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Supreme Court and High Court Judgements
ADVOCATE - ON - RECORD EXAMINATION WILL BE HELD ON 4th.,5th.,6th,7th. June,2012.
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Noted Criminal Lawyer Mr. Ravindra Kumar Kapoor Advocate, Counsel for D.P.Yadav, the sitting BSP M.L.A. & Ex.Minister of State, Lakkadpala,Karan Yadav and Praneet Bhati, pressed for day to day trial and secure presence of C.B.I. investigator.
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Section 30 of Advocates Notified by Centre - Now Advocates can appear in any Court.
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CBI to SC:
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Anticipatory bails provision to soon back in UP .
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Roorkee Fast Track Court/ ADJ Court- In a Sensational and Gruesome Double Murder Case of two ladies Sr. Advocate Mr.Ravindra Kumar Kapoor argued for Accused Shoeab,Shahnwaz,Zeeshan.
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Victim” is defined and will now be permitted to engage an advocate to assist the prosecution as well as to file an appeal;
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Allahabad High Court convicted Advocates for contempt of court in different contempt proceedings
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Ruchika case: Rathore attacked outside Chandigarh court
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Supreme Court collegium scraps Dinakaran`s chances of promotion, bar is accusing him for irregularities ranging from judicial indiscretion to encroachment of public land.
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Without establishing genuiness, photo can not be admitted in secondary evidence : Allahabad High Court- Dated 23/2/2012.
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Police not to arrest accused persons for offences punishable upto imprisionment upto 7 years - provisions of 41(1)b,41A discussed and directions issued - Allahabad High Court - Dated 11.10.2011.
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Applicability of Section 40 to 44 Evidence Act- "A Division Bench of this Court in Km. Rinki vs. State of U.P. & others, 2008 (3) JIC 267 (All.) (D.B.) and Hon'ble Single Judge in Raj Dularey Shukla v. State, 2006 (1) JIC 887 (All.) also propounded the same principle and held that if some of the accused are acquitted in a trial separately held, the other accused is not entitled to the benefit of acquittal order and his case is to be decided separately on the basis of the evidence adduced during his trial.
13. The aforesaid decisions have settled the legal position that judgments of courts of justice may be relevant under any of the provisions of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act and not otherwise. In other words, if any judgment, order or decree of a court does not fulfill requirements of any of the aforesaid sections, it has no relevancy and must be held to be irrelevant. It is also well settled that every trial has to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced in the trial itself, therefore, the previous judgment of acquittal rendered in a trial, if it is not relevant under any of sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act has no relevancy in the subsequent trial being held against co-accused and he can not be permitted to claim any advantage of such judgment, which is merely an opinion of the judge on the basis of the evidence led in the previous trial. The only relevancy of such judgment is to decide the question of applicability of bar to the subsequent trial under section 300 of the Code as section 40 of the Evidence Act makes the previous judgment relevant only for such purposes and not otherwise. In such matters, sections 41 to 44 of the Evidence Act also have no application. In this view of the matter the proceeding of the session trial being held against the petitioners can not be quashed on the basis of the judgment of acquittal rendered in favour of co-accused persons."- Allahabad High Court - Dated 1 9/09/2011.
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Interiem Bail pending final disposal of Bail u/s 389 Cr.P.C. - "Otherwise also General Rules (Criminal), applicable to lower courts and High Court Rules, applicable to high court, both provide for giving of notice of the bail application to the public prosecutor and as a well ingrained practise hearing of public prosecutor in matter of consideration of bail applications has become the rule of law. Consequently the law relating to the procedure to be followed in matters of consideration of bail applications prior to conviction holds good for post-conviction bail applications also. In this respect a full bench of our court in Smt.Amarawati's case(Supra) has held that interim bail pending consideration of final bail is permissible. It has been held therein as under-
"40. We again make it clear that the learned Sessions Judge in his discretion can hear and decide the bail application under Section 439 on the same day of its filing provided notice is given to the Public Prosecutor, or he may not choose to do so. This is entirely a matter in the discretion of the learned Sessions Judge. There may also be cases where the learned Sessions Judge on the material available before him may decide to grant interim bail as he may feel that while he has sufficient material for giving interim bail he required further material for grant of final bail. In such cases also he can in his discretion, grant interim bail and he can hear the bail application finally after a few days. All these are matters which should ordinarily be left to his discretion."
The aforesaid opinion by this court got it's approval by the apex court inLal kamlendra Pratap Singh versus State of Uttar Pradesh And Others: (2009) SCC 437 wherein it has been held by the apex court as under:-
"Learned counsel for the appellant apprehends that the appellant will be arrested as there is no provision for anticipatory bail in the State of U.P. He placed reliance on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Amarawati v. State of U.P. in which a seven-Judge Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the court, if it deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case, may grant interim bail pending final disposal of the bail application. The Full Bench also observed that arrest is not a must whenever an FIR of a cognizable offence is lodged. The Full Bench placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P.
We fully agree with the view of the High Court in Amarawati case and we direct that the said decision be followed by all courts in U.P. in letter and spirit, particularly since the provision for anticipatory bail does not exist in U.P.
In appropriate cases interim bail should be granted pending disposal of the final bail application, since arrest and detention of a person can cause irreparable loss to a person's reputation, as held by this Court in Joginder Kumar Case. Also, arrest is not a must in all cases of cognizable offences, and in deciding whether to arrest or not the police officer must be guided and act according to the principles laid down in Joginder Kumar Case."
Thus from the above discussion the law has been crystallised that pending consideration of final bail prayer an accused can be granted interim bail and hence the answer to the mooted question is that the proviso to section 389 of the Code does put an embargo nor does it curtails power of appellate court to grant interim bail. A Proviso cannot take away right conferred by parent provision and has to be read down to harmonise it with the parent section. On this aspect support can be had from apex court decision in Dadu alias Tulsidas(Supra) wherein Apex Court has observed as under:-
"Providing a right of appeal but totally disarming the Court from granting interim relief in the form of suspension of sentence would be unjust, unfair and violative of Art. 21 of the Constitution particularly when no mechanism is provided for early disposal of the appeal. The pendency of criminal litigation and the experience in dealing with pending matters indicate no possibility of early hearing of the appeal and its disposal on merits at least in many High Courts. As the present is not the occasion to dilate on the causes for such delay, we restrain ourselves from that exercise. In this view of the matter, the appellate powers of the Court cannot be denuded by Executive or judicial process".- Allahabad High Court - Dated 14/09/2011.
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Non Compliance of Section 8(c),42(1)(2),50,57 N.D.P.S.Act and 100,165,313 Cr.P.C.- Its effect - Fatal to Prosecution.
Case Laws Discussed:
1.State of Rajasthan versus Shanti: AIR 2010 SC 43
2.Sarju versus State of U.P. AIR 2009 SC 3214
3.Constitution Bench of this Court in Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana [2009 (10) SCALE 255]
4.Abdul Rashid Ibrahim Mansuri v. State of Gujarat
[(2000) 2 SCC 513]
5. Sajan Abraham v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 692]
6.Dilip versus Sate of M.P. :AIR 2007 SC 369
7.State of Punjab vs. Balbir Singh [(1994) 3 SCC 299]
8.State of West Bengal Versus Babu Chakraborty : AIR 2004 SC 4324
9.State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 299
10.State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172,Constitution Bench
11.Union Of India Versus Shah Alam and others : AIR 2010 SC 1785
12.Dilip and Another v. State of M.P. (2007) 1 SCC 450 : (2006 AIR SCW 6246)
13.State of Punjab versus Hari Singh: AIR 2010 SC 1966
14.Avtar Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (2002 (7) SCC 419)
15.Ganesh Gogoi versus State of Assam : AIR 2009 SC 2955
16.Basavaraj R. Patil and others v. State of Karnataka and others - (2000) 8 SCC 740
17.Ranvir Yadav versus State of Bihar: AIR 2009 SC (Suppl) 1439 - Allahabad High Court.
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C.B.I.directed to investigate CMO`s Murders - Allahabad High Court - Dated 29/07/2011.
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Dr. Sachan`s Murder Case - Investigation ordered to be conducted by C.B.I.- Lucknow Bench, Allahabad High Court-Dated 14/07/2011.
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Notification No. (S.I.2942 [E]) Dated 18.11.2009 issued by the Government of India, providing that not only the weight of Heroin found on analysis but the entire substance is to be taken into account while deciding the quantity -
Held "This notification can not be applied retospectively and has no aplication in instant case"-
Bail Allowed.-Allahabad High Court - Dated 30/05/2011.
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"Exhibits Ka 15 and 16 have been got proved and exhibited by the prosecution itself and therefore it can not now resile from it`s contents." - Documents produced by Prosecution binding on them - Alladabad High Court - Dated 25/05/2011.
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Bail to Juvenile : "Merely by declaration of being a juvenile does not entitle a juvenile in conflict with law to be released on bail as a matter of right"-Section 12 analysed - Allahabad High Court - Dated 24.05.2011
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ALL WITNESSES TURNED HOSTILE - WHEATHER CONVICTION CAN BE BASED ON FIR AND STATEMENTS U/S 161 CR.P.C.? YES.
"The FIR had been lodged promptly, naming the appellant as
the person who committed the offence. All the eye-witnesses,
including the injured witnesses, attributed the commission of the
offence only to the appellant in their statements under Section 161
Cr.P.C. It is difficult to imagine that the complainant and the eye-
witnesses had all falsely named the appellant as being the person
responsible for the offence at the initial stage itself - SUPREME COURT"
Standard of Proof:
• Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1952 SC 159; • State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh Baljit Singh & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 2407; • Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1981 SC 765; • Mousam Singha Roy & Ors. v. State of West Bengal, (2003)12 SCC 377; and • Aloke Nath Dutta & Ors. v. State of West Bengal,(2007) 12 SCC 230). • In Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 637, Supreme Court observed : "Considered as a whole the prosecution story may be true; but between `may be true` and `must be true` there is inevitably a long distance to travel and the whole of this distance must be covered by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence [before an accused can be convicted]."
Circumstantial Evidence:
• In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622, Supreme Court observed that it is well settled that the prosecutions case must stand or fall on its own legs and cannot derive any strength from the weakness of the defence put up by the accused. However, a false defence may be called into aid only to lend assurance to the court where various links in the chain of circumstantial evidence are in themselves complete. The Court also discussed the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone and held as under: (1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established; (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. A similar view has been reiterated by Supreme Court in - • State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114; • Krishnan v. State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430; • Ramesh Bhai & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12 SCC 603; • Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 415; • Babu v. State of Kerala, JT 2010 (8) SC 560, observing that the evidence produced by the prosecution should be of such a nature that it makes the conviction of the accused sustainable.
Hostile Witness:
State of Gujarat v. Anirudhsing, (1997) 6 SCC 514, State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani & Anr., (2003) 7 SCC 291) Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of U.P., (2006) 2 SCC 450, observed as under:".....It is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof... In Mahesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 13 SCC 271, Supreme Court considered the value of the deposition of a hostile witness and held as under: ".....If PW 1, the maker of the complaint has chosen not to corroborate his earlier statement made in the complaint and recorded during investigation, the conduct of such a witness for no plausible and tenable reasons pointed out on record, will give rise to doubt the testimony of the investigating officer who had sincerely and honestly conducted the entire investigation of the case. In these circumstances, we are of the view that PW.1 has tried to conceal the material truth from the Court with the sole purpose of shielding and protecting the appellant for reasons best known to the witness and therefore, no benefit could be given to the appellant for unfavourable conduct of this witness to the prosecution". In Rajendra & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2009) 13SCC 480, Supreme Court observed that merely because a witness deviates from his statement made in the FIR, his evidence cannot be held to be totally unreliable. Supreme Court reiterated a similar view in Govindappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 6 SCC 533, observing that the deposition of a hostile witness can be relied upon at least upto the extent he supported the case of the prosecution. So, In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence of a person does not become effaced from the record merely because he has turned hostile and his deposition must be examined more cautiously to find out as to what extent he has supported the case of the prosecution.
Abscondance of Accused :
In Matru @ Girish Chandra v. The State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 1050, Supreme Court repelled the submissions made by the State that as after commission of the offence the accused had been absconding,therefore, the inference can be drawn that he was a guilty person, observing as under: "The appellants conduct in absconding was also relied upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime such is the instinct of self- preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence but its value would alwaysdepend on the circumstances of each case Normally the courts are disinclined to attach much importance to the act of absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence for sustaining conviction. It can scarcely be held as a determining link in completing the chain of circumstantial evidence which must admit of no other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. In the present case the appellant was with Ram Chandra till the FIR was lodged. If thereafter he felt that he was being wrongly suspected and he tried to keep out of the way we do not think this circumstance can be considered to be necessarily evidence of a guilty mind attempting to evade justice. It is not inconsistent with his innocence." A similar view has been reiterated in Rahman v.State of U.P., AIR 1972 SC 110; State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 733; Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of West Bengal, JT 2010 (7) SC 379. So, Abscondance by a person against whom FIR has been lodged, having an apprehension of being apprehended by the police, cannot be said to be unnatural. Thus, mere abscondance by the appellant after commission of the crime and remaining untraceable for a period of six days itself cannot establish his guilt. Absconding by itself is not a conclusive proof of either of guilt or of a guilty conscience.
Statement u/s 313 Cr.P.C.
An accused can be questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. only for the purpose of enabling him personally to explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence against him. No matter how weak or scanty the prosecution evidence is in regard to certain incriminating material, it is the duty of the Court to examine the accused and seek his explanation on incriminating material which has surfaced against him. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. The attention of the accused must specifically be brought to inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so.
Therefore, the court is under a legal obligation to put the incriminating circumstances before the accused and solicit his response. This provision is mandatory in nature and casts an imperative duty on the court and confers a corresponding right on the accused to have an opportunity to offer an explanation for such incriminatory material appearing against him.
Circumstances which were not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used against him and have to be excluded from consideration. ( Sharad Birdhichand ; and State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 2100).
In S. Harnam Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.),
AIR 1976 SC 2140, Supreme Court held that non-indication of inculpatory material and its relevant facts by the trial court to the accused adds to the vulnerability of the prosecution case. The recording of the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not a purposeless exercise.
If any appellate Court or revisional court comes across the fact that the trial Court had not put any question to an accused, even if it is of a vital nature, such an omission alone should not result in the setting aside of the conviction and sentence as an inevitable consequence. An inadequate examination cannot be presumed to have caused prejudice. Every error or omission in compliance of the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C., does not necessarily vitiate trial. Such errors fall within category of curable irregularities and the question as to whether the trial is vitiated, in each case depends upon the degree of error and upon whether prejudice has been or is likely to have been caused to accused. Efforts should be made to undo or correct the lapse.
Wasim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 400;
Bhoor Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 1256;
Labhchand Dhanpat Singh Jain v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1975 SC 182;
State of Punjab v. Naib Din, AIR 2001 SC 3955;
Parsuram Pandey & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2004) 13 SCC 189).
In Asraf Ali v. State of Assam, (2008) 16 SCC 328, Supreme Court
observed: "Section 313 of the Code casts a duty on the court to put in an enquiry or trial questions to the accused for the purpose of enabling him to explain any of the circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. It follows as a necessary corollary therefrom that each material circumstance appearing in the evidence against the accused is required to be put to him specifically, distinctly and separately and failure to do so amounts to a serious irregularity vitiating trial, if it is shown that the accused was prejudiced."
In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622, Supreme Court observed as under :"It is trite law, nevertheless fundamental, that the prisoner's attention should be drawn to every inculpatory material so as to enable him to explain it. This is the basic fairness of a criminal trial and failures in this area may gravely imperil the validity of the trial itself, if consequential miscarriage of justice has flowed. However where such an omission has occurred it does not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings and prejudice occasioned by such defect must be established by the accused. In the event of evidentiary material not being put to the accused, the court must ordinarily eschew such material from consideration. It is also open to the appellate court to call upon the counsel for the accused to show what explanation the accused has as regards the circumstances established against him but not put to him and if the accused is unable to offer the appellate court any plausible or reasonable explanation of such circumstances, the court may assume that no acceptable answer exists and that even if the accused had been questioned at the proper time in the trial court he would not have been able to furnish any good ground to get out of the circumstances on which the trial court has relied for its conviction." (Emphasis added).
In Ganesh Gogoi v. State of Assam, (2009) 7 SCC 404, Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in Basavaraj R. Patil & Ors.v. State of Karnataka, (2000) 8 SCC 740, held that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C. are not meant to nail the accused to his disadvantage but are meant for his benefit. The provisions are based on the salutary principles of natural justice and the maxim "audi alteram partem" has been enshrined in them. Therefore, an examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has to be of utmost fairness.
In Shaikh Maqsood v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 583; and Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 595, Supreme Court held that it is the duty of the trial court to indicate incriminating material to the accused. Section 313 Cr.P.C. is not an empty formality. An improper examination/inadequate questioning underSection 313 Cr.P.C. amounts to a serious lapse on the part of the trial Court and is a ground for interference with the conviction.
In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar, AIR 1994 SC 2420, Supreme Court rejected the submission that as no question had been put to the accused on motive, no motive for the commission of the crime could be attributed to the accused, nor the same could be reckoned as circumstance against him observing that it could not be pointed out as to what in fact was the real prejudice caused to the accused by omission to question the accused on the motive for the crime. No material was placed before the court to show as to what and in what manner the prejudice, if any, was caused to the accused. More so, the accused/appellant was aware of accusation and charge against him.
Thus, it is evident from the above that the provisions of Section 313 Cr.P.C make it obligatory for the court to question the accused on the evidence and circumstances against him so as to offer the accused an opportunity to explain the same. But, it would not be enough for the accused to show that he has not been questioned or examined on a particular circumstance, instead he must show that such non- examination has actually and materially prejudiced him and has resulted in the failure of justice. In other words, in the event of an inadvertent omission on the part of the court to question the accused on any incriminating circumstance cannot ipso facto vitiate the trial unless it is shown that some material prejudice was caused to the accused by the omission of the court.
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One Bar One Vote:Supreme Court Dated 26/09/2011
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Under Constitution administrative powers vests in Chief Justice and not in Judges - "As pointed out above, under the constitutional
scheme, Chief Justice is the supreme authority and the other
Judges, so far as officers and servants of the High Court are
concerned, have no role to play on the administrative side. Some
Judges, undoubtedly, will become Chief Justices in their own turn
one day, but it is imperative under the constitutional discipline that
they work in tranquillity. Judges have been described as "hermits".
They have to live and behave like "hermits" who have no desire or
aspiration, having shed it through penance. Their mission is to
supply light and not heat. This is necessary so that their latent
desire to run the High Court administration may not sprout before
time, at least, in some cases."-Verdict of Apex Court followed in CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7936 OF 2011
The Registrar General
High Court of Judicature at Madras
Vs.
R. Perachi and others - Dated 19/09/2011.
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The State should bear in mind the dicta of this Court
in Mundrika Prasad Singh (supra) as regard the necessity to
consult the District Judge. While making appointments of
District Government Counsel, therefore, the State should
give primacy to the opinion of the District Judge. Such a
course of action would demonstrate fairness and
reasonableness of action and, furthermore, to a large extent
the action of the State would not be dubbed as politically
motivated or otherwise arbitrary. As noticed hereinbefore,
there also does not exist any rationale behind deletion of
the provision relating to consultation with the High Court
in the matter of appointment of the Public prosecutors in
the High Court.
The said provision being a salutary one, it
is expected that the State of U.P. either would suitably
amend the same or despite deletion shall consult the High
Court with a view to ensure fairness in action : Supreme Court Dated 21/4/2004.
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APPOINTMENTS OF District Government Counsels/Asst.District Government Counsels in Uttar Pradesh under amended provisions of L.R.Manual : Supreme COURT Dated 3/12/2010.
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Appointment of DGC/ADGC (Criminal)- Right of their renewal discussed in the light of prevailing judgements of Apex Court: Supreme Court Dated 4/5/2011
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"The above decisions make it clear that though
this Court is competent to entrust the investigation
to any independent agency, once the investigating
agency complete their function of investigating
into the offences, it is the court in which the
charge-sheet is filed which is to deal with all
matters relating to the trial of the accused
including matters falling within the scope of
Section 173(8) of the Code. Thus, generally, this
Court may not require further monitoring of the
case/investigation. However, we make it clear that
if any of the parties including CBI require any
further direction, they are free to approach this
Court by way of an application."- Supreme Court.
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Seniority in Services : For the reasons aforesaid this Court holds that
for determination of seniority of the officers
who were recommended on the same date, age is the
only valid and fair basis as such their seniority
should be decided on the basis of age of the
candidates who have been recommended.-Supreme Court.
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Held "(a) Section 110 of the Land Reforms Act and the notification dated 8.3.94 are valid, and there is no excessive delegation of legislative power on the State Government.
(b) Non-laying of the notification dt.8.3.94 under Section 140 of the Land Reforms Act before the State Legislature is a curable defect and it will not affect the validity of the notification or action taken thereunder.
(c) The Acquisition Act is protected by Article 31A of the Constitution after having obtained the assent of the President and hence immune from challenge under Article 14 or 19 of the Constitution.
(d) There is no repugnancy between the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, and hence no assent of the President is warranted under Article 254(2) of the Constitution.
(e) Public purpose is a pre-condition for deprivation of a person from his property under Article 300A and the right to claim compensation is also inbuilt in that Article and when a person is deprived of his property the State has to justify both the grounds which may depend on scheme of the statute, legislative policy, object and purpose of the legislature and other related factors.
(f) Statute, depriving a person of his property is, therefore, amenable to judicial review on grounds hereinbefore discussed. 144.-Supreme Court
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Advocates Act and State Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh Rules - The provisions of Rules 121 and 122-A (in
particular) of the M.P. Rules are not ultra vires of the provisions,
including the provisions of Section 15, of the Advocates Act.
These rules also do not suffer from the vice of excessive
delegation.
In view of the language of Section 15(3) of the Advocates
Act and the factual matrix afore-noticed by us, it is clear that the
amended rules of the M.P. Rules had received the approval of the
Bar Council of India, particularly Rule 122-A. The Rules would
not be invalidated for want of issuance of any notification, as it
is not the requirement in terms of Section 15(3) of the Advocates
Act and in any case would be a curable irregularity at best : Supreme Court.
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Determination of Age under Juvenile Act : "We are satisfied that the entry relating to date of birth entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence for determination of age of an accused person.
The School Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age of the accused person.
Further, the date of birth mentioned in the High School mark sheet produced by the appellant has duly been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the appellant of Class X and has also been proved by the statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd- O-Kalan and recorded by the Board.
.... Accordingly, the appellant was a juvenile on the date of occurrence that is 04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated 04.06.2007.
We are also satisfied that Rule 12 of the Rules which was brought in pursuance of the Act describes four categories of evidence which have been provided in which preference has been given to school certificate over the medical report"- Supreme Court.
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Article 136 of the
Constitution -
"...this Court will be
extremely loath to upset the judgment of
conviction which is confirmed in appeal.
However, if it is found that the
appreciation of evidence in a case,
which is entirely based on
circumstantial evidence, is vitiated by
serious errors and on that account
miscarriage of justice has been
occasioned, then the Court will
certainly interfere even with the
concurrent findings recorded by the
Trial court and the High Court.,
[Bharat
Vs. State of M.P. 2003 (3) SCC 106] - Followed.-Supreme Court - Dated 13/07/2011.
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" But in no event, the illegal recovery can be the foundation of a successful conviction under the provisions of Section 21 of the (NDPS) Act."- Supreme Court - Dated 07.07.2011.
b>
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Excercising jurisdiction under Article 136 Constitution of India : "However, if this Court is of the opinion that the
acquittal is not based on a reasonable view, then it may review
the entire material and there will be no limitation on this
Cour`s jurisdiction under Article 136 to come to a just
decision quashing the acquittal"- 1985(4) SCC 476 para 45;
1996(7) SCC 471 para 4 - Followed.-Supreme Court- Dated 24/05/2011.
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Evidence of interested witness - Appreciation thereof - can be relied upon :"in the case of
Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra [(2007) 14 SCC 150] and in
the case of State of Maharashtra v. Ahmed Shaikh Babajan
and Others [(2009) 14 SCC 267] which dealt with the
question of appreciation of evidence of interested
witnesses. Both those decisions follow the well-settled
principle that just because evidence is given by the
interested persons that is no ground for discarding the
same. We have already held that in the instant case, the
evidence given by PWs 5, 6, 7 and 8 is quite cogent and
clearly established the prosecution case."- Supreme Court - Dated 16/05/2011.
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POLICE ENCOUNTERS: "We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13/05/2011.
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"We warn policemen that they will not be excused for committing
murder in the name of `encounter' on the pretext that they were carrying out
the orders of their superior officers or politicians, however high. In the
Nuremburg trials the Nazi war criminals took the plea that `orders are
orders', nevertheless they were hanged. If a policeman is given an illegal
order by any superior to do a fake `encounter', it is his duty to refuse to carry
out such illegal order, otherwise he will be charged for murder, and if found
guilty sentenced to death. The `encounter' philosophy is a criminal
philosophy, and all policemen must know this. Trigger happy policemen
who think they can kill people in the name of `encounter' and get away with
it should know that the gallows await them."-SUPREME COURT - Dated 13th.May,2011.
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Petitioner submits matter be
considered by a larger Bench as the petition raises the following
issues of Constitutional importance:
(1) Whether the aforesaid two verdicts, viz. the 7-Judge Bench
and 9-Judge Bench decisions of this Court referred to above
really amount to amending Article 124(2) of the
Constitution?
(2) Whether there is any `Collegium' system for appointing
Supreme Court or High Court Judges in the Constitution?
3
(3) Whether the Constitution can be amended by a judicial
verdict or it can only be amended by Parliament in
accordance with Article 368?
(4) Whether the Constitutional scheme was that the Supreme
Court and High Court Judges can be appointed by mutual
discussions and mutual consensus between the judiciary and
the executive; or whether the judiciary can alone appoint
Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts?
(5) Whether the word `consultation' in Article 224 means
`concurrence'?
(6) Whether by judicial interpretation words in the Constitution
can be made redundant, as appears to have been done in the
aforesaid two decisions which have made consultation with
High Court Judges redundant while appointing a Supreme
Court Judge despite the fact that it is permissible on the clear
language of Article 124(2)?
(7) Whether the clear language of Article 124(2) can be altered
by judicial verdicts and instead of allowing the President of
India to consult such Judges of the Supreme Court as he
deems necessary (including even junior Judges) only the
Chief Justice of India and four seniormost Judges of the
Supreme Court can alone be consulted while appointing a
Supreme Court Judge?
(8) Whether there was any convention that the President is
bound by the advice of the Chief Justice of India, and
whether any such convention (assuming there was one) can
prevail over the clear language of Article 124(2)?
(9) Whether the opinion of the Chief Justice of India has any
primacy in the aforesaid appointments?
(10) Whether the aforesaid two decisions should be overruled by
a larger Bench?-Supreme Court-Dated 4/4/2011
4
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the first respondent
set up the case in the plaint that the appellant was a trespasser in the
subject room. The first appellate court has also recorded a
categorical finding, which has not been disturbed by the High Court,
that the appellant was occupying the subject room as trespasser. In
the circumstances, the suit was clearly not maintainable for want of
written permission from the Competent Authority and was rightly
dismissed by the trial court- Appeal Dismissed- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated- 01 Dec 2010
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The plaintiff in a suit for specific performance, cannot obviously succeed unless he proved that he was ready and willing to perform the contract. The exhaustive correspondence between the parties clearly discloses the respective stands of the parties. Even the
prayer in the plaint shows that the appellant was not ready to pay the entire balance of Rs.34,00,000/- as agreed under
the agreement of sale but that the plaintiff insisted upon
the appellant to pay the municipal taxes before the sale, as a condition for sale. If appellant was not willing to pay Rs.34 lakhs at the time of sale, as specifically agreed under
the agreement of sale, the appellant could not claim that it was ready and willing to perform its obligations. As noticed above, after appreciating the entire evidence, learned Single Judge and Division Bench of the High Court have recorded a finding that the appellant was not ready and willing and consequently dismissed the suit. Supreme Court of India- Dated: 04:09:2011
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POLICE CUSTODY DEATHS & RAPES-"In spite of the constitutional and statutory
provisions aimed at safeguarding the personal liberty and
life of a citizen, growing incidence of torture and deaths
in police custody has been a disturbing factor. Experience
shows that worst violations of human rights take place
during the course of investigation, when the police with a
view to secure evidence or confession often resorts to
third-degree methods including torture and adopts
techniques of screening arrest by either not recording the
arrest or describing the deprivation of liberty merely as a
prolonged interrogation. A reading of the morning
newspapers almost everyday carrying reports of
dehumanising torture, assault, rape and death in custody
of police or other governmental agencies is indeed
depressing. The increasing incidence of torture and death
in custody has assumed such alarming proportions that it
is affecting the credibility of the rule of law and the
administration of criminal justice system. The
community rightly feels perturbed. Societys cry for
justice becomes louder.
Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-Dated 29/03/2011.
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Applicability of section 34 I.P.C. read with 302 - which accused actually caused the murder not certain
But It is clear that all the three accused persons had taken part in
the beating of deceased Deepak and all the accused persons dragged him
in the room and closed the door.
Therefore, it was up to the accused
persons to explain as to how Deepak died. It is very clear that all the three
accused persons had acted with common intention of causing the death
and, therefore, all the three accused persons would be guilty with the aid of
Section 34, IPC. The High Court has rightly held them guilty: Supreme Court.
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Confession a very weak type of evidence-Confession in TADA Case-The alleged confession was subsequently retracted by the appellant. The alleged confession was not corroborated by any other material. We have held in Arup Bhuyan”“s case (supra) that confession is a very weak type of evidence, particularly when alleged to have been made to the police, and it is not safe to convict on its basis unless there is adequate corroborative material. In the present case there is no corroborative material:SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-10-02-2011.
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Civil Laws- Appeal- A bare perusal of the said order would also indicate that he has
given deductions for the items held as immovable. -The Commissioner having considered the aforesaid issue carefully and after proper scrutiny, the Tribunal
was not justified in rejecting the said findings by mere conclusion and without trying to meet the findings recorded by the Commissioner–Appeal Allowed , Set aside order passed by Tribunal and restore the order of Commissioner- Supreme Court of India. –Order Dated:FEBRUARY 10, 2011.
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Criminal Laws-Appeal-Sections 120-B and 409- IPC, Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) -PC Act-- The prosecution has established - a) By awarding both the works of Idamalayar at a very high and exorbitant rate with special conditions having heavy financial implications. b) By reducing the retention and security amount. c) By allowing the contractor to return only fifty per cent of the empty cement bags. Having arrived at such conclusion,
- High Court failed to appreciate in its proper sense the materials placed by the prosecution and brushed aside several important items of evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Unable to accept the conclusion of the High Court, namely, ““the proved circumstances are not sufficient to hold that there was conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution”“.
- Satisfied that the Special Court after framing various points for consideration and after thorough discussion has accepted the case of the prosecution insofar as the work of driving the surge shaft, lining the surge shaft, balance driving the power tunnel and other allied works of Idamalayar Hydro Electric Power Project at a higher or exorbitant rates to the contractor K.P. Poulose and the accused persons have abused their official positions.
-The Special Court has also accepted the prosecution case founding that A1 along with K.P. Poulose, Paul Mundakkal and other accused persons entered into criminal conspiracy and rightly convicted them.
-The High Court committed a grave error in acquitting the accused without adverting to the reliable and acceptable evidence adduced by the prosecution.- Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011
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Civil Laws-Section 64A(1)(a)-Goods Act, 1930-Receipt given to the petitioner for payment of the amount in the proforma invoice, it had been indicated that the prices prevailing on the date of billing would apply.
--The billing was done on 5th of April, 1989. In the absence of any evidence of any deliberate intention on the part of the respondents to delay delivery of the vehicle, we are unable to agree with the petitioner that the increase in price has to be borne by the respondents
-- It is the liability of the petitioner to pay the extra price when the excise duty had been enhanced prior to the delivery of the vehicle—
-The Special Leave Petition fails and is dismissed-Supreme Court of India :Order Dated Feb 10, 2011
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Civil Laws-Rule 4-Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board (Sale of
Immovable Property) Rules 1997-It is clear that the allottees cannot postpone the payment of instalments merely on the ground that some of the amenities were not ready. If they were not entitled for postponement of the instalments, it follows that they will be liable to pay the normal interest on the delayed instalments up to date of payment. However, having regard to the fact that the Rules did not contemplate compound interest and penal interest and the Market Committee was yet to complete certain infrastructural work like water, sewerage disposal, as held in Shantikunj (supra), the Market Committee will not be entitled to claim any compound interest or penal interest.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: FEBRUARY 10, 2011
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Criminal Laws--Handed over the sample parcel, duly sealed and sample impression of seal to Constable for depositing the same in the office of Chemical Examiner. --None had tampered with the aforesaid case property and the seal which remained in his custody. --Deposited the case property in the office of Chemical Examiner on the same day and tendered receipt. --Report of the Chemical Examiner (Ex. PJ) which indicates that the seals were intact when the sample was received and tallied with the sample impression of the seal.
--It is note worthy that such a report of the Chemical Examiner would be admissible under Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. Considering the aforesaid clear evidence, it cannot be said that there is any infirmity in the link evidence merely because there was a delay of few days in sending the sample to the office of the Chemical Examiner.-Appeal Dismissed- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated-February 11, 2011.
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In the facts of this case, we deem it appropriate
to direct that the appeal, which was dismissed in default
for not depositing the amount in time, shall be restored
to its original number and be heard expeditiously by the
Tribunal.-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated February 11, 2011.
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Writ- Transfer Petition- Transfer Petition pending at the District Judge (MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P.) to the competent Court at Pune, Maharashtra. The petitioners allege in the petition that the MACT Court, Gautam Budh Nagar, U.P. has no jurisdiction in the matter. - An order of transfer of a case can be passed where both the courts, namely, the transferor court as well as the transferee court, have jurisdiction to hear the case and the party seeking transfer of the case alleges that the transferee court would be more convenient because the witnesses are available there or for some other reason it will be convenient for the parties to have the case heard by the transferee court. There is no question of transfer of a case which has been filed in a court which has no jurisdiction at all to hear it.-With these observations, the transfer petition is dismissed-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011
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Appeal- Civil Laws- Post of Ticket Collector is categorised in Annexure IV in Class B-2 but while doing so the underlying object of division of staff into three broad groups A, B and C for vision tests of candidates and of serving Railway employees in non-Gazetted Railway services seems to have been overlooked. Broadly, Class B-2 covers a certain staff in workshops and engine rooms engaged on duties. It has been so done because failing eyesight may endanger themselves or other employees from moving parts of the machinery and crane drivers on open line. This is in consonance with the objective of group B viz; `in the interest of the employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“. Insofar as Ticket Collectors are concerned, vision tests for them are not required `in the interest of employee himself or his fellow workers or both”“ as contemplated in group B but it is required in the interest of administration only - the objective contemplated in group C. In this view of the matter, there seems to be no rational basis, in relation to the object set out in Para 510 of IRMM, of categorizing the post of Ticket Collectors under Class B-2 in Annexure IV. However, it is for the respondents to have a fresh look insofar as categorisation of posts pertaining to non-Gazetted Railway services in Annexure IV is concerned. Suffice it to say that categorization of posts for the purpose of vision tests must have nexus with the object set out in Para 510. Having regard to the objective of division of groups/ classes for the purpose of vision tests under Para 510 of IRMM, the post of Ticket Collectors can not be held to be covered by Class B-2 but rather will be covered by Class C-2. Any inconsistency in categorization of Railway posts in Annexure IV, in our view, must not operate against the appellant in getting promotion to the post of Ticket Collector.
--the appellant could not have been denied promotion to the post of Ticket Collector as he had passed written test and viva voce and was provisionally selected for the post of Ticket Collector and had been declared medically fit in Class C-2. --Appeal is allowed- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 14, 2011
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Appeal- Sec 302-Indian Penal Code-Medical Officer of Mauza Burdwan Medical College, opined that the death was due to the effect of the injuries as noted anti-mortem in nature; that all the injuries as noted in the post mortem examination report might be caused if a person pushed against the wall and it may be homicidal in nature- Appeal Dismised- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 14, 2011
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Appeal-Civil Laws-The appellant has pointed out that apart from being a Member of the Bar, he is a former President of the Student Union of the AMU, former elected Member of AMU Court, Life Member of AMU Old Boys Association and Donor Life Member of the AMU-- He had produced documents in support of the said averments. The said averments are not shown to be false. The appellant claims that his only interest in filing the writ petition was to ensure that AMU continues to be an Institution of academic excellence and that no action of the University should dilute its academic excellence. On the other hand, the respondents contend that the writ petition was filed with the oblique motive of maligning the Vice Chancellor of the University. It is not necessary to examine that aspect now-Held- he has sufficient interest to file the writ petition in public interest. The High Court ought not to have dismissed the public interest litigation only on the ground of locus standi of appellant to file the writ petition. Appeal Allowed-Supreme Court of India-Order Dated: Feb 14 2011
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The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no justification for the High Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, to interfere with the findings of the revisional authority and the punishment imposed, which had been accepted by the Administrative Tribunal It is impermissible in law.
--The revisional authority did not interfere with the findings recorded by the appellate authority that respondent was not guilty of charges 2,3,4 and 5. The appellate authority found that as only charges 1,6 and 7 were proved and the other charges relating mis- appropriation of additional fare were not proved, the punishment of dismissal was excessive and consequently set aside the same and imposed a lesser punishment of reduction in rank.
-On the facts and circumstances, the said order of the appellate authority did not call for interference and that too in exercise of power of revision.
Therefore we are of the view that the High Court was justified in restoring the decision of the appellate authority imposing a lesser punishment.
However while the High Court was justified in restoring the order of reinstatement with imposition of lesser punishment of reduction in service with continuity of service, the High Court was not justified in granting the reliefs of seniority and 25% back wages. When the High Court has upheld the finding that the respondent was guilty of charges 1,6 and 7, any direction for back wages would amount to rewarding the guilty, which is not permissible. Nor will he be entitled to restoration of his seniority as ordered by the High Court.
we allow this appeal in part and set aside the order of the High Court awarding backwages of 25% and restoring the seniority.- Supreme Court of India –Order Dated :Feb 14, 2011
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Civil Laws-Assigning of lesser marks to Sardar Mahinder Singh not only denied him the first place in the panel, but also unjustly and undeservedly gave the first respondent, the first place in the panel. The manner of assigning marks showed a clear intention to favour the first respondent at the cost of the other applicants. It is this finding that persuaded the General Manager of IOC to scrap the selection. The High Court having recorded a finding that the appellant was satisfied about the illegality committed by the selection committee, ought to have rejected the writ petition, as the decision of the appellants to scrap the selection was reasonable and not arbitrary.-Appeal Allowed- Supreme Court of India-Order dated:Feb 14, 2011
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Held-Supreme Court of India- Order Dated: Feb 15, 2011-Coming to the case at hand we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in imposing the extreme penalty of death upon the appellants. We say so for reasons more than one. Firstly, because the appellants are not professional killers. Even according to the prosecution they were only a part of the coal mafia active in the region indulging in theft of coal from the collieries. The deceased being opposed to such activities appears to have incurred their wrath and got killed. Secondly, because even when the deceased was a politician there was no political angle to his killing. Thirdly, because while all culpable homicides amounting to murder are inhuman, hence legally and ethically unacceptable yet there was nothing particularly brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting or dastardly in the manner of its execution so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation of the community or exhaust depravity and meanness on the part of the assailants to call for the extreme penalty. Fourthly, because there was difference of opinion on the question of sentence to be awarded to the convicts. The Trial Court did not find it to be a rarest of rare case and remained content with the award of life sentence only which sentence the High Court enhanced to death. Considering all these circumstances, the death sentence awarded to the appellants in our opinion deserves to be commuted to life imprisonment.-Appeal Allowed
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Held- Supreme Court of India-Order Dated Feb 15, 2011- The DNA test of Rimpa by CDFD, a pioneer institute in Hyderabad matched with that of blood of her parents and brother. The Doctors at AIIMS have put the parts of the deceased girls which have been recovered by the Doctors of AIIMS together. These bodies have been recovered in the presence of the Doctors of AIIMS at the pointing out by the accused Surendra Koli. Thus, recovery is admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
On the facts of the case we see no reason to interfere with the findings of the trial court and the High Court that the appellant Surendra Koli is guilty of murdering Rimpa Haldar. Both Courts have gone into the evidence in great detail and we have perused the same. The appellant appears to be a serial killer, and these cases in our opinion fall within the category of rarest of the rare cases as laid down in Bachan singh Vs State of Punjab, 1982 SCC 689 which has been subsequently followed in Atbir Vs Government of NCT of Delhi, 2010 SCC (9) 1.
The killings by the appellant Surendra Koli are horrifying and barbaric. He used a definite methodology in committing these murders. He would see small girls passing by the house, and taking advantage of their weakness lure them inside the house no. D-5, Sector 31, Nithari Village, Noida and there he would strangulate them and after killing them he tried to have sex with the body and would then cut off their body parts and eat them. Some parts of the body were disposed off by throwing them in the passage gallery and drain (nala) beside the house. House no. D-5, Sector 31 had become a virtual slaughter house, where innocent children were regularly butchered.
In our opinion, this case clearly falls within the category of rarest of rare case and no mercy can be shown to the appellant Surendra Koli.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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Held- It is, therefore, difficult for us to uphold the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High Court and hence we quash and set aside the same. If, however, the writ petitioner, respondents herein, has/have any other alternative remedy or forum to claim allotment of the land, they obviously will have to first of all get the letter of the State Government quashed and set aside which has ordered stopping the allotment of rehabilitation land forthwith. Unless the respondents succeed in doing so, no allotment of the land could have been made specially without any enquiry as to whether the predecessor-in-interest had left any land at all in Pakistan when he migrated to India. Besides this, learned counsel for the appellants-State further informed that the writ petitioner, predecessor-in- interest of the respondents herein had already been allotted land under the rehabilitation scheme way back in the year 1952 and, therefore, claim for allotment for the second time should not have been allowed by the High Court contrary to the government instructions. We find force in this submission also, and, therefore, this aspect was required to be examined and enquired before any order was passed in favour of the respondents-claimants- Supreme Court of India- Order Dated Feb 15, 2011
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Held- The appellant has preferred this appeal against the final judgment dated 10.09.2007 before this Court. This appeal is also barred by limitation of 114 days. There is no satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay before this Court also. -Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 17,2011
The Union of India ought to have been careful particularly in filing this Civil Appeal because the Division Bench, by the impugned order, has dismissed the appeal before it on the ground of delay. It is a matter of deep anguish and distress that majority of the matters filed by the Union of India are hopelessly barred by limitation and no satisfactory explanations exist for condoning inordinate delay in filing those cases.
On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are constrained to dismiss this appeal on the ground of delay. However, in the larger interest, we are keeping the question of law open
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Held- Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the suit is pending before the Small Causes Court, Pune.
We direct the proceedings in the suit to continue, however, no final order in the suit be passed until the disposal of the writ petition to be filed by the appellants before the Bombay High Court.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, we request the Bombay High Court to dispose of the writ petition, if filed (by the appellants within four weeks from today) as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within a period of one year from the date of filing of the writ petition.
In case, the writ petition is not filed within a period of four weeks, this order would be of no avail to the appellants- Supreme Court of India -Order Dated: Feb 15 2011
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HELD- In view of the fact that the inspection and verification in regard to renewal of permission for the second, third, fourth and fifth years will be restricted only to the consideration of the additional faculty and additional infrastructure, it may not be necessary to apply the lengthy time schedule prescribed for initial permission, to renewal of permissions during the next four years. The DCI Regulations presently contemplate almost similar time schedules in regard to applications for establishment of new dental colleges, for opening of higher courses of study, for increase of admission capacity, and for renewal of permissions, with 15th July being the last date both for grant of permission or renewal of permission. DCI and Central Government may consider amendment to the DCI Regulations suitably to provide for a shorter and distinct time schedule for renewal of permissions, so that the dental colleges could file applications till end of February and the process of grant or refusal of renewal is completed by 15th of June. Conclusion
22. In view of the above, these writ petitions are allowed as follows : (a) The condition imposed by the Central Government (requiring the dental colleges to secure appropriate orders from this court approving the renewals of permission) in the letters of renewal of permission issued to the petitioners in July/August/September, 2010, is quashed; (b) It is however declared that the renewal of permissions issued by Central Government to the petitioners for the academic year 2010-2011, are valid.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 15,2011
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HELD--The language of the circular dated 13.12.1995 makes it crystal clear that the Government took a fresh decision in supersession of earlier instructions that promotion to Grade-IV may be given from amongst officials in Grade-III on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade. Hence, the decision of the Government to make promotions to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic grade could take effect only from 13.12.1995 and not from a prior date and the respondents, who had filed O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 in the Central Administrative Tribunal could not claim any promotion to Grade-IV on the basis of their seniority in the basic cadre with effect from any date prior to 13.12.1995. The Central Administrative Tribunal was, therefore, not right in allowing O.A. No.2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997 by order dated 11.08.2000, directing the Government to consider promoting the applicants to Grade-IV with effect from the dates their immediate juniors in the basic grade seniority were so promoted subject to their being found fit with consequential benefits of seniority as well as arrears of pay and allowance and of retiral benefits in the case of those of the applicants in the O.As. who had retired on superannuation. In our considered opinion, the High Court ought to have interfered with the decision of the Tribunal.
18. We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the impugned orders dated 22.05.2003 of the High Court and the common order dated 11.08.2000 of the Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 2484 of 1997 and O.A. No.2099 of 1997. The two O.As. stand rejected. There will be no order as to costs.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17, 2011
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HELD--The High Court unfortunately took a very technical view in the matter of applying the multiplier. The High Court cannot keep out of its consideration the claim of the daughter of the first claimant, since the daughter was impleaded, and was 49 years of age. Admittedly, the deceased was looking after the entire family. In determining the age of the mother, the High Court should have accepted the age of the mother at 65, as given in the claim petition, since there is no controversy on that. By accepting the age of mother at 67, the High Court further reduced the multiplier from 6 to 5, even if we accept the reasoning of the High Court to be correct. The reasoning of the High Court is not correct in view of the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra). Following the same the High Court should have proceeded to compute the compensation on the age of the deceased.
Thus, the finding of the High Court is contrary to the ratio in Sarla Verma (supra), which is the leading decision on this question and which we follow.
This Court, therefore, cannot sustain the High Court judgment and is constrained to set aside the same. The award of MACT is restored.
The appeal is allowed. No costs
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HELD--In the present case the acquisition proceeding commenced with the notification under Section 4 issued on 06.03.1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by the Collector on 09.07.1980, i.e., before 30.04.1982, the date from which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was made applicable to the pending and subsequent proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of K.S. Paripoornan (supra) the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1A).
All the appeals, therefore, are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent and disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs. -SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED FEB 17,2011
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Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. ...Appellant(s)
versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondent(s) - Case
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Civil Laws-There is concurrent finding that a pond exists and the area covered by it varies in the rainy season. In such a case no part of it could have been allotted to anybody for construction of house building or any allied purposes. It is important to notice that the material resources of the community like forests, tanks, ponds, hillock, mountain etc. are nature”“s bounty. They maintain delicate ecological balance. They need to be protected for a proper and healthy environment which enables people to enjoy a quality life which is the essence of the guaranteed right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Government, including the Revenue Authorities i.e. Respondents 11 to 13, having noticed that a pond is falling in disuse, should have bestowed their attention to develop the same which would, on one hand, have prevented ecological disaster and on the other provided better environment for the benefit of the public at large. Such vigil is the best protection against knavish attempts to seek allotment in non-abadi sites- Appeal Dismissed- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011
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CIVIL LAWS--An agreement signed by the parties in the matter of collection of toll. While rejecting the argument of the writ petitioner that he was not liable to pay stamp duty under Article 35(b) read with Section 2(16) of the Act, the Division Bench observed: ““On bare reading of the section it becomes clear that all leases with respect to immovable property would be leases in terms of Section 2(16) but in addition to leases of immovable property in other three categories there would also be lease under category (c) in which any instrument by which tolls of any description are let would be a lease for the purpose of Section 2(16). The instrument by which right to collect toll is conveyed has to be treated as lease for the purposes of Stamp Act. Right to collect toll will never in any circumstances involve immovable property. Basically toll is collected for using a road or bridge and as such neither the road nor the bridge is leased out, only the right to collection is leased out and this right of leasing out the collection is ““lease”“ for the purposes of Stamp Act- APPEAL ALLOWED- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED FEB 17, 2011
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CRIMINAL LAWS-The letter which forms the basis of conviction by the Appellate Court was never produced during the investigation and for the first time produced by the witness during the course of trial, when she appeared as a witness. It is submitted that authenticity of the letter in question has not been proved and hence the appellate Court ought not to have reversed the judgment of acquittal and convicted the appellant. --Moreover, this letter had not been produced before the police during the course of the initial investigation and had been handed over to the police after several months. This fact, as also a reading of the letter, indicates that this was a concocted piece of evidence and the work of a legal mind, as no person would write such a letter meeting all legal requirements for implicating himself and his near relatives, in a claim for dowry. It has also been pointed out that view taken by the Trial Court was one of the possible views which the High Court in appeal ought not to have reversed.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 17,2011
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If the order has re-determined the valuable rights of the parties to the proceeding, whether without issuing any notice or after issuing notice, it is a judgment as per the tests laid down in Khimji's case.
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HELD--With regard to recovery of the pistol, the learned counsel is right that the pistol was recovered from a public place but it was recovered from the place which could not have been easily located by anyone and, therefore, the accused cannot get benefit which the learned counsel wanted him to get. From the memo of recovery, it is clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under a plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar. Thus, it is very clear that the pistol had been hidden by digging earth under the plant of Sarkanda about half a kilometer away on the eastern katcha path from bridge of Ladhuwala Uttar and, therefore, in our opinion, the recovery cannot be said to be from a place which could have been easily accessible to anyone.
--With regard to recovery memo, the mistake committed in writing the word "witness"
or "witnesses" can not be said to be so material so as to adversely affect the case of the prosecution. – SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED:FEB 18,2011
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The import manifest and the bill of entry having been filed before the Collectorate of Customs (Imports) Mumbai, the same having been assessed and clearance for home consumption having been allowed by the proper officer on importers executing bond, undertaking the obligation of export, in our opinion, the Collector of Customs (Preventive), not being a ““proper officer”“ within the meaning of Section 2(34) of the Act, was not competent to issue show cause notice for re- assessment under Section 28 of the Act. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the Collector of Customs (Preventive), who had issued the show cause notices was assigned the functions under Section 28 of the Act as ““proper officer”“ either by the Board or the Collector/Commissioner of Customs. We are convinced that Notifications No. 250-Cus and 251-Cus., both dated 27th August, 1983, issued by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of the Section 4 of the Act, appointing Collector of Customs (Preventive) etc. to be the Collector of Customs for Bombay, Thane and Kolaba Districts in the State of Maharashtra did not ipso facto confer jurisdiction on him to exercise power entrusted to the ““proper officers”“ for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act. In that view of the matter, we do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. V. Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the revenue in the second set of appeals, that the source of power to act as a ““proper officer”“ is Sections 4 and 5 of the Act and not sub-section 34 of Section 2 of the Act. The said sections merely authorize the Board to appoint officers of Customs and confer on them the powers and duties to be exercised/discharged by them, but for the purpose of Section 28 of the Act, an officer of customs has to be designated as ““proper officer”“ by assigning the function of levy and collection of duty, by the Board or the Commissioner of Customs. The argument is rejected accordingly. Similarly, revenue’‘‘‘s reliance on the decision of this court in Ram Narain Bishwanath & Ors. (supra) is clearly misplaced. In that case the issue for determination was that when goods imported and cleared at Paradip Port (Orissa State) were seized by the Customs authorities in West Bengal on the allegation that these had been imported on the strength of fictitious licences, whether the customs authorities at Paradip or West Bengal will have the jurisdiction to initiate adjudication proceedings. By a short order it was held that it was for the customs authorities at Paradip to initiate proceedings against the importer. Apart from the fact that none of the statutory provisions were considered in that case, the issue arising for consideration in the present appeals was not the subject matter therein. Thus, the said decision is of no avail to the revenue.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEBRUARY 18, 2011
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The Dean of King Edward Memorial Hospital as well as Ms. Pinky Virani (who claims to be the next friend of the petitioner) are directed to intimate the brother(s)/sister(s) or other close relatives of the petitioner that the case will be listed on 2nd March, 2011 in the Supreme Court and they can put forward their views before the Court, if they so desire. Learned counsel for the petitioner and the Registry of this Court shall communicate a copy of this Order forthwith to the Dean, KEM Hospital. The Dean, KEM Hospital is requested to file an affidavit stating his views regarding the prayer in this writ petition, and also the condition of the petitioner- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011
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The liability of the Insurance Company to pay compensation was limited to six persons travelling inside the vehicle only and that the liability to pay the others was that of the owner, we, in this case, are faced with the same problem as had surfaced in Anjana Shyam's case (supra). The number of persons to be compensated being in excess of the number of persons who could validly be carried in the vehicle, the question which arises is one of apportionment of the amounts to be paid. Since there can be no pick and choose method to identify the five passengers, excluding the driver, in respect of whom compensation would be payable by the Insurance Company, to meet the ends of justice we may apply the procedure adopted in Baljit Kaur”“s case (supra) and direct that the Insurance Company should deposit the total amount of compensation awarded to all the claimants and the amounts so deposited be disbursed to the claimants in respect to their claims, with liberty to the Insurance Company to recover the amounts paid by it over and above the compensation amounts payable in respect of the persons covered by the Insurance Policy from the owner of the vehicle, as was directed in Baljit Kaur”“s case- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED: FEB 18,2011
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This is, however, a clear case where the admissions of the seven appellants took place due to the fault of the rule-making authority in not making the State Rules, 2008 in conformity of the MCI Regulations. For this fault of the rule-making authority if the appellants are discharged from the MBBS course, they will suffer grave injustice. On the peculiar facts of the case, we are thus of the view that this is a fit case where this Court should exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice between parties. In Delhi Judicial Service Association, Tis Hazari Court, Delhi v. State of Gujarat and Others. [(1991) 4 SCC 406] after examining the width of this power under Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court held: ““No enactment made by Central or State legislature can limit or restrict the power of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, though while exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution, the court must take into consideration the statutory provisions regulating the matter in dispute. What would be the need of ““complete justice”“ in a cause or matter would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and while exercising that power the Court would take into consideration the express provisions of a substantive statute. Once this Court has taken seisin of a case, cause or matter, it has power to pass any order or issue direction as may be necessary to do complete justice in the matter. --In the facts of the present case, we have found that the
appellants were not to be blamed for having secured
admission in the MBBS course and the fault was entirely of
the rule-making authority in making the 2008 Rules and the
appellants have gone through the pains of appearing in the
common entrance test and have been selected on the basis of
their merit and admitted into the MBBS course in the college
in accordance with the State Rules, 2008 and have pursued
their studies for a year. Hence, even though under the MCI
Regulations the appellants were not eligible for admission to
the MBBS course in the academic year 2008-2009, for the
purpose of doing complete justice in the matter before us, we
direct that the admissions of the appellants to the MBBS
course in the college during the academic year 2008-2009 will
not be disturbed. This direction shall not, however, be treated
as a precedent- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA - ORDER DATED- FEB 18,2011
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HELD--the Tribunal should have considered the prospect of future income while computing compensation but the Tribunal has not done that. In the appeal, which was filed by the appellants before the High Court, the High Court instead of maintaining the amount of compensation, granted by the Tribunal, reduced the same. In doing so, the High Court had not given any reason. The High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from the multiplier used by the Tribunal without disclosing any reason therefore. The High Court has also not considered the clear and corroborative evidence about the prospect of future increment of the deceased. When the age of the deceased is between 51 and 55 years the multiplier is 11, which is specified in the II Column in the II Schedule in the Motor Vehicles Act, and the Tribunal has not committed any error by accepting the said multiplier. This Court also fails to appreciate why the High Court chose to apply the multiplier of 6.-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -ORDER DATED : FEB 18 2011
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HELD-- a permanent disability certificate by the said Medical Board. Therefore, the said certificate clearly establishes that Appellant had sustained permanent disability to his own body to the extent of 50% and even after several surgeries; he was not able to control his urination. We can well appreciate and imagine the problems and difficulties of a young boy aged 16 years, who is not able to control his urination and spoils his clothes even while attending school. We have been given to understand that he is required to go with additional sets of clothings so that he could change the same, in case they are spoiled. This is the state of affairs even as on date. We do not doubt the genuineness and correctness of the aforesaid certificate. Even otherwise, Respondents have also not contended that this certificate is forged or fabricated and has been obtained with an intention to get compensation-APPEAL ALLOWED- ORDER DATED- FEB 18, 2011
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HELD--The proliferating unaided private colleges, may need a full complement of students for their comfortable sustenance (meeting the cost of running the college and paying the staff etc.). But that cannot be at the risk of quality of education. To give an example, if 35% is the minimum passing marks in a qualifying examination, can it be argued by colleges that the minimum passing marks in the qualifying examination should be reduced to only 25 or 20 instead of 35 on the ground that the number of students/candidates who pass the examination are not sufficient to fill their seats? Reducing the standards to `fill the seats”“ will be a dangerous trend which will destroy the quality of education. If there are large number of vacancies, the remedy lies in (a) not permitting new colleges; (b) reducing the intake in existing colleges; (c) improving the infrastructure and quality of the institution to attract more students. Be that as it may. The need to fill the seats cannot be permitted to override the need to maintain quality of education. Creeping commercialization of education in the last few years should be a matter of concern for the central bodies, states and universities.
13. No student or college, in the teeth of the existing and prevalent rules of the State and the University can say that such rules should be ignored, whenever there are unfilled vacancies in colleges. In fact the State/University, may, in spite of vacancies, continue with the higher eligibility criteria to maintain better standards of higher education in the State or in the colleges affiliated to the University. Determination of such standards, being part of the academic policy of the University, are beyond the purview of judicial review, unless it is established that such standards are arbitrary or `adversely affect”“ the standards if any fixed by the Central Body under a Central enactment. The order of the Division Bench is therefore unsustainable. ORDER DATED:FEB 18, 2011
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Held- The only ground on which Article 14 has been put forward by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the fixation of the cut-off date for payment of the revised benefits under the two notifications concerned was arbitrary and it resulted in denying arrears of payments to certain Sections of the employees. This argument is no longer res integra. It has been held in a catena of judgments that fixing of a cut-off date for granting of benefits is well within the powers of the Government as long as the reasons therefor are not arbitrary and are based on some rational consideration.”“
-- We have sympathies for the appellant but, in a society governed by Rule of law, sympathies cannot override the Rules and Regulations. We may recall the observations made by this Court while considering the issue of compassionate appointment in public service. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramachhandra Ambekar and Anr. (1994) 2 SCC 718, wherein the Court observed: ““The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration.... Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered that ““law is the embodiment of all wisdom”“. Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be.- Order Dated Feb 21 ,2011
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HELD- Counsel appearing for the appellant also submitted that the punishment awarded to the appellant was too severe and harsh considering the nature and the degree of the offences established. The appellant belongs to Air Force, which is a disciplined service. The allegations made against the appellant were serious. The charge number (2) against him stood proved. The said charge is also serious and we are of the considered opinion that for an offence of the aforesaid nature the authority was justified in awarding him the punishment of dismissal from service.
-- The scale of punishment provided in Section 73 of the Act clearly confirms the position that dismissal from service is a lesser punishment than that of detention in prison. By commuting the punishment of three months detention and imposing the punishment of dismissal, the Confirming Authority has strictly followed the scale of punishment provided for in Section 73 of the Act and, therefore, there is no justification for any interference with the nature of punishment awarded to the appellant-APPEAL DISMISSED- ORDER DATED- FEB 21, 2011
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HELD--The High Court has gone on the premise that once the Appellant have themselves extended the benefit to the Respondent they cannot further classify the benefit of investment up to the date of amendment, putting the unit in the negative list. It appears that the High Court while arriving at the said finding has failed to appreciate the fact that the case of the Respondent was considered for exemption in the light of the judgment passed by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620 wherein it was held that the Respondent is entitled to exemption. However, the issue of quantum was kept open. The High Court while giving the said finding has altogether closed itself in considering the said issue and on the contrary has held that only because the Respondent has been considered for grant of exemption, there is no issue of quantum and the Respondent is entitled to entire exemption. In our opinion the said finding is not in line with the observations made by this Court in the Mahabir Vegetable case (supra) reported at (2006) 3 SCC 620. The quantification made by the LLSC is in accord with the ratio laid by this Court.
Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High Court leaving the parties to bear their own costs.- ORDER DATED February 21, 2011.
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HELD--We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court should not have passed the impugned order for deposit of Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the appeals when the Appellate Authority had directed the appellant to make pre- deposit for Rs.5,00,000/- for both the appeals. The second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act states that in the case of an appeal against a decision or order imposing a penalty or redemption charges, no such appeal shall be entertained unless the amount of the penalty or redemption charges has been deposited by the appellant. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act, however, states ““where the Appellate Authority is of opinion that the deposit to be made will cause undue hardship to the appellant, it may, at its discretion, dispense with such deposit either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may impose.”“ Hence, under the Act discretion is vested in the Appellate Authority to dispense with a pre-deposit of penalty either unconditionally or subject to such condition as the Appellate Authority may impose. If in exercise of such discretion, the Appellate Authority in the present case dispensed with the pre-deposit penalty of Rs.1,30,00,000/- in each of the two appeals subject to the appellant depositing a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court ought not to have enhanced the amount of pre-deposit to Rs.20,00,000/- for each of the two appeals.
As the two appeals of the appellant have not been heard on merits, we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi and the order of the learned Single Judge and direct that in case the appellant deposits the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- as directed by the Appellate Authority within two months from today, the two appellate orders of the Appellate Authority will stand quashed and the appeal will be heard on merits afresh by the Appellate Authority.
With the aforesaid directions, the appeals are allowed. No costs- ORDER DATED- February 21, 2011.
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An order passed by the Settlement Commission
could be interfered with only if the said
order is found to be contrary to any
provisions of the Act. So far findings of the
fact recorded by Commission or question
of facts are concerned, the same is not
open for examination either by the High
Court or by the Supreme Court. In the
present case the order of the Settlement
Commission clearly indicates that the said
order, particularly, with regard to the
imposition of simple interest @ 10 per cent
per annum was passed in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 14 but the High
Court wrongly interpreted the said Rule
and thereby arrived at an erroneous
finding.
So far as the second issue with respect to interest
on Rs. 50 lacs is concerned, the same
being a factual issue should not have been
gone into by the High Court exercising the
writ jurisdiction and the High Court
should not have substituted its own
opinion against the opinion of the
Settlement Commission when the same
was not challenged on merits.
In that view of the matter, we set aside the order passed by the
Punjab & Haryana High Court by the impugned judgment and
order and restore the order of the Settlement Commission
leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
ORDER DATED-February 21, 2011.
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It is by now a settled law that the exemption notification has to be construed strictly and there has to be strict interpretation of the same by reading the same literally. In this connection reference can be made to the decision of this Court in Collector of Customs (Preventive), Amritsar vs. Malwa Industries Limited reported at (2009) 12 SCC 735 as also to the decision in Kartar Rolling Mills vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi reported at (2006) 4 SCC 772 wherein also it was held by this Court that finding recorded by the Tribunal and the two authorities below are findings of fact and such findings in absence of evidence on record to the contrary is not subject to interference. In order to get benefit of such notification granting exemption the claimant has to show that he satisfies the eligibility criteria. Since the Tribunal and the authorities below have categorically held that the appellant does not satisfy the eligibility criteria on the basis of the evidence on record, therefore, we hold that the said exemption Notification is not applicable to the case of the appellants.
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The pressures on state executive and judicial officers charged with the administration of the criminal law are great. But it is precisely the predictability of those pressures that makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us all. Order Dated-24-2-2011
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On a consideration of the matter it cannot be said that there is no disproportion or even a sizeable disproportion.....There are also other possible errors in the calculations in regard to point (c). The finding becomes inescapable that the assets were in excess of the known sources of income. But on the question whether the extent of the disproportion is such as to justify a conviction for criminal misconduct...., a somewhat liberal view requires to be taken of what proportion of assets in excess of the known sources of income constitutes ““disproportion”“ for purposes of Section 5(1)(e) of the Act
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where the appeal is against a conviction and sentence of death or of imprisonment, and the appellant dies during the pendency of the appeal, any of his near relatives may, within thirty days of the death of the appellant, apply to the Appellate Court for leave to continue the appeal; and if leave is granted, the appeal shall not abate; (b) the power to grant leave to continue the appeal is conferred on the court and not on the Registrar under Order VI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966.--Supreme Court Of India- Order Dated:February 25, 2011
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Learned Solicitor General submits that if the Bank is allowed to appropriate this amount, then he has no objection to the appeal of the appellant being heard on merit by the DRAT. We direct that the Indian Bank would be at liberty to appropriate the amount which is already with the Bank, however, this would be subject to the final decision of the appeal by the DRAT.--
In the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the DRAT to hear and dispose of the appeal on all questions of law, as expeditiously as possible, in any event, within two months from the date of the communication of this order.--Supreme Court of India- Dated:February 25, 2011.
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The Trial Court to conduct the trial of the case on day-to-day basis and conclude the same as expeditiously as possible. Supreme Court of India- Dated:February 25, 2011.
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Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are constrained to hold that the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside on the short ground that while deciding the case, the Tribunal has ignored the specific directions issued by this Court, vide order dated 30th August, 2001. It is evident from the impugned order, in particular from paras 15 and 16 that the Tribunal has not appreciated the facts obtaining in the present case in their correct perspective, which has resulted in vitiating its decision on the question of leviability of import duty. Although, from para 14 of the impugned order it is evident that the Tribunal was conscious of the direction of this Court that it was required to first record the correct facts and then in the factual perspective locate and apply the relevant law, yet in the very next paragraph it proceeds to hold that when it is accepted that Notification No. 118/59-Cus. did not exist at the time of clearance of the vessel from the ship yard, the persistent plea that the ship was manufactured in a warehouse located in India and therefore, it attracted 8 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606 9 (2009) 14 SCC 342 excise duty alone need not be considered at all. In our opinion, in light of the decision and directions of this Court in C.A. 1998 of 2000, judicial discipline obliged the Tribunal to examine the entire legal issue after ascertaining the foundational facts, regardless of its earlier view in the matter. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be sustained
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The High Court overlooked that what section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal. ---In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the claimant-respondent but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case. ---In the light of the discussion made above this appeal must succeed.
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the decision of the High Court, permitting the State Govern- ment to continue with the recruitment process, initiated on the basis of the Amendment Rules, 2005 which have been declared by it to be illegal is clearly indefensible. Having clearly held that ““the requirement of ad- herence to the Statutory Regulations framed by the NCTE cannot be left to be determined at the discretion of the authorities of the State Govern- ment and that there was no compelling reason with the State to justify a departure from the Statutory Regulations, any action under illegal rules would be null and void”“, the High Court could not have permitted the State Government to perpetuate an illegality. To say the least, we are equally amazed by the stand of the State Government. Having failed to sustain the Amendment Rules, 2005 before the High Court, it would be improper for the State to go ahead with the recruitments under the said amended Rules which have been declared null and void, particularly when the decision of the High Court on that issue has not been ques- tioned by it. We are of the view that the impugned observation by the High Court would be clearly inimical to the rule of law. While it is trite that Courts can exercise judicial discretion in moulding the relief, however, such discretion cannot be exercised to perpetuate and encour- age an illegality.
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The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence.-Supreme Court Allowed the request.
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The appellant filed a revision before the High Court which was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 420 and 471 of the I.P.C.
Admittedly, the entire amount of Rs.60,000/- involved in the case, has been deposited by the appellant.
The Chief Executive Officer of the Zila Parishad, Beed, has filed an application before this Court in which it is mentioned that since the entire amount has been deposited by the appellant, they have no objection if the sentence under Section 420 of the I.P.C. is compounded. The alleged incident took place 23 years ago and the appellant has already undergone a part of the sentence.
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the complainant. In our considered view, ends of justice would meet if, while upholding the conviction of the appellant, the sentence is reduced to the period already undergone by him. We direct accordingly.
This order is subject to the appellant”“s paying additionally a fine of Rupees One Lakh within six weeks from today. This appeal is disposed of with these observations and directions.
In case the amount of fine, as directed above is not deposited by the appellant, then this order would be of no avail to the appellant and he would have to serve out the remaining period of sentence.
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Order to conduct Trial Expediously- Supreme Court of India-Order Dated 28 Feb 2011
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On the basis of the materials on record, the enquiry officer held the writ petitioner guilty with which the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority agreed. It is well settled that High Court while exercising the power of judicial review from the order of the disciplinary authority do not act as a Court of appeal and appraise evidence. It interferes with the finding of enquiry officer only when the finding is found to be perverse. We are of the opinion that the Division Bench of the High Court erred in setting aside the order of learned Single Judge and quashing the order of compulsory retirement. The finding recorded by the enquiry officer is based on the materials on record and on proper appreciation of evidence which cannot be said to be perverse calling for interference by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-ORDER DATED 28 FEB 2011
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Even assuming, however, that the bus crew ought to have been examined as that would have greatly enhanced the value of the prosecution evidence, but their non-examination case would not mean that the entire prosecution story would fall through as there were several other credible witnesses including an injured one-- The appeal is accordingly dismissed.-Supreme Court of India -Order Dated- 4 Feb 2011.
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SUICIDE NOTE- DEFENCE TOOK BY ACCUSED THAT SUICIDE NOTE WRITTEN BY DECEASED-FAILURE TO REBUT THE PRESUMTION THAT HE HAD CAUSED DOWRY DEATH-APPEAL DISMISSED- In the instant case, evidently, the suicide note, Ext.P-2
purported to have been written by Sarla (deceased) had been taken by appellant as his defence while making his statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the onus was on him to establish his defence by leading sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he has caused the dowry death. The appellant miserably failed to discharge that onus.--SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, DATED- 14/01/2011
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TRANSFER PETITION ALLOWED-CR.P.C-The petitioner has been able to show the
circumstances from which it can be reasonably inferred
that it has become difficult for the witnesses to safely
depose truth because of fear of being haunted by those
against whom they have to depose. The reluctance of the
witnesses to go to the court at Haridwar in spite of
receipt of repeated summons is bound to hamper the
course of justice.
If such a situation is permitted to
continue, it will pave way for anarchy, oppression, etc.,
resulting in breakdown of criminal justice system. In
order to see that the incapacitation of the eye-witnesses
is removed and justice triumphs, it has become
necessary to grant the relief claimed in the instant
petition. On the facts and in the circumstances of the
case this Court is of the opinion that interest of justice
would be served if transfer of the case from Haridwar to
Delhi is ordered.
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Accused caused single blow in quarrel--Converted from Culpable homicide amounting to Culpable homicide not amounting to murder- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- DATED-06/01/2011
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No intention to murder- Section 302 converted into 304 Part-II- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- dated--03/01/2011
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No Intention - as mentioned U/s 300 IPC- considering the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased as opined by Medical Expert- the conviction from Section 302 to Section 323 is altered.- SUPREME COURT OF INDIA- dated--03/01/2011
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BAIL- GRANTED-DELAY IN CONCLUDING THE TRAIL-SUPREME COURT OF INDIA -dated--03/01/2011-
In deciding bail applications an important factor which should certainly be taken into consideration by the Court is the delay in concluding the trial. Often this takes several years, and if the accused is denied bail is ultimately acquitted, who will restore so many years of his life spent in custody? Is Article 21 of the constitution, which is the most basic of all the fundamental rights in our Constitution, not violated in such a case? Of course this is not the only factor, but it is certainly one of the important factors in deciding whether to grant bail.
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Evidence on record - The deceased was subjected to crueltyand harassment by her husband, the appellant herein and the harassment was in connection with the demand of dowry- victim (deceased) died within oneyear and two months of the marriage- to set aside the
conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code but in the facts and circumstances of this case we proceed to convict the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentence him to 9 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.10,000/-
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Dyeing Declaration - All witnesses hostiled - Conviction maintained on the basis of dyeing declaration alone : Supreme Court.
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Question of revival of the repealed clauses of L.R.
Manual in case the substituted clauses are struck down by the court,
would not arise. In view of this, the interim order would amount to
substituting the legal policy by the judicial order, and thus not
sustainable:Supreme Court
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it is now a settled law that a
confessional statement duly recorded by a police officer in a
case related to TADA Act and the rules framed thereunder
would continue to remain admissible for the offences under
any other law which were tried along with TADA offences
under Sections 12 read with Section 15 of the Act
notwithstanding that the accused was acquitted of offences
under the TADA Act in the same trial. But, here is a case
where the allegation was mainly for the offences under the IPC
and some offences under the TADA Act were also incorporated
initially but later on the same were dropped. Consequently,
charges in the said case were framed only for offences under
14
the IPC and not under the TADA Act and the trial is also only
for offences under the IPC and not under the TADA Act.
Therefore, such confessional statement as made by the
respondent no. 4 under the TADA Act, in a different case,
cannot be used or utilised by the prosecution in the present case as the charges were framed only for the offences under
the Indian Penal Code.
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The recovery of blood
stained loan form application bearing name and address of
appellant Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli from the scene of
offence and the serological report which opines the blood to be
of group -O- which is the blood group of the deceased
conclusively establishes the presence of accu sedat the scene of
offence. Even though the panch-witness Vijaybhai has
turned hostile to the prosecution but the spot panchnama has
been cogently and convincingly proved through the testimony
of the Investigating Officer.-conviction maintained
:Supreme Court.
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Held " I. Absence of appellant from duty as Guard Commander for 25
minutes was bona fide and permissible under the statutory rules.
II. Imposition of punishment of punishment drill for 10 days for
the said absence was unwarranted.
III. Protest by the appellant against the imposition of the said
punishment could not warrant enhancement of punishment of the
appellant for confinement in cell for ten days.
IV. Disobedience of the enhanced punishment could not, in this
case, warrant initiation of disciplinary proceedings by the
Commandant concerned against the appellant.
V. The Commandant could not himself become the Judge of his
own cause.
VI. The Commandant could not appoint his own subordinate as the
inquiry officer.
VII. The Commandant could have referred the matter to his superior
officer for appropriate action in terms of Rules 1991.
VIII. Once the Commandant concerned appeared as a witness
himself in the enquiry, he could not pass the order of punishment.
IX. The Authority who initiated the disciplinary proceedings
against the appellant became a witness before the inquiry officer
appointed by him, who is subordinate to him in his office and also
accepted the enquiry report and passed the order of punishment.
Thus, the order of punishment stood vitiated.
X. The Appellate Authority could not consider the past conduct of
the appellant to justify the order of punishment passed by the
disciplinary authority without bringing it to the notice of the appellant.
XI. As the punishment order had been passed in violation of the
statutory rules and the principles of natural justice as well, it is
rendered null and void. Thus, it remained inexecutable.
XII. Past conduct of an employee should not generally be taken into
account to substantiate the quantum of punishment without bringing it
to the notice of the delinquent employee.
XIII. The error of violating the principles of natural justice by the
Disciplinary Authority has been of such a grave nature that under no
circumstance can the past conduct of the appellant, even if not
satisfactory, be taken into consideration.- Supreme Court.
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Remmission of Sentence : Part A and Part B of Punjab Government`s order for remission of sentences discussed- earlier order reviewed - the special
remission of one year under the Government Order dated 14.8.2002 was
available to persons convicted for a term of seven years for the offence
under section 304-B of IPC - Supreme Court.
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Electricity arrears do not constitute a charge over the property.
Therefore in general law, a transferee of a premises cannot be made liable for
the dues of the previous owner/occupier - Supreme Court.
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Abatement to suicide : Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing.
Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate
or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.
The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases
decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person
under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to
commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act
which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and
that act must have been intended to push the deceased into
such a position that he committed suicide - defination of suicide ? - Supreme Court.
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Police Custody Remand : Police remand can only be
made during the first period of remand after arrest
and production before the Magistrate, but not after
the expiry of the said period.- Anupam J. Kulkarni
case [sc] followed : Supreme Court.
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Short Listing Criterea
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Belated apology cannot be
accepted because it has not been given in good faith--Even if it is not belated where apology is without real
contrition and remorse and was merely tendered as a
weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it.
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The National Human Rights Commission had published
`Guidelines for the Administration of Polygraph Test (Lie
Detector Test) on an Accused` in 2000. These guidelines should
be strictly adhered to and similar safeguards should be
adopted for conducting the `Narcoanalysis technique` and the
`Brain Electrical Activation Profile` test. The text of these
guidelines has been reproduced below:
(i) No Lie Detector Tests should be administered except
on the basis of consent of the accused. An option
should be given to the accused whether he wishes
to avail such test.
(ii) If the accused volunteers for a Lie Detector Test, he
should be given access to a lawyer and the physical,
emotional and legal implication of such a test
should be explained to him by the police and his
lawyer.
(iii) The consent should be recorded before a Judicial
Magistrate.
(iv) During the hearing before the Magistrate, the
person alleged to have agreed should be duly
represented by a lawyer.
(v) At the hearing, the person in question should also
be told in clear terms that the statement that is
made shall not be a `confessional` statement to the
Magistrate but will have the status of a statement
made to the police.
(vi) The Magistrate shall consider all factors relating to
the detention including the length of detention and
the nature of the interrogation.
(vii) The actual recording of the Lie Detector Test shall
be done by an independent agency (such as a
hospital) and conducted in the presence of a lawyer.
(viii) A full medical and factual narration of the manner
of the information received must be taken on
record.
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The reserved category candidates "belonging to OBC,
SC/ ST categories" who are selected on merit and placed in
the list of General/Unreserved category candidates can
choose to migrate to the respective reserved category at the
time of allocation of services
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It is not only desirable but imperative that
electronic and news media should also play positive role in
presenting to general public as to what actually transpires during
the course of the hearing and it should not be published in such a
manner so as to get unnecessary publicity for its own paper or news
channel. Such a tendency, which is indeed growing fast, should be
stopped. We are saying so as without knowing the reference in
context of which the questions were put forth by us, were completely
ignored and the same were misquoted which raised unnecessary hue and
cry.
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The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity-- has no jurisdiction to decide --the validity of the Regulations framed by the Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission-- under Section 178 of the
Electricity Act, 2003. The validity of the Regulations may,
however, be challenged by seeking judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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The priciple reteriated that whenever a person complains and claims that there is a violation of any provision of law or a Constitutional provision,it does not automatically involve breach of fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Article 32 of the Constitution is attracted.
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1) The appellate Court has all the necessary powers to re-
evaluate the evidence let in before the trial Court as well
as the conclusions reached. It has a duty to specify the
compelling and substantial reasons in case it reverses
the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court. In the
case on hand, the High Court by adhering to all the
ingredients and by giving cogent and adequate reasons
reversed the order of acquittal.
2) The presence of the accused at the scene of crime is
proved through the ocular testimonies of PWs 1, 2, 6, 20,
23, 24 and 70, corroborated by Ex PW 12/D-I as well as
3 PCR calls Ex PW 11/A, B and C.
3) Phone calls made immediately after an incident to the
police constitutes an FIR only when they are not vague
and cryptic. Calls purely for the reason of getting the
police to the scene of crime do not necessarily constitute
the FIR. In the present case, the phone calls were vague
and therefore could not be registered as the FIR. The FIR
was properly lodged as per the statement of Shyan
Munshi PW-2.
4) Delay in recording the statement of the witnesses do not
necessarily discredit their testimonies. The court may
rely on such testimonies if they are cogent and credible.
5) The laboratory reports in the present case are vague and
ambiguous and, therefore, they cannot be relied upon to
reach any specific conclusion regarding the incident.
6) The evidence regarding the actual incident, the
testimonies of witnesses, the evidence connecting the
vehicles and cartridges to the accused - Manu Sharma,
as well as his conduct after the incident prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court has analyzed
all the evidence and arrived at the correct conclusion.
7) The public prosecutor is under a duty of disclosure under
the Cr.P.C., Bar Council Rules and relevant principles of
common law. Nevertheless, a violation of this duty does
not necessarily vitiate the entire trial. A trial would only
be vitiated if non-disclosure amounts to a material
irregularity and causes irreversible prejudice to the
accused. In the present case, no such prejudice was
caused to the accused, and therefore the trial is not
vitiated.
8) No prejudice had been caused to the right of the accused
to fair trial and non-furnishing of the copy of one of the
ballistic reports had not hampered the ends of justice.
The right of the accused to disclosure has not received
any set back in the facts and circumstances of the case.
9) The High Court has rightly convicted the other two
accused, namely, Amardeep Singh Gill @ Tony Gill and
Vikas Yadav after appreciation of the evidence of PWs 30
and 101.
10) Normally, the judgment/order should be set aside or
affirmed as the case may be but preferably without
offering any undesirable comments, disparaging remarks
or indications which would impinge upon the dignity and
respect of judicial system.
11) Every effort should be made by the print and electronic
media to ensure that the distinction between trial by
media and informative media should always be
maintained. Trial by media should be avoided
particularly, at a stage when the suspect is entitled to the
constitutional protections. Invasion of his rights is
bound to be held as impermissible : Supreme Court.
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Sections 147, 148, 341, 504,506, 324, 326 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code-- The Trial Court did not find the Appellants guilty of the aforesaid offences and hence they were acquitted—High Reversed the Order and sentenced U/s-- Section 326 of the I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- each and simple imprisonment.
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Indian Penal Code 306 IPC-- Appellant was convicted by the Assistant Sessions Judge, under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code-- High Court upheld the judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge—the sentence of rigorous imprisonment of 10 years was reduced to 5 years- the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained –Appeal Allowed
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Section 148, 302, 324, 323-IPC-Substantial part of the prosecution story has been disbelieved--Conviction of the appellant rests
solely on the testimony of (PW-2) who does not seem to
have particular respect for truth as observed by the trial
court. --High Court assumed that he had received injuries in the same occurrence in which deceased was killed--set aside the judgments of the High Court and the trial
court and acquit him of the charges under sections 302 & 324
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Indian Penal Code,1860 -Section 304 Part II-Bail Bond cancelled- It is well settled that in a case where the Trial
Court has recorded acquittal, the Appellate Court should be
slow in interfering with the judgment of acquittal. On
evaluation of the evidence, if the two views are possible,
the Appellate Court should not substitute its own view and
discard the judgment of the Trial Court. But, in the instant
case, the High Court clearly came to the conclusion that the
entire approach of the Trial Court cannot be sustained both
on the law and the facts.
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Dowry death-Harassment for dowry by In-laws of the deceased on various occasions-Deceased sent to her fathers home to arrange dowry about 10 days before the occurrence-Deceased returned to her matrimonial home on request of the accused persons-Deceased found dead under suspicious circumstances and cremated hurriedly
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Suit for partition-Defendant claiming through gift deed-
Plaintiff alleging the document to have been brought fraudulently-Suit decreed by trial court-Execution of gift deed disbelieved-Defendant`s appeal allowed- High Court dismissed plaintiff`s second appeal holding that there was no specific denial by plaintiff and the proviso to Section 68 would apply
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Death of a woman in her matrimonial house after three years of marriage-Death found to be not under ordinary circumstances-Husband and other close relatives tried under Sections 304-B, 498-A and 306 IPC-Presumption of law under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act
drawn-All the accused convicted of all the offences charged- Appeal filed by accused in the High Court against conviction and sentence
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In appeal appeal the High Court acquitted the respondent, holding that the
prosecutrix was not proved beyond reasonable doubt to be below 16 years of
age, that though the factum of respondent having committed sexual
intercourse was proved, but the absence of injuries on the person of the
prosecutrix infers the possibility of the prosecutrix being the con-senting
party to the act, that the delay in lodging FIR was not satisfactorily
explained, and that the delay coupled with non-examination renders
the prosecution case doubtful.
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Recruitment-Post of Lecturer-Order of Vice Chancellor declining to accord approval to appellant`s selection-Re-advertisement of the post- Appellant appeared before Selection Committee without any protest-Whether appellant could challenge earlier order of Vice Chancel-lor-Held, no-She was estopped by her conduct --Service Law
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This court cannot sit in judgment over
whether investigations should be launched against politicians
for alleged acts of corruption. The Supreme Court of India
functions as a Constitutional Court as well as the highest
appellate court in the country. If the Supreme Court gives
direction for prosecution, it would cause serious prejudice to
the accused, as the direction of this Court may have far
reaching persuasive effect on the Court which may ultimately
try the accused. It is always open to the petitioners to
approach the investigative agencies directly with the
incriminating materials and it is for the investigative agencies
to decide on the further course of action: Supreme Court
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As the appellant has established breach by the respondents, the award of Rs. 1,000 as damages for breach by the trial court is also upheld. As a consequence of the finding that the breach is on the part of the respondents and not on the appellant, the trial court was justified in giving a declaration that the respondents were not entitled to recover any extra cost involved in getting the work completed from the appellant. But it could not have granted the further relief of directing the respondents to refund the security deposit amount and retention deposit amount, as the appellant had neither quantified the said security deposit/retention deposit nor paid court fee thereon. Therefore, the decree granted by the trial court, to the extent it directs refund of the security deposit and retention amount, cannot be sustained.
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Whether the High Court, in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of
Investigation established under
the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 , to investigate a
cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place
within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without
the consent of the State Government ? -Yes. : Constitution Bench Supreme Court.
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Death Penalty when to be awarded : Supreme Court
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"Section 304-B merely
raises a presumption of dowry death and lays
down that the minimum sentence should be 7
years, but it may extend to imprisonment for
life. Therefore, awarding the extreme punishment
of imprisonment for life should be used in rare
cases and not in every case." -Three Judge Bench verdict
of SC in the case of Hemchand v. State of
Haryana followed : Supreme Court
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The benefit must always go to the accused and not to the
prosecution. If the prosecution wants to prove the fact, the same must be
proved by leading evidence, which is reliable and trustworthy, which
pinpoints and conclusively proves the guilt of the accused. This is not a case
where we can safely hold that the evidence led was trustworthy and
conclusively establishes that it is the accused only, who had committed the
offence. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case we are
not inclined to interfere with the order of acquittal: Supreme Court.
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The insurance companies in genuine and bona fide claims
of the insurers should not adopt the attitude of avoiding
payments on one pretext or the other.This attitude puts a serious question mark on their credibility and trustworthiness of the insurance companies. Incidentally by adopting honest approach and attitude the insurance companies would be able to save enormous litigation costs and the interest liability: Supreme Court.
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one of the grounds for cancellation of bail would be where
material evidence brought on record have been ignored and that too
without any reasons : Supreme Court
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. A Deputy General Manger is not a person who is responsible to the
company for the conduct of the business of the company. He does not fall
under any of the categories (a) to (g) listed in section 5 of the Companies
Act . He cannot be
made vicariously liable under Section 141(1) of the Act. If he has to be
made liable under Section 141(2), the necessary averments relating to
consent/connivance/negligence should have been made: Supereme Court
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No common object and not a member of unlawfull assembly-acquittal restored:Supereme Court
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Since the High Court had not kept the relevant parameters in view,
while granting bail, order of bail set aside : Supreme Court
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Non Compliance of section 50 and non examination of two recovery witness ruled fatal for prosecution, order of acquittal confirmed : Supereme Court
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As already undergone two years of imprisonment as well appeal may not heard in the near future- Intriem Bail Granted : Supereme Court
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The inherent powers can be exercised in those exceptional cases where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if are taken on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused : Supereme Court
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Transfusing wrong blood group to the patient which caused death , Mismatching of blood confirmed by the Senior Resident Doctor,Held a case of serious negligence by PGI and attending doctors, the order of state commision confirmed : Supereme Court
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Query Posted by
manoreet kaur
from
Sri Ganganagar
,rajasthan
on
19-Sep-2010
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Field-Criminal laws
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QUERY-
my parents are lawyer.any client of them logged FIR against them u/s 467,468,420,120-b,sc-st act. all these blaims are totally false now we are very tense.how can they take anticipateri bail.please answered as soon as possible.
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Posted on
1/23/2011 7:53:00 AM
by
ronak
karanpuria
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Query Status- REPLIED |
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OPINION -yeah as the possible accusation are non bailable. you can ask the magistrate for anticipatory bail. 467,468,420 IPC-means they had made some document which is false or forged for the purpose of cheating,fraud.sec-120b is for the purpose of criminal conspiracy
Give
your Legal Opinion
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Query Posted by
Anand
from
Raipur (M.P)
,Chattisgarh
on
29-Nov-2010
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Field-Criminal laws
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QUERY-
Hi, thanks for a nice forum, my father was involved in an accident case and it is under civil court, is it legal for me to ask the opposite party for a compromise by providing a financial compensation ?
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Posted on
1/23/2011 7:43:00 AM
by
ronak
karanpuria
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Query Status- REPLIED |
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OPINION -yeah if your father is charged under sec-279 IPC then such an accused can get bail and charged by less fine.
Give
your Legal Opinion
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Query Posted by
Umesh Pandey
from
Mumbai
,
on
02-Dec-2010
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Field-Criminal laws
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QUERY-
my brother has been implicated under section 364A and he has been named as accused no 3. We are trying to get bail for him. Is bail possible for this offence. Can you please suggest some earlier bail judgements which were successful.
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Posted on
1/23/2011 7:37:00 AM
by
ronak
karanpuria
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Query Status- REPLIED |
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OPINION -no under 364a bail is not possible.it is non bailable offence. although you must arrange some laywer before it is too late.
Give
your Legal Opinion
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Query Posted by
Umesh Pandey
from
Mumbai
,
on
02-Dec-2010
|
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Field-Criminal laws
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QUERY-
my brother has been implicated under section 364A and he has been named as accused no 3. We are trying to get bail for him. Is bail possible for this offence. Can you please suggest some earlier bail judgements which were successful.
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Posted on
1/9/2011 7:37:00 PM
by
Rakesh
Kapoor
|
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Query Status- REPLIED |
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OPINION -Dear Umesh Pandey, contents of FIR and role of accused person as specified in police papers is not provided by you. Without documents no opinion can be given
Give
your Legal Opinion
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Query Posted by
Umesh Pandey
from
Mumbai
,
on
02-Dec-2010
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Field-Criminal laws
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QUERY-
my brother has been implicated under section 364A and he has been named as accused no 3. We are trying to get bail for him. Is bail possible for this offence. Can you please suggest some earlier bail judgements which were successful.
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Posted on
1/30/2011 8:04:00 PM
by
Ajay
Bhullar
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Query Status- REPLIED |
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OPINION -No dear offence under sec.364A is non bailable offence but in some cases facs mattter , so it upon ur advocate how he interpret it
Give
your Legal Opinion
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Posted on: |
31-Jan-2012
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Query Posted by: |
sumit jidani
,
Delhi
,
Delhi-NCR
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Field:
|
Criminal laws
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QUERY |
is anticipatory bail provison just like delhi is available in haryana state district courts.
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Query Replied by: |
Rakesh Kapoor Advocate
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EXPERT OPINION |
Dear Sumit Jidani,
The provisions of Anticipatory bail is applicable in same manner through out states except specifically exempted. Yes provisions are same for Delhi and Haryana.
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Posted on: |
28-Jan-2012
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Query Posted by: |
kishna
,
Patna
,
bihar
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Field:
|
Criminal laws
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QUERY |
iad taken oan from apperson and retuned hisall ammont with interes h had gven loan from beerer cheques,but after payent hedidnot reurned my chequs and produced them to his acount after boncing tem he loged afals fir that he has given money toeposite in nsrnse company but i cheated him i have his hand writen peyment reciving statement.twoothe accused otanticipty bail in same case can i get anticipetory bail.there is warrantagainst me
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Query Replied by: |
Rakesh Kapoor Advocate
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EXPERT OPINION |
Dear Krishna,
The offence you talked about comes under sec 138 NI Act which is bailable one. So you may claim bail as a matter of right.
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Posted on: |
14-Dec-2010
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Query Posted by: |
anita chauhan
,
Noida
,
u.p
|
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Field:
|
Judicial Exams
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QUERY |
i wants to know the what are the other legal exams in 2011 plz rpl sir
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Query Replied by: |
Rakesh Kapoor Advocate
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EXPERT OPINION |
Dear Anita Chauhan,
Whenever any notification is published, it will be displayed on website.
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Posted on: |
02-Dec-2010
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|
Query Posted by: |
Umesh Pandey
,
Mumbai
,
|
|
Field:
|
Criminal laws
|
|
QUERY |
my brother has been implicated under section 364A and he has been named as accused no 3. We are trying to get bail for him. Is bail possible for this offence. Can you please suggest some earlier bail judgements which were successful.
|
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Query Replied by: |
Rakesh Kapoor Advocate
|
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EXPERT OPINION |
Dear Umesh Pandey, contents of FIR and role of accused person as specified in police papers is not provided by you. Without documents no opinion can be given.
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Posted on: |
29-Nov-2010
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Query Posted by: |
Anand
,
Raipur (M.P)
,
Chattisgarh
|
|
Field:
|
Criminal laws
|
|
QUERY |
Hi, thanks for a nice forum, my father was involved in an accident case and it is under civil court, is it legal for me to ask the opposite party for a compromise by providing a financial compensation ?
|
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Query Replied by: |
Rakesh Kapoor Advocate
|
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EXPERT OPINION |
Dear Anand, Please send brief facts and stage of case.
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Aplicability of section 138 Negotiable Instruement Act
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"Suspension of Sentence and Grant of Bail under section 389 Criminal Procedure Code & Wheather Rule is Bail or Jail"
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