Court overlooked that what section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal. ---In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the claimant-respondent but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case. ---In the light of the discussion made above this appeal must succeed.
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COURT |
Hon. J. D.K. JAIN and Hon. J. ASOK KUMAR GANGULY and Hon. J. H.L. DATTU
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PARTIES |
M/S. MUSTAN TAHERBHAI APPELLANT
VERSUS
COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS RESPONDENT
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
3788 OF 2003
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ACT |
the Customs Act, 1962
, Section:
Section 130E
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HEAD NOTE |
Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are constrained to hold that the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside on the short ground that while deciding the case, the Tribunal has ignored the specific directions issued by this Court, vide order dated 30th August, 2001. It is evident from the impugned order, in particular from paras 15 and 16 that the Tribunal has not appreciated the facts obtaining in the present case in their correct perspective, which has resulted in vitiating its decision on the question of leviability of import duty. Although, from para 14 of the impugned order it is evident that the Tribunal was conscious of the direction of this Court that it was required to first record the correct facts and then in the factual perspective locate and apply the relevant law, yet in the very next paragraph it proceeds to hold that when it is accepted that Notification No. 118/59-Cus. did not exist at the time of clearance of the vessel from the ship yard, the persistent plea that the ship was manufactured in a warehouse located in India and therefore, it attracted 8 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606 9 (2009) 14 SCC 342 excise duty alone need not be considered at all. In our opinion, in light of the decision and directions of this Court in C.A. 1998 of 2000, judicial discipline obliged the Tribunal to examine the entire legal issue after ascertaining the foundational facts, regardless of its earlier view in the matter. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be sustained
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COURT |
Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
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PARTIES |
HARISH KUMAR AND ANR.Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ANR. Respondent(s)
WITH
ABHA SINHA Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND ORS. Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
627 OF 2011 with 628 OF 2011
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ACT |
Criminal Procedure Code
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The Trial Court to conduct the trial of the case on day-to-day basis and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible. Supreme Court of India- Dated:February 25, 2011.
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COURT |
Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DEEPAK VERMA
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PARTIES |
PERSN MEDICINAL PLANTS PVT. LTD. & ANR. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
INDIAN BANK AND ORS. Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
2074-2078 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Learned Solicitor General submits that if the Bank is allowed to appropriate this amount, then he has no objection to the appeal of the appellant being heard on merit by the DRAT. We direct that the Indian Bank would be at liberty to appropriate the amount which is already with the Bank, however, this would be subject to the final decision of the appeal by the DRAT.--
In the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the DRAT to hear and dispose of the appeal on all questions of law, as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within two months from the date of the communication of this order.--Supreme Court of India- Dated:February 25, 2011.
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COURT |
Hon. J. B. SUDERSHAN REDDY and Hon. J. SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR
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PARTIES |
JUGAL KISHORE KHETAWAT APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF WEST BENGAL RESPONDENT
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
168 OF 2007 with 1399 of 2007
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code, Constitution of India, Criminal Procedure Code
, Section:
Section 120B/302 IPC, Art 136 of Constitution of India
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HEAD NOTE |
where the appeal is against a conviction and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any of his near relatives may, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, apply to the Appellate Court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave is granted, the appeal shall not abate; (b) the power to grant leave to continue the appeal is conferred on the court and not on the Registrar under Order VI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.--Supreme Court Of India- Order Dated:February 25, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. P. SATHASIVAM and Hon. J. Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN
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PARTIES |
Ashok Tshering Bhutia Appellant
Versus
State of Sikkim Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
945 of 2003
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
On a consideration of the matter it cannot be said that there is no disproportion or even a sizeable disproportion.....There are also other possible errors in the calculations in regard to point (c). The finding becomes inescapable that the assets were in excess of the known sources of income. But on the question whether the extent of the disproportion is such as to justify a conviction for criminal misconduct...., a somewhat liberal view requires to be taken of what proportion of assets in excess of the known sources of income constitutes ““disproportion”“ for purposes of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act
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COURT |
Hon. J. HARJIT SINGH BEDI and J. CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
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PARTIES |
TUKARAM & ORS. APPELLANT(S)
vs.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA RESPONDENT(S)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
902 OF 2007 with 1195 OF 2007 with 615 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
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COURT |
Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
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PARTIES |
MD.SUKUR ALI Appellant(s)
VERSUS
STATE OF ASSAM Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
546 OF 2011
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ACT |
Constitution of India
, Section:
Art. 21
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HEAD NOTE |
The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all. Order Dated-24-2-2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. Anil R. Dave
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PARTIES |
M/S.UTTAM INDUSTRIES APPELLANT (s)
VERSUS
COMMNR.OF CENTRAL EXCISE HARYANA Respondent (s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
3727-3728 OF 2005
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
It is by now a settled law that the exemption notification has to be construed strictly and there has to be strict interpretation of the same by reading the same literally. In this connection reference can be made to the decision of this Court in Collector of Customs (Preventive), Amritsar vs. Malwa Industries Limited reported at (2009) 12 SCC 735 as also to the decision in Kartar Rolling Mills vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi reported at (2006) 4 SCC 772 wherein also it was held by this Court that finding recorded by the Tribunal and the two authorities below are findings of fact and such findings in absence of evidence on record to the contrary is not subject to interference. In order to get benefit of such notification granting exemption the claimant has to show that he satisfies the eligibility criteria. Since the Tribunal and the authorities below have categorically held that the appellant does not satisfy the eligibility criteria on the basis of the evidence on record, therefore, we hold that the said exemption Notification is not applicable to the case of the appellants.
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COURT |
Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. Anil R. Dave
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PARTIES |
Union of India & Ors. Appellants
Versus
M/s. Ind-Swift Laboratories Ltd. Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1976 OF 2011
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
An order passed by the Settlement Commission
could be interfered with only if the said
order is found to be contrary to any
provisions of the Act. So far findings of the
fact recorded by Commission or question
of facts are concerned, the same is not
open for examination either by the High
Court or by the Supreme Court. In the
present case the order of the Settlement
Commission clearly indicates that the said
order, particularly, with regard to the
imposition of simple interest @ 10 per cent
per annum was passed in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 14 but the High
Court wrongly interpreted the said Rule
and thereby arrived at an erroneous
finding.
So far as the second issue with respect to interest
on Rs. 50 lacs is concerned, the same
being a factual issue should not have been
gone into by the High Court exercising the
writ jurisdiction and the High Court
should not have substituted its own
opinion against the opinion of the
Settlement Commission when the same
was not challenged on merits.
In that view of the matter, we set aside the order passed by the
Punjab & Haryana High Court by the impugned judgment and
order and restore the order of the Settlement Commission
leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
ORDER DATED-February 21, 2011.
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COURT |
Hon. J. R. V. Raveendran and Hon. J. A. K. Patnaik
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PARTIES |
M/s Hussnain International Appellant
Versus
Union of India & Ors. Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1980-1981 OF 2011
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD--We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court should not have passed the impugned order for deposit of Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the appeals when the Appellate Authority had directed the appellant to make pre- deposit for Rs.5,00,000/- for both the appeals. The second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act states that in the case of an appeal against a decision or order imposing a penalty or redemption charges, no such appeal shall be entertained unless the amount of the penalty or redemption charges has been deposited by the appellant. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act, however, states ““where the Appellate Authority is of opinion that the deposit to be made will cause undue hardship to the appellant, it may, at its discretion, dispense with such deposit either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may impose.”“ Hence, under the Act discretion is vested in the Appellate Authority to dispense with a pre-deposit of penalty either unconditionally or subject to such condition as the Appellate Authority may impose. If in exercise of such discretion, the Appellate Authority in the present case dispensed with the pre-deposit penalty of Rs.1,30,00,000/- in each of the two appeals subject to the appellant depositing a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court ought not to have enhanced the amount of pre-deposit to Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the two appeals.
As the two appeals of the appellant have not been heard on merits, we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and the order of the learned Single Judge and direct that in case the appellant deposits the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as directed by the Appellate Authority within two months from today, the two appellate orders of the Appellate Authority will stand quashed and the appeal will be heard on merits afresh by the Appellate Authority.
With the aforesaid directions, the appeals are allowed. No costs- ORDER DATED- February 21, 2011.
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COURT |
Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. Anil R. Dave
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PARTIES |
State of Haryana & Others Appellants
Versus
M/s. Mahabir Vegetable Oils Pvt. Ltd. Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1977 OF 2011
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD--The High Court has gone on the premise that once the Appellant have themselves extended the benefit to the Respondent they cannot further classify the benefit of investment up to the date of amendment, putting the unit in the negative list. It appears that the High Court while arriving at the said finding has failed to appreciate the fact that the case of the Respondent was considered for exemption in the light of the judgment passed by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620 wherein it was held that the Respondent is entitled to exemption. However, the issue of quantum was kept open. The High Court while giving the said finding has altogether closed itself in considering the said issue and on the contrary has held that only because the Respondent has been considered for grant of exemption, there is no issue of quantum and the Respondent is entitled to entire exemption. In our opinion the said finding is not in line with the observations made by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620. The quantification made by the LLSC is in accord with the ratio laid by this Court.
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court leaving the parties to bear their own costs.- ORDER DATED February 21, 2011.
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COURT |
Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. Anil R. Dave
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PARTIES |
Ram Narayan Tiwari Appellant
Versus
Union of India & Ors. Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1978 OF 2011
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD- Counsel appearing for the appellant also submitted that the punishment awarded to the appellant was too severe and harsh considering the nature and the degree of the offences established. The appellant belongs to Air Force, which is a disciplined service. The allegations made against the appellant were serious. The charge number (2) against him stood proved. The said charge is also serious and we are of the considered opinion that for an offence of the aforesaid nature the authority was justified in awarding him the punishment of dismissal from service.
-- The scale of punishment provided in Section 73 of the Act clearly confirms the position that dismissal from service is a lesser punishment than that of detention in prison. By commuting the punishment of three months detention and imposing the punishment of dismissal, the Confirming Authority has strictly followed the scale of punishment provided for in Section 73 of the Act and, therefore, there is no justification for any interference with the nature of punishment awarded to the appellant-APPEAL DISMISSED- ORDER DATED- FEB 21, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. D.K. JAIN and Hon. J. H.L. DATTU
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PARTIES |
Sudhir Kumar Consul Appellant
versus
Allahabad Bank Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1982-1983 OF 2011
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Held- The only ground on which Article 14 has been put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the fixation of the cut-off date for payment of the revised benefits under the two notifications concerned was arbitrary and it resulted in denying arrears of payments to certain Sections of the employees. This argument is no longer res integra. It has been held in a catena of judgments that fixing of a cut-off date for granting of benefits is well within the powers of the Government as long as the reasons therefor are not arbitrary and are based on some rational consideration.”“
-- We have sympathies for the appellant but, in a society governed by Rule of law, sympathies cannot override the Rules and Regulations. We may recall the observations made by this Court while considering the issue of compassionate appointment in public service. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramachhandra Ambekar and Anr. (1994) 2 SCC 718, wherein the Court observed: ““The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration.... Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered that ““law is the embodiment of all wisdom”“. Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be.- Order Dated Feb 21 ,2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
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PARTIES |
Visveswaraya Technological University & Anr. Appellants
Vs.
Krishnendu Halder & Ors. Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1947 OF 2011
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD--The proliferating unaided private colleges, may need a full complement of students for their comfortable sustenance (meeting the cost of running the college and paying the staff etc.). But that cannot be at the risk of quality of education. To give an example, if 35% is the minimum passing marks in a qualifying examination, can it be argued by colleges that the minimum passing marks in the qualifying examination should be reduced to only 25 or 20 instead of 35 on the ground that the number of students/candidates who pass the examination are not sufficient to fill their seats? Reducing the standards to `fill the seats”“ will be a dangerous trend which will destroy the quality of education. If there are large number of vacancies, the remedy lies in (a) not permitting new colleges; (b) reducing the intake in existing colleges; (c) improving the infrastructure and quality of the institution to attract more students. Be that as it may. The need to fill the seats cannot be permitted to override the need to maintain quality of education. Creeping commercialization of education in the last few years should be a matter of concern for the central bodies, states and universities.
13. No student or college, in the teeth of the existing and prevalent rules of the State and the University can say that such rules should be ignored, whenever there are unfilled vacancies in colleges. In fact the State/University, may, in spite of vacancies, continue with the higher eligibility criteria to maintain better standards of higher education in the State or in the colleges affiliated to the University. Determination of such standards, being part of the academic policy of the University, are beyond the purview of judicial review, unless it is established that such standards are arbitrary or `adversely affect”“ the standards if any fixed by the Central Body under a Central enactment. The order of the Division Bench is therefore unsustainable. ORDER DATED:FEB 18, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. Dalveer Bhandari and Hon. J. Deepak Verma
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PARTIES |
Ravi Appellant
Versus
Badrinarayan & Ors. Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1926 of 2011
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD-- a permanent disability certificate by the said Medical Board. Therefore, the said certificate clearly establishes that Appellant had sustained permanent disability to his own body to the extent of 50% and even after several surgeries; he was not able to control his urination. We can well appreciate and imagine the problems and difficulties of a young boy aged 16 years, who is not able to control his urination and spoils his clothes even while attending school. We have been given to understand that he is required to go with additional sets of clothings so that he could change the same, in case they are spoiled. This is the state of affairs even as on date. We do not doubt the genuineness and correctness of the aforesaid certificate. Even otherwise, Respondents have also not contended that this certificate is forged or fabricated and has been obtained with an intention to get compensation-APPEAL ALLOWED- ORDER DATED- FEB 18, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. G.S. SINGHVI and Hon. J. ASOK KUMAR GANGULY
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PARTIES |
Sri. K.R. Madhusudhan & Ors....Appellant(s)
Versus
The Administrative Officer & Anr. ...Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1923-1924 OF 2011
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD--the Tribunal should have considered the prospect of future income while computing compensation but the Tribunal has not done that. In the appeal, which was filed by the appellants before the High Court, the High Court instead of maintaining the amount of compensation, granted by the Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had not given any reason. The High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from the multiplier used by the Tribunal without disclosing any reason therefore. The High Court has also not considered the clear and corroborative evidence about the prospect of future increment of the deceased. When the age of the deceased is between 51 and 55 years the multiplier is 11, which is specified in the II Column in the II Schedule in the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Tribunal has not committed any error by accepting the said multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate why the High Court chose to apply the multiplier of 6.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -ORDER DATED : FEB 18 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. R.V. Raveendran and Hon. J. A. K. Patnaik
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PARTIES |
Chowdhury Navin Hemabhai & Ors. ...... Appellants
Versus
The State of Gujarat & Ors....... Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1925 OF 2011
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ACT |
Civil Laws
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
This is, however, a clear case where the admissions of the seven appellants took place due to the fault of the rule-making authority in not making the State Rules, 2008 in conformity of the MCI Regulations. For this fault of the rule-making authority if the appellants are discharged from the MBBS course, they will suffer grave injustice. On the peculiar facts of the case, we are thus of the view that this is a fit case where this Court should exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice between parties. In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Others. [(1991) 4 SCC 406] after examining the width of this power under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court held: ““No enactment made by Central or State legislature can limit or restrict the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, though while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the court must take into consideration the statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute. What would be the need of ““complete justice”“ in a cause or matter would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and while exercising that power the Court would take into consideration the express provisions of a substantive statute. Once this Court has taken seisin of a case, cause or matter, it has power to pass any order or issue direction as may be necessary to do complete justice in the matter. --In the facts of the present case, we have found that the
appellants were not to be blamed for having secured
admission in the MBBS course and the fault was entirely of
the rule-making authority in making the 2008 Rules and the
appellants have gone through the pains of appearing in the
common entrance test and have been selected on the basis of
their merit and admitted into the MBBS course in the college
in accordance with the State Rules, 2008 and have pursued
their studies for a year. Hence, even though under the MCI
Regulations the appellants were not eligible for admission to
the MBBS course in the academic year 2008-2009, for the
purpose of doing complete justice in the matter before us, we
direct that the admissions of the appellants to the MBBS
course in the college during the academic year 2008-2009 will
not be disturbed. This direction shall not, however, be treated
as a precedent- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA - ORDER DATED- FEB 18,2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. ALTAMAS KABIR and Hon. J. CYRIAC JOSEPH
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PARTIES |
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. ... Appellants
Vs.
K.M. Poonam & Ors. ... Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1928 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The liability of the Insurance Company to pay compensation was limited to six persons travelling inside the vehicle only and that the liability to pay the others was that of the owner, we, in this case, are faced with the same problem as had surfaced in Anjana Shyam's case (supra). The number of persons to be compensated being in excess of the number of persons who could validly be carried in the vehicle, the question which arises is one of apportionment of the amounts to be paid. Since there can be no pick and choose method to identify the five passengers, excluding the driver, in respect of whom compensation would be payable by the Insurance Company, to meet the ends of justice we may apply the procedure adopted in Baljit Kaur”“s case (supra) and direct that the Insurance Company should deposit the total amount of compensation awarded to all the claimants and the amounts so deposited be disbursed to the claimants in respect to their claims, with liberty to the Insurance Company to recover the amounts paid by it over and above the compensation amounts payable in respect of the persons covered by the Insurance Policy from the owner of the vehicle, as was directed in Baljit Kaur”“s case- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
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PARTIES |
ARUNA RAMCHANDRA SHANBAUG Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Writ Petition
, AppealNo:
115 OF 2009
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The Dean of King Edward Memorial Hospital as well as Ms. Pinky Virani (who claims to be the next friend of the petitioner) are directed to intimate the brother(s)/sister(s) or other close relatives of the petitioner that the case will be listed on 2nd March, 2011 in the Supreme Court and they can put forward their views before the Court, if they so desire. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the Registry of this Court shall communicate a copy of this Order forthwith to the Dean, KEM Hospital. The Dean, KEM Hospital is requested to file an affidavit stating his views regarding the prayer in this writ petition, and also the condition of the petitioner- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. D.K. JAIN and Hon. J. H.L. DATTU
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PARTIES |
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS -- APPELLANT
VERSUS
SAYED ALI & ANR.-- RESPONDENTS
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
4294-4295 OF 2002
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The import manifest and the bill of entry having been filed before the Collectorate of Customs (Imports) Mumbai, the same having been assessed and clearance for home consumption having been allowed by the proper officer on importers executing bond, undertaking the obligation of export, in our opinion, the Collector of Customs (Preventive), not being a ““proper officer”“ within the meaning of Section 2(34) of the Act, was not competent to issue show cause notice for re- assessment under Section 28 of the Act. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the Collector of Customs (Preventive), who had issued the show cause notices was assigned the functions under Section 28 of the Act as ““proper officer”“ either by the Board or the Collector/Commissioner of Customs. We are convinced that Notifications No. 250-Cus and 251-Cus., both dated 27th August, 1983, issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of the Section 4 of the Act, appointing Collector of Customs (Preventive) etc. to be the Collector of Customs for Bombay, Thane and Kolaba Districts in the State of Maharashtra did not ipso facto confer jurisdiction on him to exercise power entrusted to the ““proper officers”“ for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act. In that view of the matter, we do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. V. Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the revenue in the second set of appeals, that the source of power to act as a ““proper officer”“ is Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and not sub-section 34 of Section 2 of the Act. The said sections merely authorize the Board to appoint officers of Customs and confer on them the powers and duties to be exercised/discharged by them, but for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act, an officer of customs has to be designated as ““proper officer”“ by assigning the function of levy and collection of duty, by the Board or the Commissioner of Customs. The argument is rejected accordingly. Similarly, revenue’‘‘‘s reliance on the decision of this court in Ram Narain Bishwanath & Ors. (supra) is clearly misplaced. In that case the issue for determination was that when goods imported and cleared at Paradip Port (Orissa State) were seized by the Customs authorities in West Bengal on the allegation that these had been imported on the strength of fictitious licences, whether the customs authorities at Paradip or West Bengal will have the jurisdiction to initiate adjudication proceedings. By a short order it was held that it was for the customs authorities at Paradip to initiate proceedings against the importer. Apart from the fact that none of the statutory provisions were considered in that case, the issue arising for consideration in the present appeals was not the subject matter therein. Thus, the said decision is of no avail to the revenue.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA and Hon. J. ANIL R. DAVE
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PARTIES |
GURJINDER SINGH .....APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF PUNJAB .....RESPONDENT
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1237 OF 2008
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD--With regard to recovery of the pistol, the learned counsel is right that the pistol was recovered from a public place but it was recovered from the place which could not have been easily located by anyone and, therefore, the accused cannot get benefit which the learned counsel wanted him to get. From the memo of recovery, it is clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under a plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar. Thus, it is very clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under the plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away on the eastern katcha path from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar and, therefore, in our opinion, the recovery cannot be said to be from a place which could have been easily accessible to anyone.
--With regard to recovery memo, the mistake committed in writing the word "witness"
or "witnesses" can not be said to be so material so as to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. – SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED:FEB 18,2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA
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PARTIES |
KHAJA SHARIFF & ORS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
B.H.E.L., HYDERABAD Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
44 OF 2007
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
If the order has re-determined the valuable rights of the parties to the proceeding, whether without issuing any notice or after issuing notice, it is a judgment as per the tests laid down in Khimji's case.
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COURT |
Hon. J. HARJIT SINGH BEDI and Hon. J. CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
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PARTIES |
SHARADBHAI JIVANLAL VANIYA .... APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT.... RESPONDENT
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
810 OF 2004
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
CRIMINAL LAWS-The letter which forms the basis of conviction by the Appellate Court was never produced during the investigation and for the first time produced by the witness during the course of trial, when she appeared as a witness. It is submitted that authenticity of the letter in question has not been proved and hence the appellate Court ought not to have reversed the judgment of acquittal and convicted the appellant. --Moreover, this letter had not been produced before the police during the course of the initial investigation and had been handed over to the police after several months. This fact, as also a reading of the letter, indicates that this was a concocted piece of evidence and the work of a legal mind, as no person would write such a letter meeting all legal requirements for implicating himself and his near relatives, in a claim for dowry. It has also been pointed out that view taken by the Trial Court was one of the possible views which the High Court in appeal ought not to have reversed.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17,2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. G.S. SINGHVI and Hon. J. ASOK KUMAR GANGULY
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PARTIES |
STATE OF UTTARAKHAND AND OTHERS...Appellant(s)
VERSUS
HARPAL SINGH RAWAT...Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1894 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
CIVIL LAWS--An agreement signed by the parties in the matter of collection of toll. While rejecting the argument of the writ petitioner that he was not liable to pay stamp duty under Article 35(b) read with Section 2(16) of the Act, the Division Bench observed: ““On bare reading of the section it becomes clear that all leases with respect to immovable property would be leases in terms of Section 2(16) but in addition to leases of immovable property in other three categories there would also be lease under category (c) in which any instrument by which tolls of any description are let would be a lease for the purpose of Section 2(16). The instrument by which right to collect toll is conveyed has to be treated as lease for the purposes of Stamp Act. Right to collect toll will never in any circumstances involve immovable property. Basically toll is collected for using a road or bridge and as such neither the road nor the bridge is leased out, only the right to collection is leased out and this right of leasing out the collection is ““lease”“ for the purposes of Stamp Act- APPEAL ALLOWED- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. R V Raveendran and Hon. J. P Sathasivam
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PARTIES |
Meghwal Samaj Shiksha Samiti ... Appellant
Vs.
Lakh Singh & Ors. ... Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
821 OF 2004
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Civil Laws-There is concurrent finding that a pond exists and the area covered by it varies in the rainy season. In such a case no part of it could have been allotted to anybody for construction of house building or any allied purposes. It is important to notice that the material resources of the community like forests, tanks, ponds, hillock, mountain etc. are nature”“s bounty. They maintain delicate ecological balance. They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment which enables people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the guaranteed right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government, including the Revenue Authorities i.e. Respondents 11 to 13, having noticed that a pond is falling in disuse, should have bestowed their attention to develop the same which would, on one hand, have prevented ecological disaster and on the other provided better environment for the benefit of the public at large. Such vigil is the best protection against knavish attempts to seek allotment in non-abadi sites- Appeal Dismissed- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. S. H. Kapadia and Hon. J. Mukundakam Sharma and Hon. J. K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan and Hon. J. Swatanter Kumar
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PARTIES |
Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. ...Appellant(s)
versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1883 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. ...Appellant(s)
versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondent(s) - Case
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COURT |
Hon. J. Dr. Mukundakam Sharma and J. Anil R. Dave
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PARTIES |
Union of India .... Appellant
Versus
Giani .... Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1884 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD--In the present case the acquisition proceeding commenced with the notification under Section 4 issued on 06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by the Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982, the date from which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was made applicable to the pending and subsequent proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan (supra) the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1A).
All the appeals, therefore, are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent and disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs. -SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED FEB 17,2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. G.S. SINGHVI and Hon. J. ASOK KUMAR GANGULY
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PARTIES |
P.S. Somanathan and Ors. ...Appellant(s)
Versus
District Insurance Officer and Anr. ...Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1891 OF 2011
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD--The High Court unfortunately took a very technical view in the matter of applying the multiplier. The High Court cannot keep out of its consideration the claim of the daughter of the first claimant, since the daughter was impleaded, and was 49 years of age. Admittedly, the deceased was looking after the entire family. In determining the age of the mother, the High Court should have accepted the age of the mother at 65, as given in the claim petition, since there is no controversy on that. By accepting the age of mother at 67, the High Court further reduced the multiplier from 6 to 5, even if we accept the reasoning of the High Court to be correct. The reasoning of the High Court is not correct in view of the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra). Following the same the High Court should have proceeded to compute the compensation on the age of the deceased.
Thus, the finding of the High Court is contrary to the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra), which is the leading decision on this question and which we follow.
This Court, therefore, cannot sustain the High Court judgment and is constrained to set aside the same. The award of MACT is restored.
The appeal is allowed. No costs
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COURT |
Hon. J. R. V. Raveendran and Hon. J. P. Sathasivam
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PARTIES |
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited ... Appellant
Versus
Ghanshyam Dass & Ors. ... Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
4369 OF 2006
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD--The language of the circular dated 13.12.1995 makes it crystal clear that the Government took a fresh decision in supersession of earlier instructions that promotion to Grade-IV may be given from amongst officials in Grade-III on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade. Hence, the decision of the Government to make promotions to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade could take effect only from 13.12.1995 and not from a prior date and the respondents, who had filed O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 in the Central Administrative Tribunal could not claim any promotion to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic cadre with effect from any date prior to 13.12.1995. The Central Administrative Tribunal was, therefore, not right in allowing O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 by order dated 11.08.2000, directing the Government to consider promoting the applicants to Grade-IV with effect from the dates their immediate juniors in the basic grade seniority were so promoted subject to their being found fit with consequential benefits of seniority as well as arrears of pay and allowance and of retiral benefits in the case of those of the applicants in the O.As. who had retired on superannuation. In our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have interfered with the decision of the Tribunal.
18. We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the impugned orders dated 22.05.2003 of the High Court and the common order dated 11.08.2000 of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997. The two O.As. stand rejected. There will be no order as to costs.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA
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PARTIES |
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ... APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NRIPEN SARMA ... RESPONDENT(S)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1922 OF 2011
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ACT |
Civil Laws
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Held- The appellant has preferred this appeal against the final judgment dated 10.09.2007 before this Court. This appeal is also barred by limitation of 114 days. There is no satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay before this Court also. -Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 17,2011
The Union of India ought to have been careful particularly in filing this Civil Appeal because the Division Bench, by the impugned order, has dismissed the appeal before it on the ground of delay. It is a matter of deep anguish and distress that majority of the matters filed by the Union of India are hopelessly barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanations exist for condoning inordinate delay in filing those cases.
On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to dismiss this appeal on the ground of delay. However, in the larger interest, we are keeping the question of law open
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COURT |
Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
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PARTIES |
State of Haryana & Others ..Appellants
versus
Praduman Singh (D) By Lrs. ..Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
356 OF 2007
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ACT |
Civil Laws
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Held- It is, therefore, difficult for us to uphold the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court and hence we quash and set aside the same. If, however, the writ petitioner, respondents herein, has/have any other alternative remedy or forum to claim allotment of the land, they obviously will have to first of all get the letter of the State Government quashed and set aside which has ordered stopping the allotment of rehabilitation land forthwith. Unless the respondents succeed in doing so, no allotment of the land could have been made specially without any enquiry as to whether the predecessor-in-interest had left any land at all in Pakistan when he migrated to India. Besides this, learned counsel for the appellants-State further informed that the writ petitioner, predecessor-in- interest of the respondents herein had already been allotted land under the rehabilitation scheme way back in the year 1952 and, therefore, claim for allotment for the second time should not have been allowed by the High Court contrary to the government instructions. We find force in this submission also, and, therefore, this aspect was required to be examined and enquired before any order was passed in favour of the respondents-claimants- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 15, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and Hon. J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
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PARTIES |
SURENDRA KOLI Appellant (s)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. ORS.Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
2227 OF 2010
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ACT |
Criminal Laws
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Held- Supreme Court of India-Order Dated Feb 15, 2011- The DNA test of Rimpa by CDFD, a pioneer institute in Hyderabad matched with that of blood of her parents and brother. The Doctors at AIIMS have put the parts of the deceased girls which have been recovered by the Doctors of AIIMS together. These bodies have been recovered in the presence of the Doctors of AIIMS at the pointing out by the accused Surendra Koli. Thus, recovery is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
On the facts of the case we see no reason to interfere with the findings of the trial court and the High Court that the appellant Surendra Koli is guilty of murdering Rimpa Haldar. Both Courts have gone into the evidence in great detail and we have perused the same. The appellant appears to be a serial killer, and these cases in our opinion fall within the category of rarest of the rare cases as laid down in Bachan singh Vs State of Punjab, 1982 SCC 689 which has been subsequently followed in Atbir Vs Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 SCC (9) 1.
The killings by the appellant Surendra Koli are horrifying and barbaric. He used a definite methodology in committing these murders. He would see small girls passing by the house, and taking advantage of their weakness lure them inside the house no. D-5, Sector 31, Nithari Village, Noida and there he would strangulate them and after killing them he tried to have sex with the body and would then cut off their body parts and eat them. Some parts of the body were disposed off by throwing them in the passage gallery and drain (nala) beside the house. House no. D-5, Sector 31 had become a virtual slaughter house, where innocent children were regularly butchered.
In our opinion, this case clearly falls within the category of rarest of rare case and no mercy can be shown to the appellant Surendra Koli.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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COURT |
Hon. J. V.S. SIRPURKAR and Hon. J. T.S. THAKUR
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PARTIES |
Sheo Shankar Singh ...Appellant
Versus
State of Jharkhand & Anr. ...Respondents
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
791-792 OF 2005
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
Section 302/34/120B and 201 IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
Held-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 15, 2011-Coming to the case at hand we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in imposing the extreme penalty of death upon the appellants. We say so for reasons more than one. Firstly, because the appellants are not professional killers. Even according to the prosecution they were only a part of the coal mafia active in the region indulging in theft of coal from the collieries. The deceased being opposed to such activities appears to have incurred their wrath and got killed. Secondly, because even when the deceased was a politician there was no political angle to his killing. Thirdly, because while all culpable homicides amounting to murder are inhuman, hence legally and ethically unacceptable yet there was nothing particularly brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly in the manner of its execution so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community or exhaust depravity and meanness on the part of the assailants to call for the extreme penalty. Fourthly, because there was difference of opinion on the question of sentence to be awarded to the convicts. The Trial Court did not find it to be a rarest of rare case and remained content with the award of life sentence only which sentence the High Court enhanced to death. Considering all these circumstances, the death sentence awarded to the appellants in our opinion deserves to be commuted to life imprisonment.-Appeal Allowed
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COURT |
Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
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PARTIES |
PRIYA DARSHNI DENTAL COLLEGE & HOSPITAL ... Petitioner
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS ... Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
319 OF 2010
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ACT |
CIVIL LAWS
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
HELD- In view of the fact that the inspection and verification in regard to renewal of permission for the second, third, fourth and fifth years will be restricted only to the consideration of the additional faculty and additional infrastructure, it may not be necessary to apply the lengthy time schedule prescribed for initial permission, to renewal of permissions during the next four years. The DCI Regulations presently contemplate almost similar time schedules in regard to applications for establishment of new dental colleges, for opening of higher courses of study, for increase of admission capacity, and for renewal of permissions, with 15th July being the last date both for grant of permission or renewal of permission. DCI and Central Government may consider amendment to the DCI Regulations suitably to provide for a shorter and distinct time schedule for renewal of permissions, so that the dental colleges could file applications till end of February and the process of grant or refusal of renewal is completed by 15th of June. Conclusion
22. In view of the above, these writ petitions are allowed as follows : (a) The condition imposed by the Central Government (requiring the dental colleges to secure appropriate orders from this court approving the renewals of permission) in the letters of renewal of permission issued to the petitioners in July/August/September, 2010, is quashed; (b) It is however declared that the renewal of permissions issued by Central Government to the petitioners for the academic year 2010-2011, are valid.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 15,2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and Hon. J. H.L. GOKHALE
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PARTIES |
RAJESH NAUPATLAL SANKLA AND ANR. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
RAJA MAHENDRAGIR DHANRAJGIR AND ORS. Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1999 OF 2011
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, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Held- Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the suit is pending before the Small Causes Court, Pune.
We direct the proceedings in the suit to continue, however, no final order in the suit be passed until the disposal of the writ petition to be filed by the appellants before the Bombay High Court.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, we request the Bombay High Court to dispose of the writ petition, if filed (by the appellants within four weeks from today) as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within a period of one year from the date of filing of the writ petition.
In case, the writ petition is not filed within a period of four weeks, this order would be of no avail to the appellants- Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 15 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and J. A.K. PATNAIK
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PARTIES |
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .......APPELLANTS
Versus
J. JASON JOSEPH .....RESPONDENT
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1863 OF 2011
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ACT |
Civil Laws
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no justification for the High Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, to interfere with the findings of the revisional authority and the punishment imposed, which had been accepted by the Administrative Tribunal It is impermissible in law.
--The revisional authority did not interfere with the findings recorded by the appellate authority that respondent was not guilty of charges 2,3,4 and 5. The appellate authority found that as only charges 1,6 and 7 were proved and the other charges relating mis- appropriation of additional fare were not proved, the punishment of dismissal was excessive and consequently set aside the same and imposed a lesser punishment of reduction in rank.
-On the facts and circumstances, the said order of the appellate authority did not call for interference and that too in exercise of power of revision.
Therefore we are of the view that the High Court was justified in restoring the decision of the appellate authority imposing a lesser punishment.
However while the High Court was justified in restoring the order of reinstatement with imposition of lesser punishment of reduction in service with continuity of service, the High Court was not justified in granting the reliefs of seniority and 25% back wages. When the High Court has upheld the finding that the respondent was guilty of charges 1,6 and 7, any direction for back wages would amount to rewarding the guilty, which is not permissible. Nor will he be entitled to restoration of his seniority as ordered by the High Court.
we allow this appeal in part and set aside the order of the High Court awarding backwages of 25% and restoring the seniority.- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated :Feb 14, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
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PARTIES |
ZAFRUDDIN KHAN ...APPELLANT
vs.
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1862 OF 2011
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ACT |
Civil Laws
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Appeal-Civil Laws-The appellant has pointed out that apart from being a Member of the Bar, he is a former President of the Student Union of the AMU, former elected Member of AMU Court, Life Member of AMU Old Boys Association and Donor Life Member of the AMU-- He had produced documents in support of the said averments. The said averments are not shown to be false. The appellant claims that his only interest in filing the writ petition was to ensure that AMU continues to be an Institution of academic excellence and that no action of the University should dilute its academic excellence. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the writ petition was filed with the oblique motive of maligning the Vice Chancellor of the University. It is not necessary to examine that aspect now-Held- he has sufficient interest to file the writ petition in public interest. The High Court ought not to have dismissed the public interest litigation only on the ground of locus standi of appellant to file the writ petition. Appeal Allowed-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated: Feb 14 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
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PARTIES |
Budhadev Karmaskar ..Appellant
versus
State of West Bengal ..Respondents
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
135 OF 2010
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
Sec 302 IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
Appeal- Sec 302-Indian Penal Code-Medical Officer of Mauza Burdwan Medical College, opined that the death was due to the effect of the injuries as noted anti-mortem in nature; that all the injuries as noted in the post mortem examination report might be caused if a person pushed against the wall and it may be homicidal in nature- Appeal Dismised- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. Aftab Alam and Hon. J. R.M. Lodha
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PARTIES |
S.K.M. Haider .... Appellant
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ....Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1630 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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Appeal- Civil Laws- Post of Ticket Collector is categorised in Annexure IV in Class B-2 but while doing so the underlying object of division of staff into three broad groups A, B and C for vision tests of candidates and of serving Railway employees in non-Gazetted Railway services seems to have been overlooked. Broadly, Class B-2 covers a certain staff in workshops and engine rooms engaged on duties. It has been so done because failing eyesight may endanger themselves or other employees from moving parts of the machinery and crane drivers on open line. This is in consonance with the objective of group B viz; `in the interest of the employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“. Insofar as Ticket Collectors are concerned, vision tests for them are not required `in the interest of employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“ as contemplated in group B but it is required in the interest of administration only - the objective contemplated in group C. In this view of the matter, there seems to be no rational basis, in relation to the object set out in Para 510 of IRMM, of categorizing the post of Ticket Collectors under Class B-2 in Annexure IV. However, it is for the respondents to have a fresh look insofar as categorisation of posts pertaining to non-Gazetted Railway services in Annexure IV is concerned. Suffice it to say that categorization of posts for the purpose of vision tests must have nexus with the object set out in Para 510. Having regard to the objective of division of groups/ classes for the purpose of vision tests under Para 510 of IRMM, the post of Ticket Collectors can not be held to be covered by Class B-2 but rather will be covered by Class C-2. Any inconsistency in categorization of Railway posts in Annexure IV, in our view, must not operate against the appellant in getting promotion to the post of Ticket Collector.
--the appellant could not have been denied promotion to the post of Ticket Collector as he had passed written test and viva voce and was provisionally selected for the post of Ticket Collector and had been declared medically fit in Class C-2. --Appeal is allowed- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 14, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. MARKANDEY KATJU and J. GYAN SUDHA MISRA
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PARTIES |
NEHA ARUN JUGADAR & ANR. Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
KUMARI PALAK DIWAN JI Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
182 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Writ- Transfer Petition- Transfer Petition pending at the District Judge (MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P.) to the competent Court at Pune, Maharashtra. The petitioners allege in the petition that the MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. has no jurisdiction in the matter. - An order of transfer of a case can be passed where both the courts, namely, the transferor court as well as the transferee court, have jurisdiction to hear the case and the party seeking transfer of the case alleges that the transferee court would be more convenient because the witnesses are available there or for some other reason it will be convenient for the parties to have the case heard by the transferee court. There is no question of transfer of a case which has been filed in a court which has no jurisdiction at all to hear it.-With these observations, the transfer petition is dismissed-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. DALVEER BHANDARI and J. DEEPAK VERMA
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PARTIES |
JASVINDER SINGH SOHAL Appellant(s)
VERSUS
INDIAN BANK AND ANR. Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1642 OF 2011
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
In the facts of this case, we deem it appropriate
to direct that the appeal, which was dismissed in default
for not depositing the amount in time, shall be restored
to its original number and be heard expeditiously by the
Tribunal.-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated February 11, 2011.
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COURT |
Hon. J. B.Sudershan Reddy and Hon. J. Surinder Singh Nijjar
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PARTIES |
Jarnail Singh ... Appellant
VERSUS
State of Punjab ...Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1960 OF 2009
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Criminal Laws--Handed over the sample parcel, duly sealed and sample impression of seal to Constable for depositing the same in the office of Chemical Examiner. --None had tampered with the aforesaid case property and the seal which remained in his custody. --Deposited the case property in the office of Chemical Examiner on the same day and tendered receipt. --Report of the Chemical Examiner (Ex. PJ) which indicates that the seals were intact when the sample was received and tallied with the sample impression of the seal.
--It is note worthy that such a report of the Chemical Examiner would be admissible under Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. Considering the aforesaid clear evidence, it cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the link evidence merely because there was a delay of few days in sending the sample to the office of the Chemical Examiner.-Appeal Dismissed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated-February 11, 2011.
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COURT |
Hon. J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN and Hon. J. A.K. PATNAIK
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PARTIES |
Senior Law Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. And Anr. .Appellants
Versus
Guru Shakti Singh and Anr. .....Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1649 OF 2011
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ACT |
Civil Laws
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Civil Laws-Assigning of lesser marks to Sardar Mahinder Singh not only denied him the first place in the panel, but also unjustly and undeservedly gave the first respondent, the first place in the panel. The manner of assigning marks showed a clear intention to favour the first respondent at the cost of the other applicants. It is this finding that persuaded the General Manager of IOC to scrap the selection. The High Court having recorded a finding that the appellant was satisfied about the illegality committed by the selection committee, ought to have rejected the writ petition, as the decision of the appellants to scrap the selection was reasonable and not arbitrary.-Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India-Order dated:Feb 14, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. P. SATHASIVAM and Hon. J. DR. B.S. CHAUHAN
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PARTIES |
V.S. Achuthanandan .... Appellant(s)
Versus
R. Balakrishna Pillai & Ors. .... Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
350 OF 2006
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code and Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 of 1947)
, Section:
Sections 120-B and 409- IPC, Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) -PC Act
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HEAD NOTE |
Criminal Laws-Appeal-Sections 120-B and 409- IPC, Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) -PC Act-- The prosecution has established - a) By awarding both the works of Idamalayar at a very high and exorbitant rate with special conditions having heavy financial implications. b) By reducing the retention and security amount. c) By allowing the contractor to return only fifty per cent of the empty cement bags. Having arrived at such conclusion,
- High Court failed to appreciate in its proper sense the materials placed by the prosecution and brushed aside several important items of evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Unable to accept the conclusion of the High Court, namely, ““the proved circumstances are not sufficient to hold that there was conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution”“.
- Satisfied that the Special Court after framing various points for consideration and after thorough discussion has accepted the case of the prosecution insofar as the work of driving the surge shaft, lining the surge shaft, balance driving the power tunnel and other allied works of Idamalayar Hydro Electric Power Project at a higher or exorbitant rates to the contractor K.P. Poulose and the accused persons have abused their official positions.
-The Special Court has also accepted the prosecution case founding that A1 along with K.P. Poulose, Paul Mundakkal and other accused persons entered into criminal conspiracy and rightly convicted them.
-The High Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused without adverting to the reliable and acceptable evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011
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COURT |
Hon. J. DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA and Hon. J. ANIL R. DAVE
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PARTIES |
The Commissioner of Central Excise Visakhapatnam .Appellant
Versus
M/s. Mehta & Co. ...Respondent
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1090 OF 2009
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ACT |
Civil Procedure Code
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Civil Laws- Appeal- A bare perusal of the said order would also indicate that he has
given deductions for the items held as immovable. -The Commissioner having considered the aforesaid issue carefully and after proper scrutiny, the Tribunal
was not justified in rejecting the said findings by mere conclusion and without trying to meet the findings recorded by the Commissioner–Appeal Allowed , Set aside order passed by Tribunal and restore the order of Commissioner- Supreme Court of India. –Order Dated:FEBRUARY 10, 2011.
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COURT |
Hon. J. (HARJIT SINGH BEDI) and Hon. J (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
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PARTIES |
KILAKKATHA PARAMBATH SASI & ORS. ...APPELLANTS
Versus
STATE OF KERALA .....RESPONDENT
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1383 OF 2003
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code
, Section:
Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
Even assuming, however, that the bus crew ought to have been examined as that would have greatly enhanced the value of the prosecution evidence, but their non-examination case would not mean that the entire prosecution story would fall through as there were several other credible witnesses including an injured one-- The appeal is accordingly dismissed.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated- 4 Feb 2011.
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COURT |
Hon''ble Justice Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN and Hon''ble Justice P. SATHASIVAM
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PARTIES |
Bansi Lal ...Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana ...Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1322 OF 2004
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ACT |
Criminal Procdure Code,1973, Evidence Act
, Section:
Section 313 Cr.PC, Section 113B Evidence Act
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HEAD NOTE |
SUICIDE NOTE- DEFENCE TOOK BY ACCUSED THAT SUICIDE NOTE WRITTEN BY DECEASED-FAILURE TO REBUT THE PRESUMTION THAT HE HAD CAUSED DOWRY DEATH-APPEAL DISMISSED- In the instant case, evidently, the suicide note, Ext.P-2
purported to have been written by Sarla (deceased) had been taken by appellant as his defence while making his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the onus was on him to establish his defence by leading sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he has caused the dowry death. The appellant miserably failed to discharge that onus.--SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, DATED- 14/01/2011
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COURT |
Hon'ble Justice J.M. Panchal and Hon'ble Justice H.L. Gokhale
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PARTIES |
Vikas Kumar Roorkewal ... Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttarakhand and others ...Respondents
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
29 OF 2008
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ACT |
Criminal Procdure Code,1973
, Section:
Section 406 Cr.P.C
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HEAD NOTE |
TRANSFER PETITION ALLOWED-CR.P.C-The petitioner has been able to show the
circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred
that it has become difficult for the witnesses to safely
depose truth because of fear of being haunted by those
against whom they have to depose. The reluctance of the
witnesses to go to the court at Haridwar in spite of
receipt of repeated summons is bound to hamper the
course of justice.
If such a situation is permitted to
continue, it will pave way for anarchy, oppression, etc.,
resulting in breakdown of criminal justice system. In
order to see that the incapacitation of the eye-witnesses
is removed and justice triumphs, it has become
necessary to grant the relief claimed in the instant
petition. On the facts and in the circumstances of the
case this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice
would be served if transfer of the case from Haridwar to
Delhi is ordered.
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COURT |
Hon'ble Justice HARJIT SINGH BEDI, Hon'ble Justice P. SATHASIVAM, Hon'ble Justice CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
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PARTIES |
Laxmichand @ Balbutya…………… ....Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Maharashtra………………....... Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1643 OF 2005
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302 IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
Accused caused single blow in quarrel--Converted from Culpable homicide amounting to Culpable homicide not amounting to murder- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED-06/01/2011
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COURT |
Hon'ble Justice MARKANDEY KATJU, Hon'ble Justice GYAN SUDHA MISRA
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PARTIES |
State of Kerala.............Appellant
-versus-
Raneef.............................Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
_ 3____OF 2011
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ACT |
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 1973, Constitution Of India
, Section:
Article 21
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HEAD NOTE |
BAIL- GRANTED-DELAY IN CONCLUDING THE TRAIL-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -dated--03/01/2011-
In deciding bail applications an important factor which should certainly be taken into consideration by the Court is the delay in concluding the trial. Often this takes several years, and if the accused is denied bail is ultimately acquitted, who will restore so many years of his life spent in custody? Is Article 21 of the constitution, which is the most basic of all the fundamental rights in our Constitution, not violated in such a case? Of course this is not the only factor, but it is certainly one of the important factors in deciding whether to grant bail.
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COURT |
Hon'ble Justice HARJIT SINGH BEDI, Hon'ble Justice P. SATHASIVAM, Hon'ble Justice CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD
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PARTIES |
Jagat Singh .... Appellant(s)
Versus
State of H.P. .... Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1145 OF 2010
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code ,1860
, Section:
Sec 302/307/34/323 IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
No Intention - as mentioned U/s 300 IPC- considering the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased as opined by Medical Expert- the conviction from Section 302 to Section 323 is altered.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- dated--03/01/2011
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COURT |
Hon'ble Justice P. SATHASIVAM and Hon'ble Justice Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN
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PARTIES |
Ganesan ...Appellant
Versus
Rama Raghuraman & Ors. ...Respondents
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
989 of 2003
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code ,1860
, Section:
Sec 302/307/34/ 304-Part-II. IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
No intention to murder- Section 302 converted into 304 Part-II- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- dated--03/01/2011
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COURT |
HARJIT SINGH BEDI J. & P.SATHASHIVAM j.
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PARTIES |
Abrar Vs.
The State of Uttar Pradesh
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1668 OF 2005
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code ,1860
, Section:
302 I.P.C.
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HEAD NOTE |
Dyeing Declaration - All witnesses hostiled - Conviction maintained on the basis of dyeing declaration alone : Supreme Court.
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COURT |
Justice Dalveer Bhandari. and Justice. H.L. Gokhale
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PARTIES |
Sanjay Kumar Jain .....Appellant
Versus
State of Delhi .....Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
2400 OF 2010
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
Sec 302/304-B
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HEAD NOTE |
Evidence on record - The deceased was subjected to crueltyand harassment by her husband, the appellant herein and the harassment was in connection with the demand of dowry- victim (deceased) died within oneyear and two months of the marriage- to set aside the
conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but in the facts and circumstances of this case we proceed to convict the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentence him to 9 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-
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COURT |
J.M. PANCHAL,DEEPAK VERMA,Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN JJJ.
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PARTIES |
State of U.P. & Ors.
Versus
Hirendra Pal Singh etc.
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.14992-93 of 2010
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ACT |
L.R.Manual
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Question of revival of the repealed clauses of L.R.
Manual in case the substituted clauses are struck down by the court,
would not arise. In view of this, the interim order would amount to
substituting the legal policy by the judicial order, and thus not
sustainable:Supreme Court
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COURT |
J.M. PANCHAL, DEEPAK VERMA, Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN J.J.J.
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PARTIES |
State of U.P. & Ors. …… Appellants
Versus
Hirendra Pal Singh etc. …….Respondents
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APPEAL |
Writ Petition
, AppealNo:
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14992-93 of 2010)
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ACT |
U.P. L.R.MANUAL
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
APPOINTMENTS OF District Government Counsels/Asst.District Government Counsels in Uttar Pradesh under amended provisions of L.R.Manual : Supreme COURT Dated 3/12/2010.
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COURT |
Hon'ble Aftab Alam & Hon'ble R.M. Lodha
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PARTIES |
Laxmi Ram Pawar ...... Appellant
Vs.
Sitabai Balu Dhotre & Anr. ...... Respondents
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2789 OF 2005
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ACT |
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971
, Section:
Section 2(e)(v)
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HEAD NOTE |
the first respondent
set up the case in the plaint that the appellant was a trespasser in the
subject room. The first appellate court has also recorded a
categorical finding, which has not been disturbed by the High Court,
that the appellant was occupying the subject room as trespasser. In
the circumstances, the suit was clearly not maintainable for want of
written permission from the Competent Authority and was rightly
dismissed by the trial court- Appeal Dismissed- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated- 01 Dec 2010
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COURT |
P. SATHASIVAM & A.R.DAVE J.J.
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PARTIES |
Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli & Ors. Vs.
State of Gujarat
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1146 OF 2008
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code ,1860
, Section:
302
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HEAD NOTE |
The recovery of blood
stained loan form application bearing name and address of
appellant Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli from the scene of
offence and the serological report which opines the blood to be
of group -O- which is the blood group of the deceased
conclusively establishes the presence of accu sedat the scene of
offence. Even though the panch-witness Vijaybhai has
turned hostile to the prosecution but the spot panchnama has
been cogently and convincingly proved through the testimony
of the Investigating Officer.-conviction maintained
:Supreme Court.
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COURT |
P. SATHASIVAM & Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN J.J.
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PARTIES |
Mohd. Yunus Khan
Vs.
State of U.P. & Ors.
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
Arising out of S.L.P.(C) NO. 19318/2007
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Held " I. Absence of appellant from duty as Guard Commander for 25
minutes was bona fide and permissible under the statutory rules.
II. Imposition of punishment of punishment drill for 10 days for
the said absence was unwarranted.
III. Protest by the appellant against the imposition of the said
punishment could not warrant enhancement of punishment of the
appellant for confinement in cell for ten days.
IV. Disobedience of the enhanced punishment could not, in this
case, warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the
Commandant concerned against the appellant.
V. The Commandant could not himself become the Judge of his
own cause.
VI. The Commandant could not appoint his own subordinate as the
inquiry officer.
VII. The Commandant could have referred the matter to his superior
officer for appropriate action in terms of Rules 1991.
VIII. Once the Commandant concerned appeared as a witness
himself in the enquiry, he could not pass the order of punishment.
IX. The Authority who initiated the disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant became a witness before the inquiry officer
appointed by him, who is subordinate to him in his office and also
accepted the enquiry report and passed the order of punishment.
Thus, the order of punishment stood vitiated.
X. The Appellate Authority could not consider the past conduct of
the appellant to justify the order of punishment passed by the
disciplinary authority without bringing it to the notice of the appellant.
XI. As the punishment order had been passed in violation of the
statutory rules and the principles of natural justice as well, it is
rendered null and void. Thus, it remained inexecutable.
XII. Past conduct of an employee should not generally be taken into
account to substantiate the quantum of punishment without bringing it
to the notice of the delinquent employee.
XIII. The error of violating the principles of natural justice by the
Disciplinary Authority has been of such a grave nature that under no
circumstance can the past conduct of the appellant, even if not
satisfactory, be taken into consideration.- Supreme Court.
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COURT |
P. SATHASIVAM & DR.B.S.CHAUHAN
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PARTIES |
Paramjeet Singh @ Pamma ...Appellant
Versus
State of Uttarakhand ...Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1699 OF 2007
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ACT |
INDIAN PENAL CODE
, Section:
302
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HEAD NOTE |
ALL WITNESSES TURNED HOSTILE - WHEATHER CONVICTION CAN BE BASED ON FIR AND STATEMENTS U/S 161 CR.P.C.? YES.
"The FIR had been lodged promptly, naming the appellant as
the person who committed the offence. All the eye-witnesses,
including the injured witnesses, attributed the commission of the
offence only to the appellant in their statements under Section 161
Cr.P.C. It is difficult to imagine that the complainant and the eye-
witnesses had all falsely named the appellant as being the person
responsible for the offence at the initial stage itself - SUPREME COURT"
Standard of Proof:
• Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159; • State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh Baljit Singh & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 2407; • Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765; • Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2003)12 SCC 377; and • Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West Bengal,(2007) 12 SCC 230). • In Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637, Supreme Court observed : "Considered as a whole the prosecution story may be true; but between `may be true` and `must be true` there is inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this distance must be covered by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence [before an accused can be convicted]."
Circumstantial Evidence:
• In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622, Supreme Court observed that it is well settled that the prosecutions case must stand or fall on its own legs and cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence put up by the accused. However, a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court where various links in the chain of circumstantial evidence are in themselves complete. The Court also discussed the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone and held as under: (1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established; (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. A similar view has been reiterated by Supreme Court in - • State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; • Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430; • Ramesh Bhai & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12 SCC 603; • Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 415; • Babu v. State of Kerala, JT 2010 (8) SC 560, observing that the evidence produced by the prosecution should be of such a nature that it makes the conviction of the accused sustainable.
Hostile Witness:
State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing, (1997) 6 SCC 514, State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani & Anr., (2003) 7 SCC 291) Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450, observed as under:".....It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof... In Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 13 SCC 271, Supreme Court considered the value of the deposition of a hostile witness and held as under: ".....If PW 1, the maker of the complaint has chosen not to corroborate his earlier statement made in the complaint and recorded during investigation, the conduct of such a witness for no plausible and tenable reasons pointed out on record, will give rise to doubt the testimony of the investigating officer who had sincerely and honestly conducted the entire investigation of the case. In these circumstances, we are of the view that PW.1 has tried to conceal the material truth from the Court with the sole purpose of shielding and protecting the appellant for reasons best known to the witness and therefore, no benefit could be given to the appellant for unfavourable conduct of this witness to the prosecution". In Rajendra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 13SCC 480, Supreme Court observed that merely because a witness deviates from his statement made in the FIR, his evidence cannot be held to be totally unreliable. Supreme Court reiterated a similar view in Govindappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 6 SCC 533, observing that the deposition of a hostile witness can be relied upon at least upto the extent he supported the case of the prosecution. So, In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence of a person does not become effaced from the record merely because he has turned hostile and his deposition must be examined more cautiously to find out as to what extent he has supported the case of the prosecution.
Abscondance of Accused :
In Matru @ Girish Chandra v. The State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 1050, Supreme Court repelled the submissions made by the State that as after commission of the offence the accused had been absconding,therefore, the inference can be drawn that he was a guilty person, observing as under: "The appellants conduct in absconding was also relied upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime such is the instinct of self- preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence but its value would alwaysdepend on the circumstances of each case Normally the courts are disinclined to attach much importance to the act of absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence for sustaining conviction. It can scarcely be held as a determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence which must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. In the present case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the FIR was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way we do not think this circumstance can be considered to be necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to evade justice. It is not inconsistent with his innocence." A similar view has been reiterated in Rahman v.State of U.P., AIR 1972 SC 110; State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 733; Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, JT 2010 (7) SC 379. So, Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has been lodged, having an apprehension of being apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be unnatural. Thus, mere abscondance by the appellant after commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for a period of six days itself cannot establish his guilt. Absconding by itself is not a conclusive proof of either of guilt or of a guilty conscience.
Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C.
An accused can be questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of enabling him personally to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. No matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence is in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation on incriminating material which has surfaced against him. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. The attention of the accused must specifically be brought to inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so.
Therefore, the court is under a legal obligation to put the incriminating circumstances before the accused and solicit his response. This provision is mandatory in nature and casts an imperative duty on the court and confers a corresponding right on the accused to have an opportunity to offer an explanation for such incriminatory material appearing against him.
Circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him and have to be excluded from consideration. ( Sharad Birdhichand ; and State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 2100).
In S. Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.),
AIR 1976 SC 2140, Supreme Court held that non-indication of inculpatory material and its relevant facts by the trial court to the accused adds to the vulnerability of the prosecution case. The recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not a purposeless exercise.
If any appellate Court or revisional court comes across the fact that the trial Court had not put any question to an accused, even if it is of a vital nature, such an omission alone should not result in the setting aside of the conviction and sentence as an inevitable consequence. An inadequate examination cannot be presumed to have caused prejudice. Every error or omission in compliance of the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C., does not necessarily vitiate trial. Such errors fall within category of curable irregularities and the question as to whether the trial is vitiated, in each case depends upon the degree of error and upon whether prejudice has been or is likely to have been caused to accused. Efforts should be made to undo or correct the lapse.
Wasim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 400;
Bhoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1256;
Labhchand Dhanpat Singh Jain v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 SC 182;
State of Punjab v. Naib Din, AIR 2001 SC 3955;
Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 189).
In Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328, Supreme Court
observed: "Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any of the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused is required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was prejudiced."
In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622, Supreme Court observed as under :"It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court has relied for its conviction." (Emphasis added).
In Ganesh Gogoi v. State of Assam, (2009) 7 SCC 404, Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors.v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 8 SCC 740, held that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim "audi alteram partem" has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.
In Shaikh Maqsood v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 583; and Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 595, Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning underSection 313 Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction.
In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420, Supreme Court rejected the submission that as no question had been put to the accused on motive, no motive for the commission of the crime could be attributed to the accused, nor the same could be reckoned as circumstance against him observing that it could not be pointed out as to what in fact was the real prejudice caused to the accused by omission to question the accused on the motive for the crime. No material was placed before the court to show as to what and in what manner the prejudice, if any, was caused to the accused. More so, the accused/appellant was aware of accusation and charge against him.
Thus, it is evident from the above that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C make it obligatory for the court to question the accused on the evidence and circumstances against him so as to offer the accused an opportunity to explain the same. But, it would not be enough for the accused to show that he has not been questioned or examined on a particular circumstance, instead he must show that such non- examination has actually and materially prejudiced him and has resulted in the failure of justice. In other words, in the event of an inadvertent omission on the part of the court to question the accused on any incriminating circumstance cannot ipso facto vitiate the trial unless it is shown that some material prejudice was caused to the accused by the omission of the court.
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COURT |
R V Raveendran & D K Jain J.J.
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PARTIES |
Reshma Devi & Anr. REVIEW PETITION (CRL.) NO.627 OF 2009
Vs.
State of Pubjab & Anr.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1731 of 2008
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
304-B
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HEAD NOTE |
Remmission of Sentence : Part A and Part B of Punjab Government`s order for remission of sentences discussed- earlier order reviewed - the special
remission of one year under the Government Order dated 14.8.2002 was
available to persons convicted for a term of seven years for the offence
under section 304-B of IPC - Supreme Court.
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COURT |
R V Raveendran & H L Gokhale JJ.
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PARTIES |
Haryana State Electricity Board
Vs.
M/s Hanuman Rice Mills & Ors.
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
6817 of 2010
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ACT |
Electricity Supply Code
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Electricity arrears do not constitute a charge over the property.
Therefore in general law, a transferee of a premises cannot be made liable for
the dues of the previous owner/occupier - Supreme Court.
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COURT |
Dalveer Bhandari & K.S. Radhakrishnan JJ.
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PARTIES |
S.S. Chheena
Vs.
Vijay Kumar Mahajan & Another
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1503 of 2010
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
306
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HEAD NOTE |
Abatement to suicide : Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing.
Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate
or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.
The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person
under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to
commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act
which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and
that act must have been intended to push the deceased into
such a position that he committed suicide - defination of suicide ? - Supreme Court.
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice GANGULY
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PARTIES |
Ranveer Yadav .....Appellant(s)
- Versus -
State of Bihar ....Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
188 OF 2009
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ACT |
Contempt of Court
, Section:
Section 19(1)(b)
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HEAD NOTE |
Belated apology cannot be
accepted because it has not been given in good faith--Even if it is not belated where apology is without real
contrition and remorse and was merely tendered as a
weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it.
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COURT |
Division Bench of Hon`ble CJI (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN), Hon`ble Justice (S.H. KAPADIA), Hon`ble Justice R.V. RAVEENDRAN), Hon`ble Justice (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY), Hon`ble Justice (P. SATHASIVAM)
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PARTIES |
Union of India ... Appellant
Vs.
Ramesh Ram & Ors. etc. ... Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
4310-4311 OF 2010
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ACT |
Civil Procedure Code,1908, Constitution of India
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The reserved category candidates "belonging to OBC,
SC/ ST categories" who are selected on merit and placed in
the list of General/Unreserved category candidates can
choose to migrate to the respective reserved category at the
time of allocation of services
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COURT |
Division Bench of Hon`ble CJI (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN), Hon`ble Justice R.V. RAVEENDRAN), Hon`ble Justice J.M. PANCHAL
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PARTIES |
Smt. Selvi & Ors. ... Appellants
Versus
State of Karnataka ...Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1267 of 2004
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The National Human Rights Commission had published
`Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie
Detector Test) on an Accused` in 2000. These guidelines should
be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be
adopted for conducting the `Narcoanalysis technique` and the
`Brain Electrical Activation Profile` test. The text of these
guidelines has been reproduced below:
(i) No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except
on the basis of consent of the accused. An option
should be given to the accused whether he wishes
to avail such test.
(ii) If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he
should be given access to a lawyer and the physical,
emotional and legal implication of such a test
should be explained to him by the police and his
lawyer.
(iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial
Magistrate.
(iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the
person alleged to have agreed should be duly
represented by a lawyer.
(v) At the hearing, the person in question should also
be told in clear terms that the statement that is
made shall not be a `confessional` statement to the
Magistrate but will have the status of a statement
made to the police.
(vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to
the detention including the length of detention and
the nature of the interrogation.
(vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall
be done by an independent agency (such as a
hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
(viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner
of the information received must be taken on
record.
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COURT |
ALTAMAS KABIR J. & CYRIAC JOSEPH J.
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PARTIES |
Devender Kumar & Anr. etc. Vs.
State of Haryana & Ors. etc.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
988-989 of 2010
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ACT |
Criminal Procedure Code 1973.
, Section:
167(1) Cr.P.C.
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HEAD NOTE |
Police Custody Remand : Police remand can only be
made during the first period of remand after arrest
and production before the Magistrate, but not after
the expiry of the said period.- Anupam J. Kulkarni
case [sc] followed : Supreme Court.
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice Deepak Verma, Hon`ble Justice Dr B.S Chauhan
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PARTIES |
S. KHUSHBOO Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
KANNIAMMAL & ANR. Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
913/2010
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code ,1860
, Section:
Sections 499, 500 and 505
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HEAD NOTE |
It is not only desirable but imperative that
electronic and news media should also play positive role in
presenting to general public as to what actually transpires during
the course of the hearing and it should not be published in such a
manner so as to get unnecessary publicity for its own paper or news
channel. Such a tendency, which is indeed growing fast, should be
stopped. We are saying so as without knowing the reference in
context of which the questions were put forth by us, were completely
ignored and the same were misquoted which raised unnecessary hue and
cry.
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COURT |
P. SATHASIVAM & SWATANTER KUMAR J.J.
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PARTIES |
Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu
Sharma VS. State ( NCT of Delhi)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
179 of 2007
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302
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HEAD NOTE |
1) The appellate Court has all the necessary powers to re-
evaluate the evidence let in before the trial Court as well
as the conclusions reached. It has a duty to specify the
compelling and substantial reasons in case it reverses
the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. In the
case on hand, the High Court by adhering to all the
ingredients and by giving cogent and adequate reasons
reversed the order of acquittal.
2) The presence of the accused at the scene of crime is
proved through the ocular testimonies of PWs 1, 2, 6, 20,
23, 24 and 70, corroborated by Ex PW 12/D-I as well as
3 PCR calls Ex PW 11/A, B and C.
3) Phone calls made immediately after an incident to the
police constitutes an FIR only when they are not vague
and cryptic. Calls purely for the reason of getting the
police to the scene of crime do not necessarily constitute
the FIR. In the present case, the phone calls were vague
and therefore could not be registered as the FIR. The FIR
was properly lodged as per the statement of Shyan
Munshi PW-2.
4) Delay in recording the statement of the witnesses do not
necessarily discredit their testimonies. The court may
rely on such testimonies if they are cogent and credible.
5) The laboratory reports in the present case are vague and
ambiguous and, therefore, they cannot be relied upon to
reach any specific conclusion regarding the incident.
6) The evidence regarding the actual incident, the
testimonies of witnesses, the evidence connecting the
vehicles and cartridges to the accused - Manu Sharma,
as well as his conduct after the incident prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court has analyzed
all the evidence and arrived at the correct conclusion.
7) The public prosecutor is under a duty of disclosure under
the Cr.P.C., Bar Council Rules and relevant principles of
common law. Nevertheless, a violation of this duty does
not necessarily vitiate the entire trial. A trial would only
be vitiated if non-disclosure amounts to a material
irregularity and causes irreversible prejudice to the
accused. In the present case, no such prejudice was
caused to the accused, and therefore the trial is not
vitiated.
8) No prejudice had been caused to the right of the accused
to fair trial and non-furnishing of the copy of one of the
ballistic reports had not hampered the ends of justice.
The right of the accused to disclosure has not received
any set back in the facts and circumstances of the case.
9) The High Court has rightly convicted the other two
accused, namely, Amardeep Singh Gill @ Tony Gill and
Vikas Yadav after appreciation of the evidence of PWs 30
and 101.
10) Normally, the judgment/order should be set aside or
affirmed as the case may be but preferably without
offering any undesirable comments, disparaging remarks
or indications which would impinge upon the dignity and
respect of judicial system.
11) Every effort should be made by the print and electronic
media to ensure that the distinction between trial by
media and informative media should always be
maintained. Trial by media should be avoided
particularly, at a stage when the suspect is entitled to the
constitutional protections. Invasion of his rights is
bound to be held as impermissible : Supreme Court.
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COURT |
J..DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J..[H.L. DATTU]
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PARTIES |
SUNDERLAL KANAIYALAL BHATIJA ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1222 OF 2006
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ACT |
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 1973, INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT
, Section:
Section 25 Indian Evidence Act
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HEAD NOTE |
it is now a settled law that a
confessional statement duly recorded by a police officer in a
case related to TADA Act and the rules framed thereunder
would continue to remain admissible for the offences under
any other law which were tried along with TADA offences
under Sections 12 read with Section 15 of the Act
notwithstanding that the accused was acquitted of offences
under the TADA Act in the same trial. But, here is a case
where the allegation was mainly for the offences under the IPC
and some offences under the TADA Act were also incorporated
initially but later on the same were dropped. Consequently,
charges in the said case were framed only for offences under
14
the IPC and not under the TADA Act and the trial is also only
for offences under the IPC and not under the TADA Act.
Therefore, such confessional statement as made by the
respondent no. 4 under the TADA Act, in a different case,
cannot be used or utilised by the prosecution in the present case as the charges were framed only for the offences under
the Indian Penal Code.
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COURT |
Division Bench of Hon`ble CJI (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN), Hon`ble Justice (S.H. KAPADIA), Hon`ble Justice R.V. RAVEENDRAN), Hon`ble Justice (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY), Hon`ble Justice (P. SATHASIVAM)
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PARTIES |
RAMDAS ATHAWALE ... PETITIONER
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ... RESPONDENTS
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APPEAL |
Writ Petition
, AppealNo:
86 OF 2004
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ACT |
Constitution of India
, Section:
Article 32
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HEAD NOTE |
The priciple reteriated that whenever a person complains and claims that there is a violation of any provision of law or a Constitutional provision,it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of the Constitution is attracted.
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COURT |
CJI K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, P. SATHASIVAM. ,J. M. PANCHAL JJ.
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PARTIES |
KUNGA NIMA LEPCHA & ORS.
VS.
STATE OF SIKKIM & ORS.
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APPEAL |
Writ Petition
, AppealNo:
353 of 2006
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ACT |
Constitution of India
, Section:
32
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HEAD NOTE |
This court cannot sit in judgment over
whether investigations should be launched against politicians
for alleged acts of corruption. The Supreme Court of India
functions as a Constitutional Court as well as the highest
appellate court in the country. If the Supreme Court gives
direction for prosecution, it would cause serious prejudice to
the accused, as the direction of this Court may have far
reaching persuasive effect on the Court which may ultimately
try the accused. It is always open to the petitioners to
approach the investigative agencies directly with the
incriminating materials and it is for the investigative agencies
to decide on the further course of action: Supreme Court
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COURT |
Division Bench of Hon`ble CJI (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN), Hon`ble Justice (S.H. KAPADIA), Hon`ble Justice R.V. RAVEENDRAN), Hon`ble Justice (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY), Hon`ble Justice (P. SATHASIVAM)
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PARTIES |
PTC India Ltd. ... Appellant(s)
versus
Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, thr. Secy. ... Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
3902 OF 2006
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ACT |
Electricity Act, 2003-Sec 178, Constitution of India
, Section:
Article 226
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HEAD NOTE |
The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity-- has no jurisdiction to decide --the validity of the Regulations framed by the Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission-- under Section 178 of the
Electricity Act, 2003. The validity of the Regulations may,
however, be challenged by seeking judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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COURT |
Dalveer Bhandari, J.
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PARTIES |
Abdul Mannan ...Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Assam ...Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
946 OF 2002
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code,1860
, Section:
Section 304 Part II -IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
Indian Penal Code,1860 -Section 304 Part II-Bail Bond cancelled- It is well settled that in a case where the Trial
Court has recorded acquittal, the Appellate Court should be
slow in interfering with the judgment of acquittal. On
evaluation of the evidence, if the two views are possible,
the Appellate Court should not substitute its own view and
discard the judgment of the Trial Court. But, in the instant
case, the High Court clearly came to the conclusion that the
entire approach of the Trial Court cannot be sustained both
on the law and the facts.
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COURT |
CJI. K.G. BALAKRISHNAN, J. R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. D.K. JAIN, J. P. SATHASIVAM, J. J.M. PANCHAL.
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PARTIES |
State of West Bengal & others
Vs.
Committee for Protection of Democratic
Rights, West Bengal & others.
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
6249-6250 of 2001
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ACT |
Constitution of India
, Section:
226 , 32.
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HEAD NOTE |
Whether the High Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of
Investigation established under
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 , to investigate a
cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without
the consent of the State Government ? -Yes. : Constitution Bench Supreme Court.
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COURT |
P. SATHASIVAM & H.L. DATTU JJ.
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PARTIES |
Mulla & Anr. Vs, State of u.p.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
396 of 2008
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302
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HEAD NOTE |
Death Penalty when to be awarded : Supreme Court
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COURT |
P. SATHASIVAM & H.L. DATTU JJ.
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PARTIES |
G.V. Siddaramesh Vs. State of Karnataka
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
160 of 2006
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
304-B
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HEAD NOTE |
"Section 304-B merely
raises a presumption of dowry death and lays
down that the minimum sentence should be 7
years, but it may extend to imprisonment for
life. Therefore, awarding the extreme punishment
of imprisonment for life should be used in rare
cases and not in every case." -Three Judge Bench verdict
of SC in the case of Hemchand v. State of
Haryana followed : Supreme Court
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice Dalveer Bhandari and Hon`ble Justice A. K. Patnaik
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PARTIES |
MARUTHI AND ORS. Appellant(s)
:VERSUS:
STATE OF KARNATAKA Respondent(s)
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
52 Of 2010
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code,1860
, Section:
Sections 147, 148, 341, 504,506, 324, 326
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HEAD NOTE |
Sections 147, 148, 341, 504,506, 324, 326 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code-- The Trial Court did not find the Appellants guilty of the aforesaid offences and hence they were acquitted—High Reversed the Order and sentenced U/s-- Section 326 of the I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each and simple imprisonment.
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice AFTAB ALAM and Hon`ble Justice DR. B.S. CHAUHAN
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PARTIES |
Hari Kishan .....Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana ......Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
133-134 OF 2009
|
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code,1860
, Section:
Section 148, 302, 324, 323-IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
Section 148, 302, 324, 323-IPC-Substantial part of the prosecution story has been disbelieved--Conviction of the appellant rests
solely on the testimony of (PW-2) who does not seem to
have particular respect for truth as observed by the trial
court. --High Court assumed that he had received injuries in the same occurrence in which deceased was killed--set aside the judgments of the High Court and the trial
court and acquit him of the charges under sections 302 & 324
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice Dalveer Bhandari and Hon`ble Justice A. K. Patnaik
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PARTIES |
Gangula Mohan Reddy ....... Appellant
Versus
State of Andhra Pradesh .............Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1301 of 2002
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code,1860
, Section:
Section 306 IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
Indian Penal Code 306 IPC-- Appellant was convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code-- High Court upheld the judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge—the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 10 years was reduced to 5 years- the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained –Appeal Allowed
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COURT |
Dalveer Bhandari, J. & Dr. Mukundakam Sharma,J.
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PARTIES |
state of Rajasthan .... Appellant
Versus
Naresh @ Ram Naresh .... Respondent
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
837/2002
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
302/394
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HEAD NOTE |
The benefit must always go to the accused and not to the
prosecution. If the prosecution wants to prove the fact, the same must be
proved by leading evidence, which is reliable and trustworthy, which
pinpoints and conclusively proves the guilt of the accused. This is not a case
where we can safely hold that the evidence led was trustworthy and
conclusively establishes that it is the accused only, who had committed the
offence. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case we are
not inclined to interfere with the order of acquittal: Supreme Court.
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COURT |
Dalveer Bhandari & Harjeet Singh Bedi,J.J.
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PARTIES |
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. .. Appellant
Versus
M/s Ozma Shipping Company
& Another .. Respondents
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
6289 OF 2001
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ACT |
Consumer Protection Act
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The insurance companies in genuine and bona fide claims
of the insurers should not adopt the attitude of avoiding
payments on one pretext or the other.This attitude puts a serious question mark on their credibility and trustworthiness of the insurance companies. Incidentally by adopting honest approach and attitude the insurance companies would be able to save enormous litigation costs and the interest liability: Supreme Court.
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COURT |
S.B. Sinha J.,Cyriac Joseph J.
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PARTIES |
Guria, Swayam Sevi Sansthan
Vs.
State of U.P. & Ors.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1373 of 2009
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ACT |
Criminal Procedure Code
, Section:
439
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HEAD NOTE |
one of the grounds for cancellation of bail would be where
material evidence brought on record have been ignored and that too
without any reasons : Supreme Court
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COURT |
R V Raveendran J.,Dr. Mukundakam Sharma j.
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PARTIES |
K.K. Ahuja ... Appellant
Vs.
V.K. Vora & Anr. ... Respondents
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1130-31 OF 2003
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ACT |
Companies Act
, Section:
141
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HEAD NOTE |
. A Deputy General Manger is not a person who is responsible to the
company for the conduct of the business of the company. He does not fall
under any of the categories (a) to (g) listed in section 5 of the Companies
Act . He cannot be
made vicariously liable under Section 141(1) of the Act. If he has to be
made liable under Section 141(2), the necessary averments relating to
consent/connivance/negligence should have been made: Supereme Court
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COURT |
B. SUDERSHAN REDDY & AFTAB ALAM.JJ.
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PARTIES |
Union of India
Versus
Shah Alam & Anr.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1158-1159 OF 2004
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ACT |
NDPS Act
, Section:
50
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HEAD NOTE |
Non Compliance of section 50 and non examination of two recovery witness ruled fatal for prosecution, order of acquittal confirmed : Supereme Court
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COURT |
D.K. Jain,J., R.M. Lodha,J.
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PARTIES |
Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh vs. Jaspal Singh & Ors.
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
Civil Appeal : 7950 OF 2002
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ACT |
Consumer Protection Act
, Section:
U/s. 21
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HEAD NOTE |
Transfusing wrong blood group to the patient which caused death , Mismatching of blood confirmed by the Senior Resident Doctor,Held a case of serious negligence by PGI and attending doctors, the order of state commision confirmed : Supereme Court
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COURT |
Dalveer Bhandari,J. and Harjit Singh Bedi, J.
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PARTIES |
Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Ravishankar Prasad & Others
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
1080-1085 OF 2009.
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ACT |
Criminal Procedure Code
, Section:
u/s. 482
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HEAD NOTE |
The inherent powers can be exercised in those exceptional cases where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused : Supereme Court
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COURT |
India
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PARTIES |
Dinesh Kumar Sinha vs.State of Jharkhand through CBI
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APPEAL |
Bails
, AppealNo:
1076 OF 2009
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ACT |
IPC, Prevention of corruption Act
, Section:
Section: 409, 420, 467, 468, 471/465
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HEAD NOTE |
As already undergone two years of imprisonment as well appeal may not heard in the near future- Intriem Bail Granted : Supereme Court
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COURT |
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & ASOK KUMAR GANGULY JJ.
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PARTIES |
State of Maharashtra Etc. Vs. Dhanendra Shriram Bhurle Etc.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
269-270 OF 2009
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ACT |
Criminal Procedure Code
, Section:
437/439
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HEAD NOTE |
Since the High Court had not kept the relevant parameters in view,
while granting bail, order of bail set aside : Supreme Court
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COURT |
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & ASOK KUMAR GANGULY JJ.
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PARTIES |
Komal
Versus
State of M.P.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
243 OF 2009
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ACT |
IPC
, Section:
34,147.149
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HEAD NOTE |
No common object and not a member of unlawfull assembly-acquittal restored:Supereme Court
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COURT |
Justice ARIJIT PASAYAT and Justice R V RAVEENDRAN
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PARTIES |
C. Skaria Vs. The Govt. of State of Kerala & Anr.
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
6885-86 of 2003
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ACT |
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
, Section:
Order 20 Rule 16
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HEAD NOTE |
As the appellant has established breach by the respondents, the award of Rs. 1,000 as damages for breach by the trial court is also upheld. As a consequence of the finding that the breach is on the part of the respondents and not on the appellant, the trial court was justified in giving a declaration that the respondents were not entitled to recover any extra cost involved in getting the work completed from the appellant. But it could not have granted the further relief of directing the respondents to refund the security deposit amount and retention deposit amount, as the appellant had neither quantified the said security deposit/retention deposit nor paid court fee thereon. Therefore, the decree granted by the trial court, to the extent it directs refund of the security deposit and retention amount, cannot be sustained.
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice H.K. SEMA and Hon`ble Justice G.P. MATHUR
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PARTIES |
Satbir Singh and Others. Vs. State of Haryana
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
7 of 2005
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code
, Section:
Sections 304-B, 498-A and 201
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HEAD NOTE |
Dowry death-Harassment for dowry by In-laws of the deceased on various occasions-Deceased sent to her fathers home to arrange dowry about 10 days before the occurrence-Deceased returned to her matrimonial home on request of the accused persons-Deceased found dead under suspicious circumstances and cremated hurriedly
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COURT |
CJI, BRIJESH KUMAR & S.B. SINHA.
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PARTIES |
State of U.P. and Anr.
Vs.
Johri Mal
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
963-64 of 2000
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ACT |
U.P., L.R.Manual.
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
The State should bear in mind the dicta of this Court
in Mundrika Prasad Singh (supra) as regard the necessity to
consult the District Judge. While making appointments of
District Government Counsel, therefore, the State should
give primacy to the opinion of the District Judge. Such a
course of action would demonstrate fairness and
reasonableness of action and, furthermore, to a large extent
the action of the State would not be dubbed as politically
motivated or otherwise arbitrary. As noticed hereinbefore,
there also does not exist any rationale behind deletion of
the provision relating to consultation with the High Court
in the matter of appointment of the Public prosecutors in
the High Court.
The said provision being a salutary one, it
is expected that the State of U.P. either would suitably
amend the same or despite deletion shall consult the High
Court with a view to ensure fairness in action : Supreme Court Dated 21/4/2004.
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice V.N.KHARE and Hon`ble Justice N.S.HEGDE
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PARTIES |
SUNEETA AGGRWAL Vs. STATE OF HARYANA & Others.
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APPEAL |
Civil Appeal
, AppealNo:
1097 of 2000
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ACT |
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
, Section:
114
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HEAD NOTE |
Recruitment-Post of Lecturer-Order of Vice Chancellor declining to accord approval to appellant`s selection-Re-advertisement of the post- Appellant appeared before Selection Committee without any protest-Whether appellant could challenge earlier order of Vice Chancel-lor-Held, no-She was estopped by her conduct --Service Law
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice A.P.Misra and Hon`ble Justice Y.K.Sabharwal
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PARTIES |
PETITIONER:
ROSAMMAL ISSETHEENAMMAL FERNANDEZ (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
JOOSA MARIYAN FERNANDEZ & ORS.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Suit for partition-Defendant claiming through gift deed-
Plaintiff alleging the document to have been brought fraudulently-Suit decreed by trial court-Execution of gift deed disbelieved-Defendant`s appeal allowed- High Court dismissed plaintiff`s second appeal holding that there was no specific denial by plaintiff and the proviso to Section 68 would apply
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice PATTANAIK Hon`ble Justice R.P. SETHI, SHIVARAJ V. PATIL.
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PARTIES |
KANS RAJ Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB & OTHERS.
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
688-90 of 1993
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code, 1860 / Indian Evidence Act, 1972
, Section:
Section 304-B, 498-A and 306 IPC
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HEAD NOTE |
Death of a woman in her matrimonial house after three years of marriage-Death found to be not under ordinary circumstances-Husband and other close relatives tried under Sections 304-B, 498-A and 306 IPC-Presumption of law under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
drawn-All the accused convicted of all the offences charged- Appeal filed by accused in the High Court against conviction and sentence
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COURT |
Hon`ble Justice S.N.Variava & Hon`ble Justice R.C.Lahoti
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PARTIES |
PETITIONER:
STATE OF RAJASTHAN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
N. K. ACCUSED
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APPEAL |
Criminal Appeal
, AppealNo:
|
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ACT |
Indian Penal Code,1860
, Section:
376
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HEAD NOTE |
In appeal appeal the High Court acquitted the respondent, holding that the
prosecutrix was not proved beyond reasonable doubt to be below 16 years of
age, that though the factum of respondent having committed sexual
intercourse was proved, but the absence of injuries on the person of the
prosecutrix infers the possibility of the prosecutrix being the con-senting
party to the act, that the delay in lodging FIR was not satisfactorily
explained, and that the delay coupled with non-examination renders
the prosecution case doubtful.
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COURT |
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PARTIES |
M.P. Public Service Commission Vs Navnit
Kumar Potdar and Others
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APPEAL |
---Select---
, AppealNo:
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ACT |
, Section:
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HEAD NOTE |
Short Listing Criterea
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